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Advances in information technology have created radically new business mod-
els, most notably the integration of advertising with keyword-based targeting, or
“keyword advertising.” Keyword advertising has two main variations: advertising
based on keywords employed by users in search engines, often known as “sponsored
links,” and advertising based on keywords embedded in the content users view, often
known as “contextual advertising.” Keyword advertising providers such as Google
and Yahoo! use auctions to allocate advertising slots. This dissertation examines the
design of keyword auctions. It consists of three essays.
The first essay “Ex-Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions” fo-
cuses on how to incorporate available information into auction design. In our keyword
auction model, advertisers bid their willingness-to-pay per click on their advertise-
ments, and the advertising provider can weigh advertisers’ bids differently and require
different minimum bids based on advertisers’ click-generating potential. We study the
impact and design of such weighting schemes and minimum-bids policies. We find
that weighting scheme determines how advertisers with different click-generating po-
tential match in equilibrium. Minimum bids exclude low-valuation advertisers and at
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the same time may distort the equilibrium matching. The efficient design of keyword
auctions requires weighting advertisers’ bids by their expected click-through-rates,
and requires the same minimum weighted bids. The revenue-maximizing weighting
scheme may or may not favor advertisers with low click-generating potential. The
revenue-maximizing minimum-bid policy differs from those prescribed in the standard
auction design literature. Keyword auctions that employ the revenue-maximizing
weighting scheme and differentiated minimum bid policy can generate higher revenue
than standard fixed-payment auctions.
The dynamics of bidders’ performance is examined in the second essay, “Key-
word Auctions, Unit-price Contracts, and the Role of Commitment.” We extend
earlier static models by allowing bidders with lower performance levels to improve
their performance at a certain cost. We examine the impact of the weighting scheme
on overall bidder performance, the auction efficiency, and the auctioneer’s revenue,
and derive the revenue-maximizing and efficient policy accordingly. Moreover, the
possible upgrade in bidders’ performance levels gives the auctioneer an incentive to
modify the auction rules over time, as is confirmed by the practice of Yahoo! and
Google. We thus compare the auctioneer’s revenue-maximizing policies when she is
fully committed to the auction rule and when not, and show that she should give less
preferential treatment to low-performance advertisers when she is fully committed.
In the third essay, “How to Slice the Pie? Optimal Share Structure Design
in Keyword Auctions,” we study the design of share structures in keyword auctions.
Auctions for keyword advertising resources can be viewed as share auctions in which
the highest bidder gets the largest share, the second highest bidder gets the second
largest share, and so on. A share structure problem arises in such a setting regarding
how much resources to set aside for the highest bidder, for the second highest bidder,
v
etc. We address this problem under a general specification and derive implications on
how the optimal share structure should change with bidders’ price elasticity of demand
for exposure, their valuation distribution, total resources, and minimum bids.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction to Keyword Advertising and
Keyword Auctions
1.1 Introduction
Keyword advertising is a form of targeted online advertising. A basic variation
of keyword advertising is “sponsored links” (also known as “sponsored results” and
“sponsored search”) on search engines. Sponsored links are advertisements triggered
by search phrases entered by Internet users on search engines. For example, a search
for “laptop” on Google will bring about both the regular search results and adver-
tisements from laptop makers and sellers. Figure 1.1 shows such a search-result page
with sponsored links at the top and on the side of the page. Another variation of
keyword advertising is “contextual advertising” on content pages. Unlike sponsored
links, contextual advertisements are triggered by certain keywords in the content.
For example, a news article about “Cisco” is likely to be displayed with contextual
advertisements from Cisco network equipment sellers and Cisco training providers.
Both sponsored links and contextual advertisements can target users who are
most likely interested in seeing the advertisements. Because of its superior targeting
ability, keyword advertising has quickly gained popularity among marketers, and has
become a leading form of online advertising. According to a report by Interactive
Advertising Bureau and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008), keyword advertising in the
United States reached $8.5 billion in total revenue in 2007. eMarketer (2007) predicts
the market for online advertising will rise from $16.9 billion in 2006 to $42 billion in
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Figure 1.1: Search-based Keyword Advertising
2011, with keyword advertising accounting for about 40% of the total revenue.
A typical keyword advertising market consists of advertisers and publishers
(i.e., websites), with keyword advertising providers in between. There are three
key keyword advertising providers in the U.S. keyword advertising market: Google,
Yahoo!, and MSN adCenter. Next we use Google’s practice to illustrate keyword-
advertising business models.
Google has two main advertising programs, Adwords and AdSense. Adwords
is Google’s flagship advertising program that interfaces with advertisers. Through
Adwords, advertisers can submit ads, choose keywords relevant to their businesses,
and pay for the cost of their advertising campaigns. Adwords has separate programs
for sponsored search (Adwords for search) and for contextual advertising (Adwords
for content). In each case, advertisers can choose to place their ads on Google’s site
only or on publishers’ sites that are part of Google’s advertising network. Advertisers
can also choose to display text, image, or, more recently, video advertisements.
AdSense is another Google advertising program that interfaces with publishers.
Publishers from personal blogs to large portals such as CNN.com can participate in
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Google’s AdSense program to monetize the traffic to their websites. By signing up
with AdSense, publishers agree to publish ads and receive payments from Google.
Publishers may choose to display text, image, and video advertisements on their sites.
They receive payments from Google on either a per-click or per-thousand-impressions
basis. AdSense has become the single most important revenue source for many Web
2.0 companies.
Keyword advertising providers use auctions to sell their keyword advertising
slots to advertisers. The design of such auctions is the focus of this dissertation. A
basic form of keyword auction is as follows. Advertisers choose their willingness-to-
pay for a keyword phrase either on a per-click (pay-per-click) or on per-impression
(pay-per-impression) basis. An automated program ranks advertisers and assigns
them to available slots whenever a user searches for the keyword or browses a content
page deemed relevant to the keyword. The ranking may be based on advertisers’
pay-per-click/pay-per-impression only. It may also include other information, such
as their historical click-through-rate (CTR), namely the ratio of the number of clicks
on the ad to the number of times the ad is displayed. Almost all major keyword
advertising providers use automated bidding systems, but they specific designs differ
from each other and change over time.
1.2 A Historical Look at Keyword Auctions
Keyword advertising and keyword auctions were born out of practice. They
were fashioned to replace the earlier, less efficient market mechanisms and are still
being shaped by the accumulative experiences of the keyword advertising industry. In
this subsection, we chronicle the design of keyword advertising markets and keyword
auctions, and show how they evolved.
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1.2.1 Early Internet Advertising Contracts
In early online advertising, advertising space was sold through advance con-
tracts. These contracts were negotiated on a case-by-case basis. As such negotiations
were time-consuming, advertising sales were limited to large advertisers (for example,
those paying at least a few thousand dollars per month). These advertising contracts
were typically priced in terms of the number of thousand-page-impressions (cost-per-
mille, or CPM). CPM pricing was borrowed directly from off-line advertising, such
as TV, radio, and print, where advertising costs are measured on a CPM basis. The
problem with CPM pricing is that it provides no indication as to whether users have
paid attention to the advertisement. Advertisers may be concerned that their adver-
tisements are pushed to web users without necessarily generating any impact. The
lack of accountability is reflected in the saying among marketing professionals: “Half
the money spent on advertising is wasted and you don’t even know which half.”
1.2.2 Keyword Auctions by GoTo.com
In 1998, a startup company called GoTo.com demonstrated a new proof-of-
concept search engine at a technology conference in Monterey, California. At that
time, all other search engines sorted search results based purely on algorithm-assessed
relevancy. GoTo.com, on the other hand, devised a plan to let advertisers bid on top
positions of the search result. Specifically, advertisers can submit their advertisements
on chosen words or phrases (“search terms”) together with their pay-per-click on these
advertisements. Once the submitted advertisements are validated by GoTo.com’s
editorial team, they will appear as a search result. The highest advertiser will appear
at the top of the result list; the second-highest advertiser will appear at the second
place of the result list, and so on. Each time a user clicks on an advertisement, the
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advertiser will be billed the amount of the bid.
GoTo.com’s advertising model contains several key innovations. First, adver-
tising based on user-entered search terms represents a new form of targeted advertising
that is based on users’ behavior. For example, a user who searches “laptop” is highly
likely in the process of buying a laptop. Keyword-based search engine advertising
opens a new era of behavioral targeted advertising.
Second, by billing advertisers only when users click on the advertisements,
GoTo.com provides a partial solution to a longstanding issue of lack of accountability.
Clicking on an advertisement indicates online users’ interests. Therefore, pay-per-click
represents a significant step toward more accountable advertising. The ability to track
behaviorial outcomes such as clicks is a crucial difference between online advertising
and its off-line counterparts. The act of clicking on an advertisement provides an
important clue on advertising effectiveness. Accumulated information on clicking
behavior can be further used to fine-tune advertisement placement and content. In
such a sense, pay-per-click is a significant leap from the CPM scheme and signifies
the huge potential of online advertising.
Finally, the practice of using auctions to sell advertising slots on a continuous,
real-time basis is another innovation. These real-time auctions allow advertisements
to go online a few minutes after a successful bidding. As there is no pre-set minimum
spending, auction-based advertising has the advantage of tapping into the “long tail”
of the advertising market, that is, advertisers who have small spending budgets and
are more likely to “do-it-yourself.”
GoTo.com was re-branded as Overture Services in 2001 and acquired by Yahoo!
in 2003. During the process, however, the auction mechanism and the pay-per-click
pricing scheme remained largely unchanged.
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1.2.3 Subsequent Innovations by Google
Google, among others, made several key innovations to the keyword advertising
business model. Some of these have become standard features of today’s keyword
advertising. In the following, we briefly review these innovations.
Content vs. Advertising. The initial design by GoTo.com features a “paid
placement” model: paid advertising links are mixed with organic search results so
that users cannot tell whether a link is paid for. Google, when introducing its own
keyword advertising in 1998, promoted a “sponsored link” model that distinguished
advertisements from organic search results. In Google’s design, advertisements are
displayed on the side or on top of the result page with a label “sponsored links.”
Google’s practice has been welcomed by the industry and policy-makers and has now
become standard practice.
Allocation Rules. Google introduced a new allocation rule in 2002 in its
“Adwords Select” program in which listings are ranked not only by bid amount, but
also by CTR (later termed as “quality score”). Under such a ranking rule, paying
a high price alone cannot guarantee a high position. An advertiser with a low CTR
will get a lower position than advertisers who bid the same (or slightly lower) but
have higher CTRs. In 2006, Google revised its quality score calculation to include not
only advertisers’ past CTRs but also the quality of their landing pages. Advertisers
with low quality scores are required to pay a high minimum bid or they will become
inactive.
Google’s approach to allocation gradually gained acceptance. At the beginning
of 2007, Yahoo! conducted a major overhaul of its online advertising platform that
considers both the CTRs of an advertisement and other undisclosed factors. Microsoft
adCenter, which came into use only at the beginning of 2006, used a ranking rule
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similar to Google’s Adwords. Before that, all of the advertisements displayed on the
MSN search engine were supplied by Yahoo!.
Payment Rules. In the keyword auctions used by GoTo.com, bidders pay
the amount of their bids. This way, any decrease in one’s bid will result in less pay-
ment. As a result, bidders have incentives to monitor the next highest bids and make
sure their own bids are only slightly higher. The benefits from constantly adjusting
one’s bid create undesirable volatility in the bidding process. Perhaps as a remedy,
Google used a different payment rule in their Adwords Select program. In Adwords
Select, bidders do not pay the full amount of their bids. Instead, they pay the lowest
possible to remain above the next highest competitor. If the next highest competitor’s
bid drops, Google automatically adjusts the advertiser’s payment downward. This
feature, termed as “Adwords Discounter,” is essentially an implementation of second-
price auctions in a dynamic context. One key advantage of such an arrangement is
that bidders’ payments are no longer directly linked to their bids. This reduces bid-
ders’ incentive to game the system. Recognizing this advantage, Yahoo! (Overture)
also switched to a similar payment rule.
Pricing Schemes. As of now, Google’s Adwords for search offers only pay-
per-click advertising. On the other hand, Adwords for content allows advertisers to
bid either pay-per-click or pay-per-thousand-impression. Starting spring 2007, Google
began beta-testing a new billing metric called pay-per-action with their Adwords for
content. Under pay-per-action metric, advertisers pay only for completed actions of
choice, such as a lead, a sale, or a page view, after a user has followed through the
advertisement to the publisher’s website.
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1.2.4 Beyond Search Engine Advertising
The idea of using keywords to place most relevant advertisements is not lim-
ited to search engine advertising. In 2003, Google introduced an “AdSense” program
that allows web publishers to generate advertising revenue by receiving advertise-
ments served by Google. AdSense analyzes publishers’ web pages to generate a list of
most relevant keywords, which are subsequently used to select the most appropriate
advertisements for these pages. The order of advertisements supplied to a page is
determined by Adwords auctions. The proceeds of these advertisements are shared
between Google and web publishers. Yahoo! has a similar program called Yahoo!
Publisher Network.
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Chapter 2
Ex-Ante Information and the Design of Keyword
Auctions
2.1 Introduction
Keyword advertising is distinguished from offline advertising and other online
advertising because it delivers the most relevant advertisement to Internet users,
yet in less intrusive ways. The effectiveness of this type of advertising has been
demonstrated in its acceptance among marketers. The leading provider of keyword
advertising, Google, increased its total revenue 39-fold between 2002 and 2007 to
$16.6 billion, mostly from keyword advertising. Keyword advertising has consistently
accounted for about 40 percent of the total online advertising revenue in the last few
years and will remain the biggest form of online advertising for years to come. It is
expected to reach about $16.8 billion by 2011 (eMarketer 2007).
Keyword advertising is undoubtedly enabled by new information technolo-
gies. One of the key differences between keyword advertising and traditional forms
of advertising such as radio and TV is that keyword advertising providers, with the
help of information technology, can better track outcomes of advertisements including
how many Internet users click on them and the number that end up making a pur-
chase. The ability to track such outcomes not only allows marketers to better account
for their advertising campaigns, but also shapes the design of keyword auctions—a
novel mechanism that keyword advertising providers such as Google, Yahoo!, and
MSN use to allocate advertising slots. First, it enables outcome-based pricing (or
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pay-for-performance), including the now standard “pay-per-click,” in which adver-
tisers pay only when Internet users click on their advertisements, and new variants
such as “pay-per-call” (advertisers pay each time an Internet user contacts the ad-
vertiser) and “pay-per-purchase” (advertisers pay each time an Internet user follows
the advertisement to make a purchase). Second, it allows advertising providers to
gather information on advertisers’ potential to generate outcomes. For example, in
pay-per-click advertising, advertising providers typically accumulate information on
advertisers’ click-through rates (CTRs)— the number of clicks on an advertisement
divided by the number of times displayed—which can be used to infer advertisers’
click-generating potential. This paper examines how such information—the ex-ante
information on advertisers’ potential to generate outcomes—should be integrated into
the design of keyword auctions that use outcome-based pricing.
The ex-ante information on advertisers’ outcome-generating potential has been
gradually integrated into keyword auction designs in terms of ranking rules and
minimum-bid policies. The initial keyword auctions, as introduced by Overture (now
a subsidiary of Yahoo!), rank advertisers solely by their willingness-to-pay per click
(henceforth unit price), thus making no use of information on advertisers’ click-
generating potential. In 2002, Google used such information for the first time by
ranking advertisers by the product of unit prices they bid and their historical CTRs
so that, everything else being equal, an advertiser with a higher CTR will get a better
slot. Later, Google extended the ranking factor from CTRs to a more comprehensive
“Quality Score” that also takes into account the quality of the advertisement text and
other unannounced relevance factors. Yahoo! adopted a similar ranking rule in its
new advertising platform. Recently, advertising providers have begun to make min-
imum bids depend on advertisers’ click-generating potential. For example, Google
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recently switched from a one-size-fits-all minimum-bid policy to one that requires
higher minimum bids for advertisers with low CTRs. These novel designs raise many
questions. For example, what is the impact of the weighted ranking rules and dif-
ferentiated minimum-bid policies on advertisers’ equilibrium bidding behavior? How
should advertising providers rank advertisers with different CTRs and set minimum
bids for them? The goal of this paper is to address these issues.
We address the above issues by studying a model of keyword auctions. In this
model, advertisers bid unit prices; the advertising provider not only receives unit-price
bids from advertisers but also takes into account the information on the advertisers’
click-generating potential. Such information allows the advertising provider to differ-
entiate advertisers with high expected CTRs (h-type) from those with low expected
CTRs (l-type). Advertisers, on the other hand, cannot tell another advertiser’s CTR-
type or valuation-per-click. The advertising provider can assign different weighting
factors and impose different minimum bids for advertisers with high and low expected
CTRs. Using such a framework, we study how weighting schemes and differentiated
minimum-bid policies affect advertisers’ equilibrium bidding and how to design such
keyword auctions in terms of choosing weighting factors and minimum bids for ad-
vertisers with different expected CTRs. Such design issues depart from those in
standard auctions where no similar information exists. Our focus on design issues
also differentiates our study from studies that focus on equilibrium analysis under
given auction rules, such as Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007). More impor-
tantly, how to best design weighting schemes and minimum-bid policies is important
to the performance of keyword advertising platforms used by search engines.
We study the design of weighting schemes and minimum-bid policies from
two perspectives: one that maximizes total expected valuation created (the efficient
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design) and one that maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue (the revenue-
maximizing design). The efficient design maximizes the “total pie.” Such a design is
most relevant at the developing stage of the keyword advertising market in which ad-
vertising providers are likely to attract advertisers by passing much of the valuation
created to them. As the keyword advertising market becomes mature and market
shares stabilize, advertising providers will more likely focus on profitability, thereby
adopting a revenue-maximizing design.
Our study generates several important insights. We demonstrate that weight-
ing schemes and differentiated minimum bid policies have a significant impact on
equilibrium bidding. The weighting scheme determines how advertisers with differ-
ent expected CTRs match in equilibrium—an advertiser with a low weighting factor
compensates by bidding higher (than one with the same valuation-per-click but a
higher weighting factor). Minimum bids exclude low-valuation advertisers and, when
not equally constraining, can distort the equilibrium matching: some of the less-
constrained advertisers will choose not to compete with their more-constrained com-
petitors by bidding low. Despite these nontrivial equilibrium features, the efficient
keyword auction design is remarkably simple: it weights advertisers’ unit-price bids
with their expected CTRs and requires the same minimum weighted score. This im-
plies that one should rank advertisers as if they bid their true valuation, and set higher
minimum bids for advertisers with lower expected CTRs. The revenue-maximizing de-
sign may generate higher revenue than standard fixed-payment auctions, but requires
fine balancing between low- and high-CTR advertisers based on their expected CTRs
and valuation-per-click distributions. Relative to the efficient weighting scheme, the
revenue-maximizing weighting scheme may favor low- or high-CTR advertisers. In
choosing revenue-maximizing minimum bids, advertising providers should consider
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the effect of excluding low-valuation advertisers as well as that of distorted alloca-
tions among advertisers with different expected CTRs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss the re-
lated literature. In section 2.3 we lay out our research model. We examine weighting
scheme design and differentiated minimum bids design in sections 2.4 and 2.5, respec-
tively. We compare keyword auctions to standard fixed-payment auctions in section
2.6. Section 2.7 discusses some extensions, and section 2.8 concludes the paper.
2.2 Related Literature
How auctioneers should use available information has been an important area
of investigation in the auction literature. The early literature focuses on ex-post in-
formation. Riley (1988) finds that in common-value auctions, such as drilling-right
auctions, auctioneers can increase their revenue by tying winners’ payment with the
ex-post information on the item’s value. McAfee and McMillan (1986) demonstrate
that in procurement auctions, making contractors’ (bidders’) payment partially de-
pend on their ex-post realized costs can reduce the buyer’s procurement costs. This
paper focuses on how auctioneers can use ex-ante information on bidders’ outcome-
generating potential.
This research is most related to research on “scoring auctions,” or auctions in
which bidders are ranked by a score that summarizes multiple underlying attributes.
Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008) study a form of scoring auction used in
procurement settings, in which the score is a function of suppliers’ non-price attributes
(e.g., quality and time-to-completion) minus the price they ask. Ewerhart and Fieseler
(2003) study another form of scoring auction, in which a score is a weighted sum of
unit-price bids for each input factor (e.g., labor and materials). All three papers
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show that scoring auctions, though inefficient, can generate higher revenues than
efficient mechanisms such as fixed-payment first-price auctions. Keyword auctions in
this paper are different from the above scoring auctions in auction rules, equilibrium
bidding behavior, and application settings. For example, we study a multiplicative
scoring rule that is different from other scoring auctions. The difference in scoring
rules also leads to different equilibrium features (e.g., kinks and jumps in our setting).
Another important difference is that equilibrium bidding in other scoring auctions
is determined by a single parameter, whereas in our paper, equilibrium bidding is
determined both by advertisers’ valuation-per-click and by their CTR signals. Besides
scoring rules, we study differentiated minimum bid policies, which are not discussed
in the aforementioned literature.
This paper is closely related to previous studies on ranking rules in keyword
auctions. Recall that one approach ranks advertisers only by their unit prices, whereas
the other approach ranks advertisers using the product of their unit prices and his-
torical CTRs. Liu and Chen (2006) and Lahaie (2006) study the equilibrium bidding
under the two approaches and show that the latter approach is efficient and that the
revenues generated by the two approaches are ambiguously ranked. Liu and Chen
(2006) study the revenue-maximizing design under a more general class of ranking
rules with ranking-by-price and ranking-by-price×CTR as two special cases. They
show that neither ranking-by-price nor ranking-by-price×CTR is revenue-maximizing.
We extend Liu and Chen (2006) in several ways. First, this paper considers a gen-
eral multi-slot setting, while Liu and Chen (2006) assume a single slot. Second, this
paper allows valuation-per-click to be correlated with CTR signals. Third, for the
first time in the literature, this paper studies the use of differentiated minimum bids,
together with the weighted ranking rule, as a way of exploiting ex-ante information
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on advertisers.
Several authors have looked at keyword auctions from different perspectives.
Following the “auction of contracts” literature (McAfee and McMillan 1986; Samuel-
son 1986), a few authors (e.g., Sundararajan 2006) study whether advertisers should
pay a fixed payment, a contingent payment, or a combination of the two. Weber
and Zheng (2007) study a model of paid referrals in which firms can offer a “bribe”
to the search engine in exchange for a higher position. They show that the revenue-
maximizing design is a weighted average of the “bribe” and the quality of the product
offered by each firm. Feng (2007) studies the optimal allocation of multiple slots when
buyers’ valuation of slots decreases at different speeds. Edelman et al. (2007) and
Varian (2007) examine equilibria of auctions with a “generalized second price (GSP)”
payment rule, that is, that winners pay only the lowest price that keeps their po-
sitions. They study GSP auctions under a complete-information setting (that is,
advertisers know each others’ valuation for slots).1 Edelman et al. (2007) show that
GSP auctions under a complete-information setting do not have a dominant-strategy
equilibrium, and advertisers will not bid their true valuation. Both Edelman et al.
(2007) and Varian (2007) show that GSP auctions admit a range of stable equilibria,
and the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue under the GSP rule is at least as high as
that under the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. While their characterization of the
equilibria under the GSP rule applies to both the rank-by-price case and the rank-by-
price×CTR case, they do not study what ranking rules advertising providers should
choose, nor do they study optimal minimum-bid policies. This paper complements
theirs by examining how ranking rules and minimum-bid policies affect equilibrium
1Edelman et al. (2007) also study a related “generalized English auction” where advertisers do
not have complete information on others’ valuation but can observe their previous bids.
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bidding and how advertising providers should design such auction dimensions. Also,
different from Edelman el al. (2007) and Varian (2007), we model keyword auc-
tions as an incomplete-information game (i.e., advertisers only know a distribution of
other advertisers’ valuation and click-generating abilities). The real-world keyword
auctions may lie between complete-information and incomplete-information. For ex-
ample, Google does not publish advertisers’ bids while Yahoo! does with measures
that prevent large-scale automatic harvesting of such information. In either case, ad-
vertisers may not know at every minute how much other advertisers value the slots.
2.3 Model Setup
We consider a problem of assigning m advertising slots associated with a key-
word to n (n ≥ m) risk-neutral advertisers. Each advertiser has one advertisement
for the keyword and can use only one slot. The number of clicks an advertisement can
attract depends both on the quality of the advertisement and on the prominence of
the slot the advertisement is assigned to. The quality of an advertisement is consid-
ered an attribute of the advertisement and may be determined by the relevance of the
advertisement to the keyword, the attractiveness of the advertised product or service,
and how well the advertisement is written. For example, for the keyword “refinance,”
an advertisement from a more reputable lender may generate more clicks than one
from a less reputable lender. The prominence of a slot is considered a slot-specific
factor and may be determined by the position, size, shape, or media format (text,
image, or video) of the slot. For example, an advertisement may attract more clicks
when placed on the top of a page than when placed at the bottom of the page. In this
light, we assume the number of clicks generated by an advertiser at slot j is δjq. δj
is a deterministic factor that we use to capture the prominence of slot j. We assume
16
δ1 ≥ δ2... ≥ δm > 0 and normalize δ1 = 1. q is a stochastic number that we use to
capture the quality of the advertisement. We interpret q as the advertiser’s CTR in
the sense that the higher the quality of the advertisement, the more likely a Web user
will click on it. It is important to note that, in general, CTRs are subject to both
the advertisement effect and the slot effect. In this paper, an advertiser’s CTR refers
exclusively to the attractiveness of an advertisement, regardless of any slot effect.
Though an advertiser’s CTR is realized only after the auction, the adver-
tiser and the auctioneer may have ex-ante information about the advertiser’s future
CTRs. This is because e-commerce technologies make it easy for advertising providers
to track advertisers’ past CTRs and to make predictions about their future CTRs.
We assume that the auctioneer can observe a signal about each advertiser’s future
CTR; the same signal is observed by the advertiser but not by other advertisers. For
simplicity, we assume that such signal allows the auctioneer to distinguish between
two types of advertisers, those with high expected CTRs (h-type) and those with low
expected CTRs (l-type). We will extend our model to a multiple CTR-type case in
section 2.7. Denote Qh and Ql (Qh > Ql > 0) as the expected CTRs for l-type and
h-type advertisers, respectively. We assume the probabilities for advertisers being
h-type and l-type are α and 1 − α, respectively. These probabilities are common
knowledge.
Each advertiser has a valuation v for each click, termed the advertiser’s valuation-
per-click. Advertisers may differ in valuation-per-click. For example, for the key-
word “refinance,” bankone.com may have a higher valuation-per-click than aggregate
lender lendingtree.com. The distribution of the valuation-per-click may be corre-
lated with the advertiser’s CTR signal such that l- and h-type advertisers may have
different valuation-per-click distributions. For example, aggregate lenders (e.g., lend-
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ingtree.com) may have higher CTRs but lower valuation-per-click than banks (e.g.,
bankone.com) for the keyword “refinance.” Let Fl(v) and Fh(v) denote the cumula-
tive distribution of valuation-per-click for l- and h-type advertisers, respectively. The
realization of an advertiser’s valuation-per-click is not known by the auctioneer or
other advertisers. But the distributions Fh(v) and Fl(v) are common knowledge.
We assume Fl(v) and Fh(v) have a fixed support [0, 1], and the density func-
tions, fl(v) and fh(v), are positive and differentiable everywhere within the support.
This assumption can be generalized to [vl, v¯l] and [vh, v¯h] for l- and h-type advertisers,
respectively. We also assume that one advertiser’s valuation-per-click and expected-
CTR type are independent of another advertiser’s.2
We assume advertisers’ payoff functions are additive in their total valuation
and the payment. In particular, conditional on winning slot j, an advertiser’s payoff
is
vqδj − payment. (2.1)
Advertising slots are sold through a weighted unit-price auction, which we de-
scribe below. Each advertiser is asked to submit a b that is the advertiser’s willingness-
to-pay per click, or unit price. The auctioneer assigns each advertiser a score based
on the advertiser’s unit-price bid and CTR signal. The score for an advertiser is
s =
{
b, if the advertiser is h-type
wb, if the advertiser is l-type
, (2.2)
where w is the weighting factor for l-type advertisers, and the weighting factor for
h-type advertisers is normalized to 1. The auctioneer allocates the first slot to the
2The independent-private-value assumption applies to auctions in which the bidders are buying
for their own use and not for resale (McAfee and McMillan 1987). We consider keyword auctions as
independent-private-value auctions because advertisers or their advertising agencies bid on slots to
display their own advertisements, and slots, once sold, are assigned to specific advertisements and
cannot be resold to other advertisers.
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advertiser with the highest score, the second slot to the advertiser with the second
highest score, and so on. Winners pay for their realized clicks at unit prices they
bid.3 We call such an auction format a weighted unit-price auction.
By allowing w to take different values, we can accommodate the following
stylized auction formats. When w equals one, the winners are determined solely by
the prices they bid. One example is Overture’s auction format. When w is less
than one, bid prices from l-type advertisers are weighted less than those from h-type
advertisers. Google’s auction fits in this category because under Google’s ranking
policy, bids from advertisers with high click-generating potential are weighted more.
We also allow the auctioneer to set different minimum bids (or reserve prices)
for advertisers with different CTR signals. In particular, we let bl and bh be the
minimum bids for l- and h-type advertisers, respectively.
The auction proceeds as follows. First, the auctioneer announces weighting
factors and minimum bids. All advertisers receive signals about their future CTRs
and learn their valuation-per-click before the auction. Then, each advertiser submits
a unit-price bid, and the auctioneer assigns advertisers to slots based on their unit-
price bids and CTR signals according to the announced weighting scheme. Finally,
the number of clicks is realized, and advertisers pay the realized clicks at the unit
prices they bid.
3An alternative payment rule is a “second-score” rule; that is, advertisers will pay a price that
matches the next highest score rather than their own scores (all scores are calculated using expected
CTRs). We show in the appendix that under our framework, the “second-score” weighted unit-price
auctions generate the same expected revenue for the auctioneer as the “first-score” version studied
here. The main results in this paper apply also to the “second-score” setting, as these results concern
only the expected revenue. We choose to work with the “first-score” format as it permits explicit
bidding functions.
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2.4 Designing Weighting Scheme
We start by assuming no minimum bids so that we can focus on the design of
the weighting scheme. We will first consider how weighting factors affect advertisers’
equilibrium bidding. Then, we will examine the efficient and revenue-maximizing
weighting schemes.
2.4.1 Weighting Scheme and Equilibrium Bidding
Throughout this paper, we consider a symmetric, pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium. By “symmetric,” we mean that advertisers with the same valuation-per-
click and CTR signal will bid the same.
Let bh (v) denote the equilibrium bidding function for h-type advertisers, and
bl (v) for l-type advertisers. A bidding function in our setting is a function that asso-
ciates advertisers’ unit-price bids with their valuation-per-click. Because advertisers
differ both in valuation-per-click and in expected CTRs, we need a pair of bidding
functions to describe our equilibrium. The condition for the pair to be an equilib-
rium is that an advertiser finds it is optimal to bid according to this pair if all other
advertisers bid according to this pair. We conjecture that both bidding functions are
strictly increasing (we verify this in the appendix). The following result is key to our
analysis.
Lemma 2.4.1. An l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v matches an h-type
advertiser with valuation-per-click wv in equilibrium. Formally,
bh(wv) = wbl(v), ∀v, wv ∈ [0, 1] . (2.3)
Proof. Unless otherwise noted, all proofs are in the appendix.
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The intuition for Lemma 2.4.1 is as follows. Consider an h-type advertiser
with valuation-per-click wv and an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v. If
the former bids wb and the latter bids b, the two advertisers tie, and therefore their
chances of winning each slot are the same. Meanwhile, conditional on winning the
same slot, the l-type advertiser’s payoff (Qlδj(wv − wb)) differs from the h-type ad-
vertiser’s (Qhδj(v − b)) only by a scalar. So their total expected payoffs differ only
by a scalar, too. Because multiplying the objective of an optimization problem by a
scalar does not change the solution to the problem, we conclude that if bidding b is
optimal for the l-type advertiser then bidding wb must also be optimal for the h-type
advertiser, and vice versa.
We call two advertisers comparable if they tie or match (in scores) in equilib-
rium without minimum bids. Lemma 1 greatly simplifies the derivation of advertisers’
equilibrium winning probabilities. Let us first consider an l-type advertiser’s winning
probability against any advertiser, or the advertiser’s one-on-one winning probability,
denoted as Gl(v). Lemma 1 suggests that an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click
v can beat another advertiser, say B, if and only if B is l-type and has valuation-per-
click less than v, or B is h-type and has valuation-per-click less than wv. Hence,
Gl(v) = αFh(wv) + (1− α)Fl(v). (2.4)
Similarly, an h-type advertiser’s winning probability against any advertiser,
Gh(v), is
Gh(v) = αFh(v) + (1− α)Fl(v/w). (2.5)
We denote P jl (v) and P
j
h(v) as l- and h-type advertisers’ probabilities of win-
ning the jth slot, respectively. We can write P jl (v) and P
j
h(v) as
P jθ (v) = (
n−1
n−j)Gθ(v)
n−j [1−Gθ(v)]j−1 , θ ∈ {l, h} . (2.6)
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Bidding Functions
Proposition 2.4.2. Given w (w > 0), equilibrium bidding functions are given by
bl(v) = v −
∫ v
0
∑m
j=1 δjP
j
l (t)dt∑m
j=1 δjP
j
l (v)
,∀v ∈ [0, 1]
bh(v) = v −
∫ v
0
∑m
j=1 δjP
j
h(t)dt∑m
j=1 δjP
j
h(v)
,∀v ∈ [0, 1]
. (2.7)
Proposition 2.4.2 characterizes the equilibrium for a weighted unit-price auc-
tion. In Figure 2.1, we plot advertisers’ equilibrium scores when l-type’s weighting
factor is 0.5 and the valuation distributions are uniform. Recall that score is bid times
weighting factor. We plot scores instead of unit-price bids because the former better
illustrates the equilibrium matching between l- and h-type advertisers. Clearly, an
l-type with valuation-per-click 1 ties with an h-type with valuation-per-click 0.5, and
h-type advertisers with higher valuation have no comparable l-type advertisers.
Interestingly, the figure shows a kink in h-type advertisers’ equilibrium bidding
function. Intuitively, this is because h-type advertisers with valuation-per-click less
than 0.5 compete with both l- and h-type advertisers, whereas h-type advertisers
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with valuation-per-click higher than 0.5 complete only with h-type advertisers. The
sudden change in the number of competitors causes h-type advertisers with valuation-
per-click higher than 0.5 to bid considerably less aggressively than h-type advertisers
with valuation-per-click lower than 0.5, thus the kink. Generally speaking, when
the weighting factor w for l-type advertisers is less than one, the h-type advertisers’
equilibrium bidding function has a kink at w. When w is greater than one, the l-type
advertisers’ equilibrium bidding function has a kink at 1/w.4 These kinks reflect the
impact of weighting scheme on the equilibrium matching between l-type and h-type
advertisers.
Proposition 2.4.2 has the following implications. Advertisers who receive a
high weighting factor are favored in equilibrium allocation, and can win more often
with the same unit price. Some advertisers who receive a high weighting factor may
out-compete all advertisers who receive a low weighting factor, and thus can benefit
from such a situation by bidding less aggressively. Increasing l-type’s weighting factor
causes the following effects. It increases l-type advertisers’ one-on-one winning proba-
bility and decreases h-type advertisers’ one-on-one winning probability (see (2.4) and
(2.5)). Consequently, l-type advertisers are selected more often into high-ranked slots
and have a larger total expected winning (defined as the expected value of the slot an
advertiser may win, i.e.,
∑m
j=1 δjP
j
θ (v)). Meanwhile, it causes more h-type advertisers
to bid aggressively because there are more h-type advertisers with valuation-per-click
below w who face competition from both CTR-types.
4If we allow more general supports, such as [vl, v¯l] and [vh, v¯h], there may be as many as two
kinks in the bidding functions. For example, with general supports [1, z] (2 < z < 4) for l-type and
[1, 2] for h-type and w = 0.5, l-type advertisers’ equilibrium bidding function has a kink at 2, and
h-type advertisers’ equilibrium bidding function has a kink at z/2. In some special cases, such as
with supports [2, 4] for l-type and [1, 2] for h-type and w = 0.5, there is no kink in either type’s
equilibrium bidding function.
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2.4.2 Efficient Weighting Scheme
We measure the efficiency by the total value created. The efficiency criterion,
therefore, emphasizes the “total pie,” which is important if the auctioneer’s objec-
tive is to transfer much of the value to advertisers in return for their participation.
This is especially true when the keyword advertising market is still nascent, and on-
line advertising providers are still trying to steal market share from the traditional
advertising providers. The efficiency criterion may become the criterion of choice
for advertising providers who aim at long-term development rather than short-term
profits, regardless of their market positions.
We define the efficient weighting factor, weff , as one that maximizes the total
expected valuation. We focus on expected valuation (thus ex-ante efficiency) because
advertisers’ valuation for slots is also determined by the realized CTRs after the
auction. The assignment of an advertiser with valuation-per-click v and CTR-signal
θ to slot j will generate an expected valuation of vδjQθ, θ ∈ {l, h}. Given that the
probability of assigning an advertiser to slot j is P jθ (v), the total expected valuation
generated by all advertisers is,
W = n (1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
v
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
l (v) fl (v) dv
+nαQh
∫ 1
0
v
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
h (v) fh (v) dv. (2.8)
Proposition 2.4.3. The efficient weighting factor (for l-type advertisers) is Ql/Qh.
Proposition 2.4.3 suggests that it is efficient to weight advertisers’ bids by
their expected CTRs (note that the weighting factor pair (Ql/Qh, 1) is equivalent to
the pair (Ql, Qh)). Such a weighting scheme is also efficient if advertisers were to bid
their true valuation. In other words, the auctioneer can achieve efficiency by weighting
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unit-price bids by expected CTRs as if advertisers are bidding their true valuation,
despite that in our model advertisers generally do not bid their true valuation-per-
click. The reason for this lies in the way l- and h-type advertisers are matched in
equilibrium. According to Lemma 2.4.1, an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click
v is comparable with an h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click wv. The efficiency
criterion requires comparable advertisers to generate the same expected valuation.
Hence, the efficient weighting factor must be Ql/Qh.
It is worth noting that the efficient weighting factor is independent of the
distribution of valuation-per-click and that of CTR types. This feature makes it
straightforward to implement an efficient weighting scheme: the auctioneer only needs
to estimate the expected CTR for each advertiser-keyword combination and use it
to weight the advertiser’s unit-price bid. Given that keyword auctions have already
been set up to accumulate CTR information for all advertisers and all keywords, it is
possible to estimate an advertiser’s CTR on a particular keyword and that estimation
can be perfected over time.
2.4.3 Revenue-Maximizing Weighting Scheme
Another useful design criterion is revenue-maximization. As the industry ma-
tures and the competition for market shares settles, an efficient design toward future
growth becomes less appealing, and the auctioneer’s objective is likely to transform
from maximizing the “total pie” to maximizing the total revenue from existing ad-
vertisers. Next, we examine how an auctioneer should choose the weighting factor to
maximize the expected revenue.
We define the revenue-maximizing weighting factor, w∗, as one that maximizes
the total expected revenue of the auctioneer. We can explicitly derive the auctioneer’s
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expected revenue (pi) as (see the appendix for details)
pi = n(1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
l (v)
(
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
)
fl(v)dv
+nαQh
∫ 1
0
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
h(v)
(
v − 1− Fh(v)
fh(v)
)
fh(v)dv. (2.9)
In the above, the total expected revenue consists of the expected revenue from
l-type advertisers (the first term) and the expected revenue from h-type advertisers
(the second term). Recall that P jl (v) is an l-type advertiser’s probability of winning
the jth slot, and P jh(v) is an h-type advertiser’s probability. We interpret the terms
Ql
[
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
]
and Qh
[
v − 1− Fh(v)
fh(v)
]
(2.10)
as l-type’s and h-type’s “revenue contribution” to the auctioneer if they are assigned
to a standard slot (δ = 1), respectively. Revenue contribution refers to the revenue
captured by the auctioneer, which is usually less than the total valuation created.
The difference between advertisers’ revenue contribution and their valuation for slots
is considered to be the informational rent kept by the advertisers. According to
this interpretation, the total expected revenue can be viewed as the total expected
revenue contribution of the winners at all slots. The concept of revenue contribution
is closely related to the concept of “virtual valuation” introduced by Myerson (1981)
in the optimal auction setting. One difference is that we consider revenue contribution
across multiple slots, whereas Myerson (1981) studies a single object.
The revenue-maximizing weighting factor can be characterized by the first-
order condition of the total expected revenue with respect to the weighting factor.
Except in some special cases, the revenue-maximizing weighting factor cannot be
expressed in an explicit form. Next, we focus on two issues regarding the revenue-
maximizing weighting factor. First, how is it different from the efficient weighting
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factor? Second, how is it affected by the underlying model primitives, especially
valuation-per-click distributions? We first consider a setting in which the valuation-
per-click is independent of the CTR signal, so that the valuation-per-click distribu-
tions for l- and h-type advertisers are the same (commonly denoted as F (v)).
We say a distribution function F (v) is an increasing-hazard-rate (IHR) distri-
bution if its hazard rate f(v)
1−F (v) increases in v throughout the support. Many distri-
butions, including uniform, normal, and exponential, are IHR.
Proposition 2.4.4. If the valuation-per-click and CTR signals are independent, and
F (v) is IHR, then the revenue-maximizing weighting factor w∗ must be higher than
the efficient weighting factor weff .
Proposition 2.4.4 implies that when the distributions of valuation-per-click are
the same across l- and h-type advertisers, the revenue-maximizing weighting factor
is generally inefficient and discriminates against h-type advertisers relative to the
efficient design. The intuition is as follows. For any weighting factor less than weff , if
the valuation-per-click distribution is IHR,
Ql
(
v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
)
> Qh
(
wv − 1− F (wv)
f(wv)
)
, for all v. (2.11)
In other words, for any weighting factor less than weff , the revenue contribution of an
l-type advertiser is always higher than that of a comparable h-type advertiser. Thus,
the auctioneer can always earn a higher revenue by raising w to allocate the slots
more often to l-type advertisers.
When l- and h-type advertisers have different valuation-per-click distributions,
however, the revenue-maximizing weighting factor may or may not be higher than the
efficient weighting factor, as illustrated by the following example.
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Example 2.4.5. Assume there is only one slot and the valuation-per-click of l- and h-
type advertisers are uniformly distributed on [0, z] and [0, 1], respectively. Let α = 0.5,
Ql = 0.5, Qh = 1, and n = 5. We can explicitly solve the revenue-maximizing
weighting factor as w∗ = 1
0.6z+0.8
, which is lower than weff = 0.5 when z > 2 and
higher than weff when z < 2.
In the above example, when z increases, the valuation-per-click distribution
of the l-type advertisers becomes less “tight.” As a result, they can claim more in-
formational rent and contribute less to the total revenue. So the auctioneer should
allocate the slots less often to them by lowering the weighting factor for l-type adver-
tisers. When l-type advertisers’ valuation distribution is loose enough, the revenue-
maximizing weighting factor can be less than the efficient weighting factor.
The above example highlights that it is not always best to discriminate against
advertisers with high expected CTRs. This is fundamentally because advertisers’ rev-
enue contribution is determined both by expected CTRs and valuation distributions.
h-type advertisers do not necessarily contribute less to the total revenue than l-type
advertisers who have the same total valuation for slots, especially when the former
have “tighter” valuation distributions.
2.5 Designing Differentiated Minimum Bids
The optimal auction literature suggests that an optimal design often involves
imposing minimum bids to exclude advertisers whose participation reduces the auc-
tioneer’s revenue. In our setting, the auctioneer can impose differentiated minimum
bids for l- and h-type advertisers because of the information on advertisers’ future
CTRs.
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We say a minimum bid for h-type advertisers is more constraining than that
for l-type advertisers if the comparable h-type advertiser for the lowest participating
l-type advertiser is excluded by the minimum bids. We similarly define the case of
a more constraining minimum bid for l-type advertisers. A pair of minimum bids is
equally constraining if neither bid is more constraining.
Next we will focus on the scenario in which the weighting factor for l-type
advertisers is no higher than that for h-type advertisers (assumption A1 below) and
the minimum bid for h-type advertisers is equally or more constraining (assumption
A2). Analyses of other scenarios—where the weighting factor for l-type is higher
and/or the minimum bid for l-type is more constraining—are analogous. We also
assume that the minimum bid for h-type advertisers is low enough such that at least
some l-type advertisers have comparable participating h-type advertisers (assumption
A3). This assumption excludes a trivial case in which l-type advertisers and h-
type advertisers each compete with advertisers of their own type. Formally, these
assumptions are:
A1) w ≤ 1. A2) wbl ≤ bh. A3) bh < w.
As in section 2.4, we first examine the impact of differentiated minimum bids
on equilibrium bidding and then study the efficient and revenue-maximizing minimum
bid design.
2.5.1 Minimum Bids and Equilibrium Bidding
We conjecture that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists. l-type advertisers’ equi-
librium bidding function must satisfy two criteria: (a) the lowest participating l-type
advertiser must have a valuation-per-click of bl and bid his or her true valuation-per-
click, (b) the equilibrium bidding function must be strictly increasing. The criterion
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(a) is simply the consequence of minimum bids, and the criterion (b) is required by
the incentive compatibility condition (see the appendix for a proof). The criteria for
h-type advertisers are symmetric.
Since the minimum bid for h-type advertisers is more constraining, some low-
valuation l-type advertisers cannot match any participating h-type advertiser in the
equilibrium score. But l-type advertisers with high enough valuation-per-click can.
We call the lowest valuation-per-click for l-type advertisers to match a participating
h-type advertiser the matching point for l-type advertisers, denoted as v0.
If the matching point equals one, no l-type advertiser can match an h-type
advertiser in equilibrium. We will focus on the more interesting case of the matching
point less than one and assume the condition for that is satisfied (see Proposition
2.5.2 for such a condition).
Will l-type advertisers with valuation-per-click above the matching point match
with their comparable h-type advertisers as in the case of no minimum bids? The
following lemma shows that they do.
Lemma 2.5.1. Under assumptions A1-A3, an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-
click v above the matching point match an h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click
wv in equilibrium. Formally,
bh(wv) = wbl(v),∀v > v0. (2.12)
The question remains where the matching point is. One may conjecture that
the matching point will be the valuation-per-click of the l-type advertiser who is
comparable with the lowest participating h-type advertiser. However, we show that
this may be not the case.
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Remark 2.5.1 (Postponed Matching). If the minimum bid for h-type advertisers is
more constraining, at least some low-valuation l-type advertisers will bid lower scores
than their comparable h-type advertisers.
Suppose the opposite, that is, every l-type advertiser will match the compara-
ble h-type advertiser in equilibrium whenever the latter is not excluded by minimum
bids. The first l-type advertiser to have a comparable h-type advertiser is bh/w.
By definition, bh/w is also the matching point. Since the h-type advertiser with
valuation-per-click bh must bid the true valuation (by criterion (a)) and earn zero
payoff, the l-type advertiser must also bid his/her true value (by Lemma 2.5.1) and
earn zero payoff. However, this cannot be an equilibrium because the l-type adver-
tiser can always earn a positive payoff by bidding less. This contradiction leads us to
conclude that the matching point must be higher than bh/w. In other words, l-type
advertisers avoid matching their comparable h-type ones in equilibrium until their
valuation-per-click is high enough.
Given that the minimum bids are not equally constraining, the two bidding
functions cannot both be continuous. If both bidding functions were continuous, by
the definition of the matching point, the l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v0
must match the h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click bh in equilibrium scores
and both must earn zero payoff. Our previous argument shows that this cannot be
an equilibrium. The following proposition establishes the equilibrium bidding with
minimum bids.
Proposition 2.5.2. Under assumptions A1-A3, the equilibrium bidding functions are
given by
bθ(v) = v −
∫ v
bθ
∑m
j=1 δjP
j
θ (t) dt∑m
j=1 δjP
j
θ (v)
,∀v ∈ [bθ, 1] , θ ∈ {l, h}, (2.13)
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where P jl (v) and P
j
h(v) are defined in (2.6) and the one-on-one winning probabilities
for l- and h-type advertisers are now
Gl (v) =
{
αFh (bh) + (1− α)Fl (v) for v ∈ [bl, v0)
αFh (wv) + (1− α)Fl (v) for v ∈ [v0, 1] (2.14)
Gh (v) =
{
αFh (v) + (1− α)Fl (v0) for v ∈ [bh, wv0)
αFh (v) + (1− α)Fl
(
v
w
)
for v ∈ [wv0, 1] (2.15)
The matching point v0 is determined by
w
∫ v0
bl
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
l (t) dt =
∫ wv0
bh
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
h (t) dt. (2.16)
when w
∫ 1
bl
∑m
j=1 δjP
j
l (t) dt <
∫ w
bh
∑m
j=1 δjP
j
h (t) dt, and is 1 otherwise.
Proposition 2.5.2 characterizes the equilibrium under a weighted unit-price
auction with differentiated minimum bids. In Figure 2.2, we show an example of
h-type advertisers facing a more constraining minimum bid. In this example, we let
m = 1, n = 5, α = 0.5, Fl(v) = Fh(v) = v, w = 0.5, bl = 0, and bh = 0.1. Figure 2.2
shows the equilibrium scores for l- and h-type advertisers.
From the figure, l-type advertisers with valuation-per-click lower than the
matching point (0.26) bid lower scores than any h-type advertisers. l-type advertis-
ers with valuation-per-click above the matching point match with their comparable
h-type advertisers (with valuation-per-click between 0.13 and 0.5). h-type advertisers
with valuation-per-click higher than 0.5 beat any l-type advertisers. h-type advertis-
ers with valuation-per-click lower than 0.13 bid lower scores than l-type advertisers
below the matching point but bid higher than l-type advertisers above the matching
point. As before, the kinks are explained by an abrupt increase/decrease in the num-
ber of competing advertisers: the first kink in h-type advertisers’ equilibrium bidding
function is because l-type advertisers start matching h-type advertisers; the second
is because l-type advertisers can no longer match h-type advertisers.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Bidding Functions with Minimum Bids
The example confirms the “postponed matching” effect outlined in Remark
2.5.1. In this example, l-type advertisers with valuation-per-click between 0.2 and
0.26 are comparable with h-type advertisers with valuation-per-click between 0.1 and
0.13, but choose not to match the latter. Intuitively, the minimum bid forces h-
type advertisers with low valuation-per-click to bid close to their true valuation.
Their comparable l-type advertisers, who do not face such a constraint, have the
option of bidding significantly lower than their true valuation, which leads to low
winning probabilities but high per-click payoffs. Bidding low (and not matching their
comparable h-type advertisers) is a dominant strategy for l-type advertisers until
their valuation-per-click reaches the matching point.
The jump in l-type advertisers’ bidding function at the matching point con-
firms our earlier argument about discontinuity.5 At the matching point, l-type ad-
5Strictly speaking, at the matching point, the l-type advertiser is indifferent between bidding low
and bidding high, and hence could use a mixed strategy. To preserve a pure-strategy equilibrium, in
deriving Proposition 2.5.2, we assume that the h-type advertiser always bids high. This assumption
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vertisers’ bidding strategy changes from not matching h-type advertisers to matching
them. The fact the two strategies require quite different unit-price bids explains the
jump in the equilibrium bids.
Proposition 2.5.2 has several implications. First, minimum bids exclude low-
valuation advertisers and force the participating ones, especially those whose valua-
tion is close to the minimum bids, to bid aggressively. In the above example, h-type
advertisers between 0.1 and 0.13 bid higher than they would in the absence of min-
imum bids (dashed lines indicate their equilibrium scores without minimum bids).
Second, if the minimum scores for two CTR-types are the same (in other words, the
minimum bid for h-type advertisers is w-times of that for l-type advertisers), two ad-
vertisers who would tie without minimum bids remain tying. This is also the reason
we call such minimum bids equally constraining. Third, when minimum bids are not
equally constraining, advertisers who face a less constraining minimum bid may be
better off by choosing not to match their comparable advertisers who face a more-
constraining minimum bid, a strategy leading to lower winning odds but a higher
per-click payoff. However, advertisers whose valuation is far above minimum bids
will choose to match their comparable advertisers, even if the minimum bids are not
equally constraining. This later finding is consistent with Google’s claim that their
differentiated minimum-bids policy only affects a small percentage of advertisers.6
As we have mentioned earlier, the intuition in Proposition 2.5.2 carries over
to other scenarios (h-type advertisers receive a lower weighting factor, and/or the
does not affect the equilibrium outcome because the probability measure for an advertiser to be an
l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v0 is virtually zero.
6Google stated in its official blog Inside Adwords (http://adwords.blogspot.com/2006/11/landing-
page-quality-update.html) that the introduction of a differentiated minimum-bids policy “will affect
a very small portion of advertisers ... However, those who may be providing a low quality user
experience will see an increase in their minimum bids.”
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minimum bid for l-type advertisers is more constraining). For example, when the
minimum bid for l-type advertisers is more constraining, h-type advertisers will post-
pone matching their comparable l-type advertisers, and the jump will occur in h-type’s
equilibrium bidding function.
2.5.2 Efficient Minimum Bids
We now consider the impact of minimum bids on allocation efficiency. We
call a pair of equally constraining minimum bids a uniform minimum score policy
because they result in identical minimum scores for l- and h-type advertisers. We say
a keyword auction is weakly efficient if it allocates assets in a way that maximizes the
total expected valuation of all participating advertisers. The notion of weak efficiency
we use is similar to one discussed by Mark Armstrong (2000). Weak efficiency is
different from “strong” efficiency in that weak efficiency concerns the total valuation
of participating bidders, whereas strong efficiency concerns the total valuation of
all bidders and the auctioneer. Weak efficiency is a necessary condition for strong
efficiency.
If the auctioneer uses a uniform minimum score policy, all participating l-
type advertisers match their comparable h-type advertisers in equilibrium. Hence,
if the weighting factor is Ql/Qh, the auction is still efficient by the same argument
in Proposition 2.4.3. In fact, such designs are also necessary for the auction to be
weakly efficient.
Proposition 2.5.3. A weighted unit-price auction is weakly efficient if and only if
the auctioneer uses the efficient weighting factor and a uniform minimum score.
Proposition 2.5.3 provides a theoretical justification for using differentiated
minimum bids. A uniform minimum-score rule implies that auctioneers should set
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high minimum unit prices for advertisers with low expected CTRs. This is consistent
in principle with Google’s recently adopted differentiated minimum-bid practices.
Once again, a uniform minimum-score policy is easy to implement because it
does not require knowing the distribution of advertisers’ valuation-per-click. Propo-
sition 2.5.3 shows that weighting advertisers’ unit-price bids by their expected CTRs,
together with a simple uniform minimum-score rule, allows the auctioneer to achieve
efficiency among participating advertisers.
2.5.3 Revenue-Maximizing Minimum Bids
Similar to the derivation of (2.9), we can explicitly evaluate the expected
revenue of the auctioneer with minimum bids
pi = n(1− α)Ql
∫ 1
bl
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
l (v)
(
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
)
fl(v)dv
+nαQh
∫ 1
bh
m∑
j=1
δjP
j
h (v)
(
v − 1− Fh(v)
fh(v)
)
fh(v)dv. (2.17)
A pair of minimum bids is revenue-maximizing if this pair is chosen to maxi-
mize (2.17). In the appendix we characterize the revenue-maximizing minimum bid
policy using a set of first-order conditions. The revenue-maximizing minimum bid pol-
icy can be computed numerically. In general, when choosing the revenue-maximizing
minimum bids, the auctioneer needs to consider both the exclusion effect and the
distortion effect. The exclusion effect is well-known in the auction design literature.
A minimum bid excludes advertisers whose valuation-per-click is lower than the min-
imum bid, and forces the remaining advertisers to bid higher than they would in the
absence of such a minimum bid. The distortion effect is new, however. We have shown
earlier that when the minimum bid for h-type advertisers is more constraining, some
l-type advertisers will bid lower scores than their comparable h-type advertisers.
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The condition for revenue-maximizing minimum bids in our setting is generally
different from the “exclusion principle” in standard auctions. The exclusion principle
requires that the revenue-maximizing minimum bid should be chosen to admit only
the advertisers with positive revenue contribution. In our setting, this would require
the revenue-maximizing minimum bids to satisfy, respectively,
bl −
1− Fl(bl)
fl(bl)
= 0 and bh −
1− Fh(bh)
fh(bh)
= 0. (2.18)
The conditions in (2.18) are not revenue-maximizing in our setting, however. They
ignore the fact that in our setting, minimum bids also cause a distortion effect that
has revenue consequences.
The revenue-maximizing minimum bids generally do not have a uniform score
either. Intuitively, when we restrict to a uniform minimum-score policy, the distortion
effect does not exist. As a result, the revenue-maximizing minimum bid policy should
simply exclude advertisers with a negative revenue contribution, that is, one that
satisfies (2.18). However, the minimum bid pair determined by (2.18) seldom has a
uniform minimum score. For example, if the valuation-per-click distributions for l-
and h-type advertisers are the same, conditions in (2.18) lead to the same minimum
bid for l- and h-type advertisers, implying different minimum scores for l- and h-type
advertisers.
We summarize the above observations in the following remark.
Remark 2.5.2. The revenue-maximizing minimum bid policy is generally not a uni-
form minimum-score policy or one resulting from a traditional exclusion principle (as
determined by (2.18)).
We conclude the above discussion with an example that illustrates how the
revenue-maximizing minimum bids in our setting differ from a uniform minimum-
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Table 2.1: A Comparison of Revenues under Different Minimum Bid Policies
minimum bid policy (bl,bh) total expected revenue
revenue-maximizing uniform score (0.481, 0.385) 0.5211
traditional exclusion principle (0.333, 0.500) 0.5213
revenue-maximizing (0.334, 0.615) 0.5309
score policy and from those recommended by the auction design literature. The
following example also shows that the auctioneer can achieve a higher revenue with
a revenue-maximizing minimum bid policy.
Example 2.5.4. Assume there are five advertisers and one slot. Let α = 0.5, Ql =
0.8, Qh = 1, w = 0.8, Fh(v) = v, and Fl(v) = 2v − v2. We calculate the minimum
bids and expected revenues under three policies: a revenue-maximizing uniform-score
policy, a policy using the exclusion principle, and a revenue-maximizing policy (see
table 2.1).
2.6 A Comparison with Fixed-Payment Auctions
Given the results on the efficient and revenue-maximizing designs, we are now
able to compare weighted unit-price auctions with traditional auction formats where
bidders bid fixed payments. Note that in fixed-payment auctions, winners pay a
fixed payment upfront, whereas in unit-price auctions, winners pay ex-post based
on realized outcomes. In this sense, advertisers bear less risk in unit-price auctions
than in fixed-payment auctions. The risk-sharing feature of unit-price auctions is
considered advantageous, for example, by McAfee and McMillan (1986) in the study
of procurement auctions. Here we move beyond risk-sharing advantage and focus
on comparing weighted unit-price auctions with fixed-payment auctions on allocation
efficiency and revenue.
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To make a fair comparison, we extend the standard fixed-payment auction to a
multi-object setting. We define the generalized first-price auction as one in which (1)
advertisers bid their total willingness-to-pay b for the first slot, (2) slots are assigned
based on the ranking of bids, and (3) if an advertiser wins the j-th slot, he/she will
pay δjb.
Given our model setting, the probability of an advertiser’s expected total val-
uation for the first slot being less than x is
αFh
(
x
Qh
)
+ (1− α)Fl
(
x
Ql
)
. (2.19)
When there is only one slot, the generalized first-price auction reduces to a
standard first-price auction in which advertisers’ valuation for the slot is distributed
according to (2.19). Such a standard auction is known to be efficient. In fact, the
generalized first-price auction is also efficient. This is because, as in standard auctions,
advertisers’ bids are monotonically increasing in their valuation (for the first slot) such
that slots are allocated efficiently.
Recall that in efficient weighted unit-price auctions, an advertiser is assigned
a slot if and only if the advertiser has the highest total valuation for the slot among
those who have not been assigned a slot (Proposition 2.4.3). This implies that efficient
weighted unit-price auctions allocate the same way as generalized first-price auctions
and thus generate the same expected revenue to auctioneers. Thus:
Proposition 2.6.1. The efficient weighted unit-price auction achieves the same effi-
ciency and expected revenue as a generalized first-price auction.
Because the efficient weighted unit-price auction generates the same expected
revenue as the generalized first-price auctions (Proposition 2.6.1) and the revenue-
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maximizing weighted unit-price auction can generate more revenue than the efficient
weighted unit-price auction (Proposition 2.4.4), we immediately have:
Corollary 2.6.2. Revenue-maximizing weighted unit-price auctions generate more
revenue than generalized first-price auctions.
According to the optimal mechanism design literature, the standard auctions
(with an appropriately set reserve price) can achieve the highest revenue among all
mechanisms in assigning a single-object setting. The above corollary indicates, how-
ever, that weighted unit-price auctions can achieve even higher revenue. The reason
lies in that weighted unit-price auctions allow the auctioneer to discriminate advertis-
ers based on information about their expected CTRs, which is not considered in the
standard mechanism design setting. Therefore, this corollary illustrates that ex-ante
information on bidders’ outcome-generating potential can be exploited to enhance
the auctioneer’s revenue.
We shall note that Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary 2.6.2 are obtained with the
assumption that the auctioneer has the same information on advertisers’ future CTRs
as advertisers themselves do. In keyword auctions, because advertising providers have
full access to advertisers’ CTR history, we expect advertisers’ information advantage
on future CTRs to be small, especially after advertisers have had a long enough history
with the advertising provider. However, in other settings where auctioneers have
substantially less information on bidders’ future outcomes than bidders themselves,
fixed-payment auctions may achieve higher allocation efficiency and revenue than
weighted unit-price auctions.
2.7 Discussion
In this section, we consider relaxing some of the model assumptions.
40
The Quality of CTR Information. Given the importance of the infor-
mation on advertisers’ future CTRs, a natural question is how the quality of such
information affects our results, which we attempt to address here by perturbing the
information quality. One way to do this is to assume that under perfect information,
advertisers with high and low expected CTRs can be correctly categorized into h-
types and l-types, whereas under imperfect information some of the advertisers may
be mis-categorized. Such mis-categorization maintains the same overall expected
CTR, but causes the (unbiased) expected CTR for the h-type group to be lower and
for the l-type group to be higher; more so as the information quality worsens. By this
notion of information quality, we can say one information set (τ) is less informative
than another (τ ′) if
Q′l ≥ Ql and Q′h ≤ Qh, (2.20)
where superscripts denote parameters under information set τ ′. In the extreme case,
when the CTR signal is completely uninformative, there is no difference between the
expected CTRs of the h-type group and those of the l-type group.
Obviously, our results on equilibrium bidding hold under different information
quality in the above sense. The efficient weighting factor for l-type advertisers is
higher under lower quality information because of a smaller difference between h-
type’s and l-type’s expected CTRs. The mis-categorization may cause the advertising
provider to allocate advertising slots to low valuation advertisers even though higher
valuation ones are available, and thus there is a loss of efficiency. The total expected
revenue is generally lower because of the decrease in the total valuation created. In
sum, deterioration in the quality of information on advertisers’ future CTRs generally
reduces the efficiency and the expected revenue of weighted unit-price auctions. The
following example illustrates such results.
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Table 2.2: Impact of Information Quality
weff total expected valuation w
∗ total expected revenue
perfect info 0.50 0.68 0.80 0.44
imperfect info 0.63 0.63 0.85 0.43
Example 2.7.1. Assume there is one slot , n=5, and Fl(v) = Fh(v) = v (uniform
distribution). Let α=0.5, Ql = 0.5, and Qh = 1 under perfect information, and
α=0.45, Ql = 0.591, and Qh = 0.944 under imperfect information (corresponding to
10% of low-CTR advertisers and 20% of high-CTR advertisers being mis-categorized).
Table 2.2 summarizes the changes in efficiency and total expected revenue.
Multiple CTR-types. The basic intuition of our main results holds for
multiple signal types. Suppose there are k CTR-types, indexed by θ = 1, 2, ..., k,
and the weight factor for a CTR-type θ is wθ. We can show, as in Lemma 1, that
an advertiser with a CTR-type θ1 and valuation-per-click v ties with an advertiser
with a CTR-type θ2 and valuation-per-click wθ1v/wθ2 in equilibrium. We can obtain
k equilibrium bidding functions in the same way as in Proposition 1, one for each
type. Analogous to the two-type case, it is still efficient to weight advertisers’ bids by
their expected CTRs and to impose a uniform score across different CTR-types. The
revenue-maximizing weighting scheme and minimum bid policy are more complex in
the multiple CTR-type case because of additional undetermined design parameters;
but the basic intuition follows through. For example, the minimum bid policy remains
different from a uniform-score policy and from a policy implied by the traditional
exclusion principle.
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2.8 Conclusion
Information technology gives us the ability to track online behaviors in un-
precedented detail. For online advertising, this means that advertisers can monitor
how many customers click on their advertisements and how many end up making a
purchase. This ability not only enables new outcome-based pricing (also known as
“pay-for-performance”) models but also allows advertising providers to accumulate
information on advertisers’ outcome-generating potential. Within this context, we
examine how information on advertisers’ CTRs can be used in the design of keyword
auctions. We evaluate two ways of incorporating advertisers’ CTR information into
the keyword auction design: by assigning different weighting factors for advertisers
with different expected CTRs and by imposing different minimum bids for them.
Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) note that equilibria under rank-by-price
and rank-by-price×CTR rules would be different, but do not address the impact of
different ranking rules on equilibrium outcome. This paper addresses this question,
and also a more general question of how to choose ranking rules and minimum bid
policies to best utilize the ex-ante information on advertisers’ future CTRs. We study
the impact of weighting schemes and differentiated minimum bid policies and how
they should be configured to maximize allocation efficiency or total expected revenue.
Although we use pay-per-click keyword auctions as a specific context for our
discussion, our model framework and implications can be applied to other outcome-
based pricing settings such as pay-per-call and pay-per-purchase advertising auctions.
The success of pay-per-click advertising on search engines has inspired innovations in
other areas. For example, Google introduced keyword-auction-like mechanisms into
TV, online video, and mobile phone advertising. The intuition obtained in this paper
can potentially apply to these application areas as well.
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Managerial Implications. Our analysis has several implications. First,
we gain insight on how weighting schemes and differentiated minimum bids affect
equilibrium bidding. We demonstrate that the weighting scheme determines how ad-
vertisers with different expected CTRs match in equilibrium: a low-CTR advertiser
ties in equilibrium with a high-CTR advertiser when the two have the same weighted
valuation-per-click—that is, valuation-per-click times the weighting factor. For ex-
ample, if low-CTR advertisers receive a weighting factor of w, a low-CTR advertiser
with valuation-per-click 1 matches a high-CTR advertiser with valuation-per-click w
in equilibrium.
As in classic auctions, minimum bids exclude low-valuation advertisers and
force others, especially those whose valuation is near minimum bids, to bid closer
to their true valuation. Minimum bids in our setting have other effects: When
minimum bids are not equally constraining, they distort equilibrium matching be-
tween low- and high-CTR advertisers and cause a jump in the less-constrained type’s
equilibrium bidding. Intuitively, the less-constrained type avoids competing with
the more-constrained type, who bids ultra-aggressively because of minimum bids.
But for advertisers with valuation well-above the minimum bids, the less-constrained
type matches the more-constrained type the same way as the no-minimum-bids case.
The jump reflects a transition from avoiding matching to matching among the less-
constrained advertisers. These insights, together with ones on the weighting schemes,
help advertising providers understand the impact of their auction rules on advertisers.
They also provide guidelines for advertisers on how to bid optimally.
Second, the efficient keyword auction design is remarkably simple. It involves
weighting advertisers’ pay-per-click bids with their expected CTRs, and requires the
same minimum score for all advertisers. The former implies lower weighting factors
44
for advertisers with lower expected CTRs. The latter implies higher minimum bids
for advertisers with lower expected CTRs. These appear to be consistent with designs
used in practice. For example, Google has been using historical CTRs as weighting
factors and requiring higher minimum bids for advertisers with low historical CTRs.
As we have argued in section 7, the quality of such estimation affects the level of
efficiency that keyword auctions can achieve, thus, our results draw attention to the
importance of estimating advertisers’ future CTRs. Keyword advertising providers
may improve the quality of such estimation by acquiring additional information on
advertisers’ future CTRs and refining their estimation techniques.
Third, we characterize the revenue-maximizing weighting scheme and minimum-
bid policy. The revenue-maximizing weighting scheme may favor or disfavor low-CTR
advertisers relative to the efficient weighting scheme. If low- and high-CTR adver-
tisers have the same valuation-per-click distribution, advertising providers obtain the
highest expected revenue by favoring low-CTR advertisers—the disadvantaged type.
But if low-CTR advertisers have a less tight valuation distribution than high-CTR
ones, the revenue-maximizing weighting scheme may favor low-CTR advertisers less,
possibly even disfavoring them. Such results suggest that we cannot automatically
assume that low-CTR advertisers should be favored in a revenue-maximizing design.
Relation to Other Research. This research may have implications for
online procurement auctions, which have gained some acceptance in recent years
(Snir and Hitt 2003). One of the challenges for online procurement auction designers
is to incorporate non-price dimensions such as quality, delivery, and services into
auction mechanisms (Beall et al., 2003). Weighted unit-price auctions may provide
a framework to do that. Of course, further research is needed to account for special
features in procurement settings, such as the cost associated with switching suppliers
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and the fact that suppliers may misrepresent their non-price attributes.
Our research may also have implications for posted-schedule pricing of infor-
mation goods and services. A variety of information goods and services such as radio
spectrum, network bandwidth, and Internet cache are resources allocated for exclu-
sive use, the use of which may generate trackable outcomes (e.g., number of packets
transmitted). Information system researchers have proposed several ways to price
these resources (Bapna et al. 2005; Hosanager et al. 2005; Sundararajan 2004). For
example, Sundararajan (2004) suggests a nonlinear price schedule that includes a
fixed fee and a usage-based fee. Our results may add a new direction for pricing these
goods and services, that is, to charge buyers by realized outcomes (such as usage) and
differentiate pricing schedules for buyers with different outcome-generating potential
(such as usage rates). It will be interesting to compare such an approach to existing
ones in the optimal pricing literature.
Limitations and Future Research. This research has certain limitations.
We consider CTRs as endowed attributes while in reality advertisers may manipu-
late their CTRs to gain favorable weighting factors. If the manipulation permanently
improves an advertiser’s CTR (such as by improving the presentation of the advertise-
ment), then our results apply to the post-manipulation periods. Advertising providers
may want to encourage such “manipulation.” On the other hand, manipulation that
temporarily inflates an advertiser’s CTR may be discouraged by a carefully structured
CTR-estimation method. For example, manipulation that lasts one period does not
have much impact on the weighting factor in a weighting system that emphasizes
long-term CTR history. However, coping with various forms of manipulation remains
an open issue in keyword auction designs.
Several other issues may be interesting for future research. First, it is not
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entirely clear whether keyword auctions perform better than alterative mechanisms
such as posted-price. A commonly-accepted argument holds that auctions are more
suitable than posted-price when bidders’ valuation for goods and services is more
uncertain (Pinker et al. 2003). This appears to be a plausible explanation for the
popularity of auctions in selling keyword advertising slots, given sellers’ lack of knowl-
edge on the potential value of keyword advertising slots. Second, an important issue
related to this study is how to estimate advertisers’ future CTRs. Third, it would
be interesting to examine how competition from other keyword advertising providers
affects the efficient and revenue-maximizing designs.
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Chapter 3
Keyword Auctions, Unit-price Contracts, and the
Role of Commitment
3.1 Introduction
Unit-Price Contracts (UPC) are widely used in competitive procurement auc-
tions, such as highway contracting (Stark 1974) and national defense (Samuelson
1983, 1986). In such auctions, bidders submit their bids specifying the unit price for
each of the input factors. The auctioneer then calculates a score for each bidder based
on both the unit prices and the expected quantities needed. The bidder with the low-
est score wins the auction. The final payment to the winner, however, is determined
by the number of units that are finally consumed/needed in realization. Moreover,
many other regular settings, such as the marketing of publishing rights for books
(McAfee and McMillan 1986), can also be interpreted as UPC auctions. In recent
years, various formats of UPC auctions have been adopted by major search engines,
such as Yahoo!, Google, and MSN, to sell keyword-related advertising slots on their
web sites. In these auctions, the advertisers specify their per-click willingness to pay,
and the final payments to the search engine are determined by the actual number of
click-throughs that their advertisement generates.
Previous literature in UPC procurement auctions reveals that to promote com-
petition, it is beneficial for the auctioneer to give preferential treatment to those
bidders with lower efficiency/performance level (McAfee and McMillan 1986, Ewer-
hart and Fieseler 2003). In practice, UPC auctions often offer a subsidy to contrac-
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tors with inferior production technologies or lower performance level (Ewerhart and
Fieseler 2003). Preferential government procurement policies also affect several hun-
dred billion dollars’ worth of trade worldwide each year (Graham 1983). For example,
the United Stated Government offers a 50 percent preference for domestic suppliers
for military procurement (McAfee and McMillan 1989). These practices are inter-
preted as either a protectionist devices (Lowinger 1976), or a way to increase bidding
competition (McAfee and McMillan 1986).
There is also a fast growing literature studying the “keyword auctions,” which
is one of the most popular places to apply the UPC auctions on the internet. This
stream of literature usually focuses on the impact of varying auction mechanisms on
the advertisers’ bidding behavior and the auctioneer’s revenue. Feng et al. (2007)
finds that depending on the correlation between advertisers’ willingness to pay and
their relevance, Google’s (without preferential treatment) and Yahoo’s (with pref-
erential treatment) ranking mechanism can out-perform each other under different
conditions. Weber and Zheng (2007) study a search model in which advertisers com-
pete for positions in a search engine, and show that the optimal winning rule should
put non-zero weight on the advertisers’ bids. Liu and Chen (2006) consider a weighted
unit-price auction setting where bidders bid on unit prices, and the winner is deter-
mined by their bids as well as their past performance.
The above literature assumes that bidders’ performance levels are fixed, and
does not consider the possible impact of the auction mechanism on bidders’ perfor-
mance level in the long term. It is not obvious, however, whether the practice of
preferential treatment works when bidders’ performance may change over time for
various reasons. For instance, advertisers may invest in their performance for their
own interest or reacting to the performance-based ranking policy. In general, the pos-
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sible upgrade in performance, and hence the change in the performance distribution,
calls for adjusting the preferential policy accordingly. In addition, preferential treat-
ment may discourage low-performance bidders from investing in their performance
levels, which could negatively impact the auctioneer’s revenue. Moreover, under the
preferential treatment policy, a less efficient bidder beats more efficient ones with
positive probability (Ewerhart and Fieseler 2003). This efficiency loss, especially in
the long term, might be significantly detrimental for an industry that is sensitive to
its consumer response. In the case of keyword advertising, for example, the long-term
user base is a significant basis for search engines’ revenue.
In practice, the performance-based ranking mechanisms adopted by the search
engines are constantly changing over time, which exhibits an experimental process
and may reflect the need to adjust auction policies to dynamic features. For ex-
ample, Yahoo! used to rank advertisers by their willingness-to-pay per click and
has now switched to a new mechanism that also considers click-through rates in its
ranking. Google first introduced a design that ranks advertisers by the product of
per-click prices they bid and their historical click-through rates in 2002, and is also
modifying its “bid × CTR” algorithm.1 Besides, instead of announcing how their
ranking mechanisms exactly incorporate the performance information as they did
earlier, many search engines now keep this ambiguous.
These observations indicate that it is not sufficient to study UPC auctions
in a static setting, where the firms’ performance levels remain unchanged. On the
one hand, the auction mechanism gives bidders with different performance levels
different incentives to improve their performances, and this in turn affects the long
term average industry performance level. On the other, the updated distribution
1https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=49174
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of firms’ performance levels gives the auctioneer an incentive to modify his auction
mechanism, so the auctioneer faces a commitment problem. What is the impact
of the preferential ranking rules on bidders’ performance choice? How should the
auctioneer choose the performance-based allocation policy considering advertisers’
possible performance upgrade? Should the auctioneer commit to a certain mechanism
or it is beneficial to modify its auction mechanism in time?
This paper tries to answer the questions above, by capturing the dynamic ef-
fects of bidder performance evolution. We consider a two-period model. In the first
period, the auctioneer announces the performance-based auction mechanism and the
bidders decide whether or not to improve their performance levels. In the second pe-
riod, the auction takes place, but may or may not follow the exact auction mechanism
announced by the auctioneer in the first period. Bidders bid their unit prices and
the winner is chosen based on both their bids and performance levels. This paper re-
lates to literature on investment incentives in procurement auctions (Arozamena and
Cantillon 2004, Tan 1992). Most of these studies concern the revenue equivalence
under different auction formats (e.g., first-price sealed-bid auctions versus second-
price auctions), while our paper focuses on performance-based unit-price format in
the context of keyword auctions. To our knowledge, this setup is mostly related to
Branco (2002), which studies a procurement auction where two firms compete for a
government project and the inefficient firm may improve its technology. However,
in his setting, technology choice is unobservable. Instead, we study the case where
the performance is observable and thus performance-based allocation is feasible, and
obtain different insights.
Under this performance-based unit-price auction framework, we study the bid-
ders’ decisions on performance improvement (in the first period) and bid (in the sec-
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ond period), and then examine the impact of performance-based allocation on overall
bidder performance, the auction efficiency, and the auctioneer’s revenue. We find that
the overall performance level is monotonic in the degree of preferential treatment to
those bidders with low performance: the more the auctioneer discriminates against
low-performance bidders, the higher the overall performance level. The efficient pol-
icy involves weighting bidders’ unit-price bids by their expected performance. This is
consistent with the one in a static case where the performance level is fixed, although
the former concerns both allocative efficiency and investment efficiency whereas the
later considers allocative efficiency only. We also compare the auctioneer’s revenue-
maximizing policies when she is fully committed to the auction rule and when not, and
show that she should give less preferential treatment to low-performance advertisers
when she is fully committed.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe our model in Section 3.2. In
Section 3.3, we investigate bidders’ bidding decisions, as well as their performance
evolution – how bidders with lower performance levels convert to higher performance
by paying some cost. In Section 3.4, we study the impact of performance-based allo-
cation on bidders’ overall performance. We discuss social welfare in Section 3.5, and
explore the revenue-maximizing allocation for an auctioneer in Section 3.6. Section
3.7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Model Setup
We consider an environment where the auctioneer sells a single object to n risk-
neutral bidders, and the bidders have independent and private values for the object
being sold. We capture the long-term interactions between the auction mechanism
and bidders’ overall performance levels through a two-period model. In the first
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period, the auctioneer announces the auction mechanism, and the bidders decide
whether or not to invest in improving their performance levels. In the second period,
the auctioneer either keeps the announced auction rules, or modifies the rules, and
bidders participate in the auction. We refer to the former as a full-commitment case
and the latter as a limited-commitment case.
Assume that each bidder is endowed with a yield level y, which measures one’s
productivity, or efficiency of using the object being auctioned. Denote each bidder’s
unit valuation of y as v. In keyword advertising, yield level measures the expected
number of clicks that an advertiser can generate during a given period of time, and
the unit valuation is the advertiser’s per-click valuation. In this way, each bidder’s
total valuation for the object is determined by his yield from the object, y, times
his unit valuation, v. We assume that bidders’ yield levels are independent of their
unit valuations. Therefore, a bidder with a higher yield level is stochastically more
efficient than a bidder with a lower yield level. For this reason, we also refer to one’s
yield level as his performance level.
For simplicity, we assume that y takes a discrete value yH or yL, and yH > yL.
We call the bidders with yH high type bidders, or H types, and bidders with yL low
type bidders, or L types. Denote θ ∈ {L,H} as a bidder’s type. So a θ-type bidder’s
total valuation of the asset is vyθ. A L type bidder can invest in and improve his
performance level to yH at a cost c. In keyword advertising, for example, advertisers
may engage in extensive marketing research or experiments to improve their web site
design, and thus ultimately increase their click-through rates (Schlosser et al. 2006).
We assume that bidders know their own unit valuation v and performance
levels yθ, but not those of others. The unit valuation v is independent and identically-
distributed in [0, 1] following a distribution F (v). By the convention of distribution
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functions, let F (v) = 1 for v > 1. The corresponding density function is denoted
by f(v), which is positive and differentiable everywhere in the support. A bidder’s
performance level y in the first period is believed to be yH with probability α, and
yL with probability 1 − α. Both F (v) and α are commonly known. Moreover, each
bidder’s performance level is known to, or can be verified by the auctioneer after
the auction takes place in the second period. For example, in keyword auctions, the
number of click-throughs that a certain advertisement generates is not observed by
other advertisers, but can be approximately predicted (based on its past performance)
and accurately recorded by search engines.
The object is sold through a first-price, sealed-bid unit-price auction. The
auctioneer uses a scoring rule to evaluate the bids from bidders with different per-
formance levels. In particular, a weighting factor w ∈ (0, 1] on the low type bidders’
bids is introduced to measure this differential treatment. According to w and bidders’
unit-price bids, a score is calculated for a bidder of type θ according to the following
formula:
s(b, θ) =
{
b if θ = H
wb if θ = L
(3.1)
The bidder with the highest score wins and pays for all the realized yield at his
unit-price bid b. There is no entry fee or reserve price.
We assume that a bidder’s payoff from winning the object is additive in its
total valuation for the object, yv, and its payment, yb. So the expected payoff for a
θ-type bidder with unit valuation v who placed a bid b is
Uθ(v, b) = yθ(v − b)Prob(win|b, θ). (3.2)
By allowing w to take different values, we can accommodate different auction
formats. When w = yL
yH
, the low- and high-type bidders are treated “fairly,” as the
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winner is chosen based on the ranking of the total revenue created. The Google
auction belongs to this category. When w ∈ [0, yL
yH
), the bid submitted by a low
performance bidder is treated unfavorably. When w ∈ ( yL
yH
, 1], the low-type bidder is
treated favorably. The Yahoo!’s earlier auction format determined the winner solely
by the bidding amount, which is equivalent to the case when w = 1. We denote
the case of w = 1 as a standard unit-price auction, and the case of w < 1 as a
performance-based auction.
The timing is as follows. In the first period, the auctioneer announces the
weighting factor w. Then, bidders’ performance levels and valuations realize, and the
L types decide whether to improve their performance or not. In the second period, all
bidders participate in the auction.2 Each bidder’s score is calculated. The object is
assigned to the bidder with the highest score, and payment is made to the auctioneer.
We are interested in the impacts of the performance-based allocation on bid-
ders’ performance evolution, the resulting social welfare, and the auctioneer’s ex-
pected revenue.
3.3 Bidding Strategy and Performance Conversion
In this section, we focus on the L types’ performance decisions. To derive
the subgame perfect equilibrium, we start with the second period, where bidders
participate in the auction with a given weighting factor w. We conjecture that in
equilibrium, there exists a cutoff value v∗, such that in the first period, all the L
types whose unit valuations are above v∗ will improve their performance levels by
incurring an investment cost c, and all the L types whose unit valuations are below
2In the limited commitment case, the auctioneer modifies the auction rule according to the
updated distribution of bidders’ performances before the auction begins.
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v∗ will remain at the low performance level. This conjecture is intuitive because,
in general, upon winning the object, the L types with higher unit valuations have
higher gains from improving their performance ((yH − yL)v) than those L types with
lower unit valuations. As a result, the L types with higher valuations should be more
likely to invest in their performance. We will verify later that this is an equilibrium
strategy.
3.3.1 Second Period: the Bidding Strategy for a Given w
Denote FL(v) ≡ F (v|θ = L) as the distribution function of L types’ unit
valuation in the second period, and FH(v) ≡ F (v|θ = H) as that of H types’. FL(v)
and FH(v) can be calculated by applying Bayes’ rule. In particular, according to the
conjecture of cutoff v∗ (we use Pr(·) to represent the probability of an event in the
second period),
FL(v) =
Pr(V ≤ v, θ = L)
Pr(θ = L)
=
{
F (v)
F (v∗) if v ≤ v∗
1 if v > v∗
(3.3)
and
FH(v) =
Pr(V ≤ v, θ = H)
Pr(θ = H)
=
{
αF (v)
1−(1−α)F (v∗) if v ≤ v∗
F (v)−(1−α)F (v∗)
1−(1−α)F (v∗) if v > v
∗,
(3.4)
This is because, under our conjecture, a bidder is an L type in the second period
only if he is endowed with low performance in the first period (with probability
(1 − α)) and remains at it (if his unit valuation is less than v∗). Therefore, in the
second period, a bidder with probability (1 − α)F (v∗) is an L type, and thus with
probability [1− (1− α)F (v∗)] is an H type. If we simply denote PL ≡ Pr(θ = L) and
PH ≡ Pr(θ = H), that is
PL = (1− α)F (v∗), and PH = 1− (1− α)F (v∗). (3.5)
In addition, in the second period, a bidder is an L type with unit-valuation less than
v only if he is endowed with low performance and with unit valuation less than v,
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which occurs with probability (1 − α)F (v). This accounts for (3.3). Similarly, a
bidder is an H type with unit-valuation less than v (if v ≤ v∗) with probability
αF (v). For the case where v > v∗, we need to take into account that the H types
in the second period also include those converted from L types, which happens with
probability (1− α)(F (v)−F (v∗)). Therefore, the probability of one being H type of
v > v∗ in the second period is αF (v) + (1 − α)(F (v) − F (v∗)) (Equation 3.4). We
denote the corresponding density functions as fL(v) and fH(v) accordingly (specified
in Appendix A).
We consider a symmetric, pure-strategy, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. By “sym-
metric,” we mean that bidders with the same unit valuations and performance levels
will bid the same amount in equilibrium. Let bH(v) and bL(v) denote the bidding
functions for the H types and L types in the second period, respectively. We con-
jecture that the bidding functions are strictly increasing (we will verify this later).
Using an approach similar to that in Liu and Chen (2006), we obtain the following
result regarding the bidding functions:
Lemma 3.3.1. bH(wv) = wbL(v) for v ∈ [0, v∗].
Lemma 3.3.1 shows that in equilibrium, an H type with unit valuation wv
and an L type with unit valuation v will obtain the same score (recall the scoring
rule (3.1)). The intuition is as follows. Consider an H type with unit valuation wv
who bids wb and an L type with unit valuation v who bids b. By the scoring rule,
the former has the same probability of winning as the latter. Then, the expected
payoff of the former differs from that of the latter only by a scalar according to (3.2).
Because multiplying a payoff function by a scalar does not alter the solution to an
optimization problem, b is the solution to the L type’s optimization problem if and
only if wb is the solution to the H type’s problem.
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By the conjecture of the monotonicity of bidding functions, an L type i with
unit-valuation v can beat a bidder j if and only if j is an L type and has a unit
valuation less than v, or j is an H type and has a unit-valuation less than wv (by
Lemma 3.3.1). So, the probability for an L type with unit-valuation v to beat the
other bidders, or his equilibrium winning probability, can be represented by
ρL(v) ≡ [PHFH(wv) + PLFL(v)]n−1 . (3.6)
Similarly,
ρH(v) ≡
[
PHFH(v) + PLFL(
v
w
)
]n−1
. (3.7)
Lemma 3.3.2 presents the equilibrium bidding functions.
Lemma 3.3.2. For a given w ≤ 1 and the cutoff value v∗, the equilibrium bidding
functions for H types and L types are increasing in v, and can be represented as the
following:
bL(v) = v −
∫ v
0
ρL(t)dt
ρL(v)
, for v ∈ [0, v∗] (3.8)
bH(v) = v −
∫ v
0
ρH(t)dt
ρH(v)
, for v ∈ [0, 1]. (3.9)
It is easy to verify that the above bidding functions are indeed strictly in-
creasing (see the appendix for the proof). Also, as indicated by (3.8) and (3.9), a
bidder’s equilibrium unit-price bid is always less than his true unit valuation, which
is common among first-price auctions.
It can be shown that there are two kinks (wv∗ and v∗) in the H types’ bidding
function. This is due to the kinks in the winning probability ρH(t) (see Appendix
A), as the competition situation faced by the H types is discontinuous. Figure 3.1
illustrates the equilibrium bidding functions and equilibrium scores with w = 0.5 and
v∗ = 0.5. By the scoring rule, H types’ equilibrium scores are their equilibrium bids,
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Figure 3.1: The Equilibrium Bidding Functions and Equilibrium Scores
and L types’ are their equilibrium bids adjusted by the weighting factor w. The first
kink in the H types’ bidding function is because FL(
t
w
) = 1 for all t > 0.25, and the
second is due to the kink of FH(t) at t = 0.5. Intuitively, it is still possible for an H
type with a relatively low unit valuation (v ≤ 0.25) to lose to an L type, even though
an L type’s bid gets discounted by w. However, once the H type’s unit valuation
exceeds a certain value (0.25), he can always beat an L type, because all the L types’
unit valuations are below 0.5. Therefore, there exists a kink at v = 0.25. Similarly,
an H type with an intermediate unit valuation (0.25 < v ≤ 0.5) faces different
competition pressure from an H type with higher valuation (v > 0.5), because an H
type with a high unit valuation (v > 0.5) can be either an original H type or one
converted from an L type. Therefore, the second kink happens at v = 0.5.
Denote Vθ(v) ≡ Uθ(v, bθ(v)) as the equilibrium expected payoff of a bidder
with type θ and unit valuation v. From the payoff function (3.2) and the bidding
functions (3.8) and (3.9),
Vθ(v) = yθ(v − bθ(v))ρθ(v) = yθ
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt. (3.10)
by noticing that Prob(win|bθ(v), θ) = ρθ(v) (both representing the equilibrium win-
ning probability).
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3.3.2 First Period: Performance Conversion for a Given w
Given the equilibrium bidding functions in the second period, we now solve
the L types’ decisions on performance upgrades in the first period. We show that
there does exist such a cutoff value v∗ in equilibrium, from which no bidder will
unilaterally deviate. An L type benefits from converting to an H type, because both
his performance level and his winning probability increase. The overall benefit is
represented by the increase in the equilibrium payoffs from changing from an L type
to an H type, that is, VH(v) − VL(v). However, the investment in the performance
incurs a cost c. Given w, whether an L type converts or not depends on this tradeoff.
Proposition 3.3.3. Given w (0 < w ≤ 1) and the investment cost c, there exists a
cutoff value v∗, such that an L type with unit valuation higher than v∗ converts to an
H type, and with valuations lower than v∗ does not, where v∗ is determined as follows.
v∗ = 0 if c = 0
v∗ solves ∆V (v∗) = c if 0 < c < ∆V (1)
v∗ = 1 if c ≥ ∆V (1)
(3.11)
where
∆V (v∗) = yH
∫ v∗
0
ρH(t)dt− yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL(t)dt. (3.12)
When it is costless for the L types to convert, every L type will convert to an
H type (v∗ = 0) for the benefit from both improved productivity and advantageous
position in the scoring rule. Consequently, in the second period, all bidders in the
auction are H types. In such a case, the performance-based auction is identical to
the standard unit-price auction, and the problem becomes straightforward. When
the investment cost is prohibitive (higher than the gain that the L type of the highest
unit valuation can get from the conversion), the gain from improving performance
cannot compensate for the cost, and no L types will convert (v∗ = 1). In this case,
the problem is identical to the case studied by Liu and Chen (2006).
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For the rest of this paper, we focus on the more interesting case where the
investment cost is modest and at least some L types are interested in the conversion.
In general, the conversion decision is based on the tradeoff between the gain
from conversion and the investment cost. Everything else being equal, higher cost
results in fewer L types converting. Moreover, as the cost increases, the L types who
choose to remain at the low performance level instead of converting are those with
relatively low unit-valuations, since those low-valuation L types could benefit less
from conversion than high-valuation ones. Similarly, the difference between the two
performance levels affects the L types’ decisions on the conversion: given yL, a higher
yH , which means more gain from conversion, could induce more L types to convert.
As a summary,
Corollary 3.3.4. For a given w, v∗ increases in the investment cost (c) and decreases
in the high performance level (yH).
3.4 Bidders’ Overall Performance
In this section, we examine the effect of differential treatment (w) on the
winning bidder’s overall performance level. First, we observe that the cutoff value is
closely related to the weighting factor.
Lemma 3.4.1. The cutoff value v∗ is increasing in the weighting factor w.
Intuitively, as w increases, and hence the L types are treated more favorably,3
bidders’ benefit from improving their performance levels reduces. As a result, the
benefit can no longer compensate for the investment cost c for some L types who
3Actually, when w > yLyH , L types are given preferential treatment.
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would choose to convert. So, as w increases, fewer bidders have incentive to invest
in their performance levels. In other words, the more the L types are discriminated
against in the auction (the smaller the w), the larger incentive for the L types to
improve their performance levels, because otherwise they have little chance to win.
Next, we explore the impact of the weighting factor on the expected winning
performance level. The expected winning performance level is determined by the
bidders’ performance weighted by their winning probabilities, which can be expressed
as:
yLPL
∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) fL (v) dv + yHPH
∫ 1
0
ρH (v) fH (v) dv. (3.13)
Proposition 3.4.2. The more the L types are discriminated against, the higher the
overall performance level. That is, the expected winning performance level is decreas-
ing in w.
To show this, from Lemma 3.4.1, we know that as w decreases, fewer bidders
remain at the low performance level. Moreover, as w decreases, L types’ equilib-
rium winning probabilities decrease as well. Both factors drive the expected winning
performance level to the same direction: the lower the w, the higher the expected
performance level. As a result, the performance-based auctions with 0 < w < 1, in
general, enhance the expected winning performance level compared to the standard
UPC auctions (where w = 1).
3.5 Auction Efficiency
In this section, we study the efficiency of the UPC auction. The efficiency in
our dynamic setting not only means that the object is assigned to the bidder with
the highest valuation, but also that the L types make proper investment in their
performance levels.
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The efficient weighting factor weff is defined as one that maximizes social wel-
fare, that is, the total expected payoff of the auctioneer and bidders. The efficiency
may be in the auctioneer’s best interest in the long run. In keyword auctions, es-
pecially, the market for keyword advertising is relatively nascent, and search engines
are still at an early stage of the use of the UPC auction mechanism. It is sensible for
the auctioneer (search engine) to choose an efficient design at this stage to maximize
the “total pie.” After all, unless advertisers feel that they get fair treatment in the
auctions and see high returns, they will not return for more business or allocate larger
fractions of their advertising budgets on keyword advertising.
The total welfare for the auctioneer and bidders is their total expected valua-
tion minus the expected investment cost:
n
[
yLPL
∫ v∗
0
vρL (v) fL (v) dv + yHPH
∫ 1
0
vρH (v) fH (v) dv − (1− α) (1− F (v∗)) c
]
.
(3.14)
So, weff maximizes (3.14).
In a standard static auction, an efficient policy considers allocative efficiency
only. An efficient auction allocates the object to the bidder with the highest total
valuation. In our dynamic setup, the efficiency also refers to the investment efficiency
(whether there exists over-investment or under-investment in performance). As a
result, it is not obvious whether the results in the static setting will hold in our case
when bidders can update their performance levels.
Proposition 3.5.1. The efficient weighting factor weff =
yL
yH
.
Proposition 3.5.1 shows that the efficient policy in this two-stage game involves
weighting bidders’ unit-price bids by their expected performance, which is the same
as in the static one (Liu and Chen 2006). This may look surprising, but the intuition
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is as follows. First of all, the weighting factor w = yL
yH
ensures the allocative efficiency
in the second stage. As we mentioned earlier, when w = yL
yH
, the L types and H types
are treated “fairly” in the sense that the winner is chosen based on the ranking of their
total contribution. This is equivalent to the standard first-price auction where bidders
submit their total payments for the object, so the allocative efficiency is guaranteed.
Second, the weighting factor w = yL
yH
also leads to an efficient conversion. In
general, whether an investment is efficient or not depends on the tradeoff between the
social gain (increase in the expected social welfare) and the investment cost. From
the previous discussion, the performance-based auction with w = yL
yH
is equivalent to
a first-price auction, and hence equivalent to a second-price auction by the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem (Myerson 1981). Notice that a second-price auction is a special
case of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971,
Groves 1973), in which one’s expected payoff equals the externality that he imposes
on the other bidders, or, the improvement of the social welfare that he brings in.
Therefore, the social gain from one’s conversion equals the increase of his payoff
[VH(v)− VL(v)]. For the marginal bidder, i.e., the L type with unit valuation v∗, the
increase of his payoff ∆V (v∗) is equal to the investment cost c by Eq. (3.11), which
implies that the social gain from the marginal bidder’s conversion breaks even with
the investment cost.For the L types with a higher unit valuation (v > v∗), the social
gain from conversion is greater than the investment cost. Therefore, it is efficient for
them to convert. Similarly, it is efficient for the L types with a lower unit valuation
(v < v∗) not to convert. So w = yL
yH
leads to investment efficiency.
For these reasons, we define the performance-based auction with w = yL
yH
as
an efficient performance-based auction.
It is worth noting that the above efficiency result is independent of whether
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the auctioneer can fully commit to the pre-announced auction rule or not. This
is because, in the second stage, it is always efficient to choose w = yL
yH
regardless
of bidders’ conversion patterns (as argued in the above). As a result, whether the
auctioneer can fully commit or not does not influence L types’ conversion decision in
the first period.
3.6 The Revenue-Maximizing w
In this section, we focus on the weighting factor that maximizes the auction-
eer’s expected revenue and compare the results in the full commitment case to those
in the limited commitment case. We denote wLopt and w
F
opt as the revenue-maximizing
weighting factors for the former and the latter case, respectively.
Based on bidders’ bidding strategy in the second period, and the L types’ deci-
sions of their performance conversion in the first period, for a given w, the auctioneer’s
expected revenue can be expressed as (see the appendix for the derivation)
pi = nyLPL
∫ v∗
0
ρL(v)
(
v − 1− FL(v)
fL(v)
)
fL(v)dv
+nyHPH
∫ 1
0
ρH(v)
(
v − 1− FH(v)
fH(v)
)
fH(v)dv. (3.15)
Basically, the first term is the expected revenue from the L types in the second
period (the “ex post” L types), and the second term is that from the “ex post” H
types. Denote Jθ(v) ≡
[
v − 1−Fθ(v)
fθ(v)
]
, θ ∈ {H,L}. In the standard auction litera-
ture, Jθ(v) is called virtual value (Myerson 1981) or marginal revenue (Bulow and
Roberts 1989), which represents the expected revenue a certain bidder can bring to
the auctioneer if he wins.
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3.6.1 Auctioneer with Limited Commitment
Since some higher-valued, low-performance bidders improve their performance
levels in the first period, the distribution of the H types and L types changes at the
beginning of the second period. As a result, the original w, which is pre-announced
at the beginning of the first period, may no longer be optimal, and the auctioneer
has incentive to host the auction following a different rule. In practice, both Yahoo!
and Google experience a migration of their ranking mechanisms over time. Moreover,
neither of them announce the exact w that they are using now, which gives them
more flexibility in altering their ranking mechanism. This corresponds to the case
where the auctioneer has limited commitment to her pre-announced policy, and the
actual auction rule could differ from an earlier announcement (before the L types
make their conversion decision).4
When the auctioneer has limited commitment, the L types make their conver-
sion decisions based on their anticipation of the weighting factor that the auctioneer
will choose in the second period. With this anticipation, the break-even condition
(3.11) holds. The auctioneer chooses an revenue-maximizing weighting factor based
on her belief about the L types’ conversion decisions. In equilibrium, the beliefs are
consistent with the equilibrium choice of v∗ and wLopt. The equilibrium outcome is
thus identical to a simultaneous move game where the auctioneer and bidders act at
the same time. The revenue-maximizing weighting factor and the cutoff value are
determined by the equation system below.
∆V (v∗) = c and
∂pi
∂w
= 0, (3.16)
where the first equation is the break-even condition for the L types, and the second
4Or from auction to auction, if considering the case where auctions are held repeatedly.
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equation comes from the first-order condition of the expected revenue (3.15) with
respect to w. Specifically,
∂pi
∂w
= n(1−α)yL
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
JL(v)f(v)dv+nαyH
∫ wv∗
0
dρH (v)
dw
JH(v)f(v)dv. (3.17)
Proposition 3.6.1 discusses the revenue-maximizing w.
We say a cumulative distribution function F (v) is increasing-hazard-rate (IHR)
if its hazard rate f(v)
1−F (v) increases in v within the support. Many distributions, in-
cluding uniform, normal, and exponential, satisfy the condition of increasing hazard
rate.
Proposition 3.6.1. In the limited commitment case, the revenue-maximizing weight-
ing factor wLopt is determined by (3.16). Moreover, if F (v) is IHR, this revenue-
maximizing weighting factor is greater than the efficient weighting factor, that is,
wLopt >
yL
yH
.
Proposition 3.6.1 shows that it is beneficial for the auctioneer to give more
preferential treatment to the L type bidders than the efficient level. It indicates that
the recommendation of preferential treatment to the L types in a static setting also
applies to the dynamic setting, though with a different magnitude. This is because, in
the absence of commitment, the auctioneer chooses the revenue-maximizing weighting
factor based on the ex post (after conversion) type distribution in the second period
only, which is exactly as making the choice in a static case. Favoring L type bidders
raises L type bidders’ winning probabilities, which in turn increases the competitive
pressure on H type bidders and thus force them to bid more aggressively. The for-
mer effect tends to lower the auctioneer’s expected revenue, but the latter tends to
enhance the auctioneer’s expected revenue. The resolution of such a tradeoff involves
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some preferential treatment to L type bidders. Such a result holds regardless of the
distribution of types (α) and the exact performance levels (yH and yL).
The revenue-maximizing weighting factor, however, is different from that in a
static case, which corresponds to a special case of v∗ = 1 in our setting.5 Proposition
3.6.2 compares the revenue-maximizing w in the limited commitment case to that in
the static case.
Proposition 3.6.2. When v ∼ U [0, 1], the auctioneer should give more preferential
treatment to the L types when they are able to improve their performance levels than
when their performance levels are fixed.
This is because, after the conversion of some higher-valued, low-performance
bidders, the remaining L types are in a more disadvantaged situation. So, the auc-
tioneer should give them more preferential treatment to promote competition.
How does the revenue-maximizing weighting factor impact the equilibrium
performance level compared to an efficient weighting factor? Recall that Proposi-
tion 3.4.2 indicates that a higher weighting factor leads to lower expected winning
performance. So we have,
Corollary 3.6.3. If F (v) is IHR, the revenue-maximizing weighting factor results in
a lower expected winning performance level than the efficient weighting factor does.
In some instances, the expected winning performance is an important factor
for the auctioneer to consider. For example, the performance in keyword auctions
measures the relevance of the advertisements to consumers, which could impact con-
sumers’ search costs for the information of interest and hence affect the long-term
5Fixing v∗ = 1 and solving the second equation in (3.16) give us the revenue-maximizing weighting
factor in the static case.
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user base. In this case, subsidizing the lower types is not only at the cost of efficiency,
as discussed earlier, but also at the cost of lowering the performance, and therefore
is even more costly.
3.6.2 Auctioneer with Full Commitment
When fully committed to the pre-announced auction rules, the auctioneer’s
decision on w directly affects the L types’ performance choices. So the auctioneer
has to consider the effect of w on the L types’ conversion patterns, as well as on the
intensity of competition. The effect on competition is similar to that in the limited
commitment case. The effect on the L types’ conversion patterns is reflected by the
term of dv
∗
dw
in the first-order condition below.
n
[
(1− α) [(yLρL(v∗)− yHρH(v∗)) v∗ + c] f(v∗) + αyH
∫ v∗
wv∗
dρH (v)
dv∗
JH(v)f(v)dv
]
×dv
∗(w)
dw
+
∂pi
∂w
= 0 .(3.18)
where ∂pi
∂w
is defined as in (3.17).
Lemma 3.6.4. The revenue-maximizing weighting factor wFopt is jointly determined
by Equation (3.11) and (3.18).
Considering the ex post (after conversion) competition in the second period,
the auctioneer has incentive to subsidize the L types (by setting w > yL
yH
), which
forces the H types to bid more aggressively. We call this effect the competition effect,
which is captured by the term ∂pi
∂w
in (3.18). However, lower w, or less subsidy to
the L types, makes more L types convert, and this could presumably enhance the
auctioneer’s revenue. We call this effect the conversion effect, which is captured by
the term in the first square bracket in (3.18). In general, the revenue-maximizing
weighting factor is determined by the balance between the competition effect and the
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conversion effect, which depends on the proportion of H types and L types in the
distribution.
How does the equilibrium differ in the full-commitment case from that in the
limited-commitment case?
Proposition 3.6.5. If the expected revenue in (3.15) is concave with respect to w
(i.e., ∂2pi/∂w2 < 0) and F (v) is IHR, wFopt < w
L
opt.
Proposition 3.6.5 shows that an auctioneer who can commit to the auction rule
should give less preferential treatment to the low performance bidders than she does
when she cannot fully commit. The intuition is as follows. In the full-commitment
case, the preferential treatment not only affects the competition in the second period
(as in the limited-commitment case), but also impacts L types’ conversion decisions.
A less preferential treatment to L types gives them more incentive to improve their
performance levels, which is beneficial for the auctioneer. However, this objective
is not achievable when the auctioneer cannot commit to an auction rule. This is
because as any announcement that the auctioneer makes before the second period is
not credible, bidders make their performance upgrade decisions based on their own
expectations.
The concavity condition per se does not drive the result in Proposition 3.6.5;
rather, it ensures that the optimization problem in the limited commitment case is well
behaved. In fact, as long as ∂pi/∂w = 0 (the second equation in (3.16)) has a unique
solution, the result in Proposition 3.6.5 holds (see this in the proof of Proposition
3.6.5). Also, we can show that the assumption of concavity of the revenue function
can be relaxed to a weaker notion of quasiconcave functions. The concavity condition
is satisfied by many common distributions, for instance, uniform distribution. The
following is one numerical example.
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Example 3.6.6. Let F (v) = v (uniform distribution at [0, 1]), n = 5, α = 0.5,
yH = 1, and yL change from 0.1 to 0.9. We can derive the revenue-maximizing
weighting factors and the maximum revenue with the changes in the yL in the limited-
commitment case and the full-commitment case, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: A Comparison of the Cases with Different Commitments
Figure 3.2(a) says that wopt in the full-commitment case is less than that in
the limited-commitment case. Also, Figure 3.2(b) shows that a fully committed auc-
tioneer makes more expected revenue than an auctioneer with limited commitment.
In fact, whether an auctioneer can fully commit or not has a general impact on her
expected revenue, as summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.6.7. A fully committed auctioneer makes more revenue than an auc-
tioneer with limited commitment.
This is because with full commitment, the auctioneer can always commit to
the revenue-maximizing weighting factor chosen in the limited commitment case and
achieve at least the same revenue as in the limited commitment case. But the reverse
is not true.
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3.7 Conclusion
We study a performance-based unit-price auction model where the low per-
formance bidders can improve their performance level at a cost. We find that there
exists a cutoff value in bidders’ unit valuations, such that all low-type bidders with
unit valuations greater than the cutoff value convert to a high performance level. The
efficient allocation in the static case carries on to our dynamic case. The revenue-
maximizing weighting factor, however, is different from that in the static case. In
addition, whether or not the auctioneer can commit to an auction policy also impacts
the revenue-maximizing factor. In the limited-commitment case, the auctioneer has
more incentive to subsidize lower performance bidders to promote competition than
in the static case where bidders performance levels remain unchanged. Moreover, the
revenue-maximizing weighting factor in the full-commitment case is less than that
in the limited-commitment case, which indicates that the auctioneer should give less
preferential treatment to the low-type bidders to encourage them to improve their
performance levels.
Our research generates several managerial implications. First, allocation poli-
cies critically affect bidders’ performance choices, and auctioneers should handicap
low-performance bidders for better overall performance. Improving overall perfor-
mance should be an important concern for such markets as two-sided networks. For
example, in keyword auctions hosted by the search engines, both user traffic and ad-
vertising revenue are important for the search engine, and the performance/relevance
of the advertisement affect the search engine’s long-term user base.
To achieve long-run allocation efficiency, which is probably more important
for a start-up company which wishes to establish a good reputation, it is sufficient to
follow the efficient policy developed in a static setting. In particular, the auctioneer
72
needs to estimate the performance levels of the bidders and adjust their unit-price
bids by the estimated performance in allocating objects.
If the improvement of performance takes a long time, and the short-run profit
is also important for the auctioneer, it is beneficial for the auctioneer to bias toward
disadvantaged bidders to promote overall competition. Taking into account bidders’
possible upgrade in their performance, auctioneers with limited commitment should
bias even more than suggested in a static case. It is important to note that the
benefit of preferential treatment to low-performance bidders is at the cost of lower
efficiency and the market’s overall performance. Moreover, auctioneers may be better
off if they can fully commit to a pre-announced revenue-maximizing policy. The
lack of commitment in keyword auctions may be due to the fact that the market
for keyword advertising is still nascent, and both search engines and advertisers are
learning from practice. In a well understood market, it is better for an auctioneer to
credibly communicate its commitment, e.g., explicitly announce the weighting factor.
In doing so, the auctioneer should bias less for low-performance bidders to encourage
them to improve performance.
Future extension of this research includes introducing competition among mul-
tiple auctioneers. In the traditional procurement setting, it is natural to assume that
auctioneers are monopolists, since the objects requested differ from one another. In
keyword auctions, however, the competition among keyword advertising providers
(mainly, Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft) is commonly observed and has become an
important feature. Open questions remain: How do bidders make the performance
choice with an outside option; and how is the revenue-maximizing weighting factor
determined in competing auctions?
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Chapter 4
How to Slice the Pie? Optimal Share Structure
Design in Keyword Auctions
4.1 Introduction
Unlike conventional advertising, keyword advertising providers, such as Google,
Yahoo!, and MSN, use auctions to sell keyword advertising resources. A typical key-
word auction runs like this: for each keyword, keyword advertising providers offer
several advertising slots at the same time. Advertisers compete for these slots by bid-
ding on their willingness-to-pay per impression (pay-per-impression) or willingness-to-
pay per click (pay-per-click). In pay-per-impression auctions, a keyword advertising
provider ranks advertisers by their pay-per-impressions and, in pay-per-click auctions,
by the product of pay-per-clicks and click-through-rates, which are defined as the num-
ber of clicks per thousand page impressions. The keyword advertising provider then
fills keyword advertising slots such that the highest ranked advertiser goes to the first
slot, the second highest ranked advertiser goes to the second slot, and so on. If we
view slots as resources of various sizes, keyword auctions can also be viewed as share
auctions in which the auctioneer packages the total resources into various shares and
simultaneously sells them to bidders. We study a “share structure” problem arising
from such an auction setting, that is, how much resources should keyword advertising
providers set aside for the highest bidder, for the second highest bidder, and so on.
We consider resources in the keyword advertising setting to be “effective im-
pressions,” or impressions adjusted for effectiveness. This is to account for the fact
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that different slots on the same page may get different amount of users’ attention.
By this notion of resources, a top slot offers more effective impressions than than a
bottom one. Similarly, a slot on website optimized for advertising offers more effective
impressions than one on a website that is not optimized for advertising, for the same
number of raw impressions.1
An important premise of our study is that keyword advertising providers can
choose the share structure, that is, keyword advertising providers can choose the
fractions of total available resources assigned to the highest advertiser, the second
highest advertiser, and so on. Such flexible shares can be implemented with existing
infrastructures. For example, keyword advertising providers can tailor the amount of
effective impressions allocated to k-th highest bidder by randomizing between different
slots and by controlling the number of websites on which the advertisement is shown.
In the end, advertisers do not get fixed slots, but receive certain amount of effective
impressions that may come from multiple slots.2
There are several reasons for keyword advertising providers to choose share
structures rather than take them for granted. First, assigning the jth slot to the jth
highest bidder may be a natural choice when there is a single website. However, with
the advent of “AdSense,” many websites become available for advertisers. Simply
assigning jth slots on every website to the j-th highest advertiser may not always
make sense because, for one, first slots on all websites may be too much resources
for any single advertiser. Second, there are cases where the number of available
1In practice, the effectiveness of slots can be inferred from natural experiments that involve
identical advertisements being displayed on different slots. keyword advertising providers may also
conduct such experiments.
2In fact, even in the current system, advertisers are not guaranteed a particular slot. Google
provides advertisers an estimation of expected number of impressions and clicks, along with their
expected slots, in its Traffic Estimator software.
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slots on any single website may be too few to satisfy many advertisers at the same
time. As a result, keyword advertising providers may want to allocate a “fraction”
of a slot to an advertiser (e.g., by time-sharing with other advertisers). Third, how
advertising slots are located on a page is often up to the publishers. There may be no
meaningful ranking among slots (e.g., horizontally-arranged slots may have roughly
the same value to advertisers). In sum, as more and more advertisers and publishers
participating in keyword auctions,3 it is imperative for keyword advertising providers
to optimize on the way advertising resources are allocated among winning bidders.
This requires keyword advertising providers to choose share structures, rather than
letting them dictated by the (natural) distribution of slots on and across pages.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the optimal share
structure problem associated with keyword auctions. We address the optimal share-
structure problem in the following setting. The auctioneer has a fixed amount of
resources and divides them into multiple shares. Bidders’ valuation for a share is
determined by the size of the share and a private signal (we shall call it the bidder’s
type). Bidders are invited to bid their willingness-to-pay for per unit resource (or
unit price). The auctioneer allocates shares to bidders in a way such that the bid-
der who offers to pay the highest unit price gets the largest share, the bidder who
offers to pay the second highest unit price gets the second largest share, and so on.
In this setting, we first characterize the optimal share structure that maximizes the
auctioneer’s expected revenue. We then examine how the optimal share structure is
3keyword advertising providers are also actively seeking expansion of their keyword advertising
services to other media, including mobile devices, radio, online video, and print advertising. For
example, in February 2006, Google announced a deal with global operator Vodafone to include
its search engine on Vodafone Live! mobile internet service. Google experimented with classified
advertising in the Chicago Sun-Times in fall 2005. On January 17, 2006, Google agreed to acquire
dMarc Broadcasting, an automated booking and scheduling service for radio advertisements. In
August 2007, Google began a new type of video advertisement on popular video site YouTube.
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affected by various factors, including bidders’ price elasticity of demand (defined as
the percentage change in demand due to one percent change in price), the distribution
of bidders’ type, total resources available, and whether a minimum bid is used.
Our analysis generate several insights on designing optimal share structures
in keyword auctions. First, we characterize the optimal share structure under our
model setting. We conclude that when advertisers’ valuation is linear or convex in
share sizes, a single grand share, or winner-take-all, is optimal. When advertisers’
valuation is sufficiently concave, multiple shares may become optimal. The optimal
share structure generally consists of a series of what we call “plateaus,” or consecutive
shares with identical size. The starting and ending ranks of plateaus are determined
mainly by the distribution of bidders’ type. For a special group of single-peaked
type distributions (such as uniform, normal, or exponential distributions), plateaus
degenerate to single shares so that the optimal share structure consists of a series of
strictly decreasing shares.
We also offer several insights on how the optimal share structures should
change when the underlying demand or supply factors change. We say a share struc-
ture is steeper if it has larger high-ranked shares and smaller low-ranked ones. First, as
bidders’ demands for advertising resources become less elastic, the auctioneer should
use a less steep share structure. When bidders have near-perfect or perfect elastic
demand (the valuation function is close to linear), the auctioneer should allocate as
much resources as possible to the highest advertisers. Second, a change in the type
distribution affects the optimal share structure in the following way. The optimal
share structure should remain the same in the case of “scaling” (i.e., multiplying
each advertiser’s type by a common factor), and less steep when the type distribu-
tion is “shifted” to the right (i.e., increasing each advertiser’s type by a common
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factor). Third, when total resource increases, the absolute share sizes increase. But
changes in percentage values of shares depend on how advertisers’ price elasticity
of demand changes in total resources assigned to them: high-ranked shares should
increase by a larger percentage when bidders’ price elasticity of demand increases
in the amount of resources allocated, and the converse is true when bidders’ price
elasticity decreases. This result reinforces our previous intuition that a more elastic
demand should be associated with a steeper share structure. Finally, we show that
the auctioneer should use a less steep share structure when imposing an optimally
set minimum bid (and a steeper share structure when not). Together the above re-
sults provide useful guidelines for keyword advertising providers on how to fit share
structures to the micro-market conditions for each keyword.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss the
related literature. We set forth our model in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we derive
general results on optimal share structures. Section 4.5 discusses how the optimal
share structure is affected by the underlying supply and demand factors. In Section
4.6, we extend our analysis to a case with minimum bids. Section 4.7 concludes the
paper.
4.2 Literature Review
Our research problem bears some connections to the prize-allocation problem
in contests (Glazer and Hassin 1988, Moldovanu and Sela 2001, Liu et al. 2007).
As in keyword auctions, prizes are allocated by the rank of contestants. Contests
are often viewed as all-pay-auctions (all-pay auctions are auctions in which bidders
forfeit their bids whether they win or not). Glazer and Hassin (1988) are the first to
study the prize-allocation problem using the all-pay auction framework. One of their
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findings is that winner-take-all is optimal when contestants’ cost is a linear function of
their effort and skill is uniformly distributed. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) generalize
Glazer and Hassin (1988)’s result by showing that winner-take-all is always optimal
for general distributions as long as the disutility function is linear; on the other hand,
when the disutility function is convex, multiple prizes may be optimal. Our winner-
take-all result under the linear valuation setting echoes the finding of Moldovanu
and Sela (2001) under the contest setting. However, there are noticeable differences
between this study and Moldovanu and Sela’s. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) model
all-pay auctions whereas we study keyword auctions in which only winners pay. We
characterize the optimal share structure for n-shares whereas Moldovanu and Sela’s
analysis is limited to two prizes (generalizing their results to more than two prizes is
nontrivial). Our findings on the existence of plateaus in the optimal share structures
and its relationship to the underlying type distribution are novel. Moreover, we
offer several managerial insights that are nonexistent in Moldovanu and Sela (2001),
including how bidders’ type distribution and total resources available affect optimal
share structures. Liu et al. (2007) also study how type distributions affect allocation
of total prize sum, but they do so in a consumer contest setting in which the contest
designer has a different objective than ours.
Prior research have examined keyword auctions from several other perspec-
tives. A few authors study Google’s novel way of ranking advertisers, that is, by
weighting advertisers’ pay-per-click bids by their historical click-through-rates (We-
ber and Zheng 2007, Liu and Chen 2006, Lahaie 2007). They found that such Google’s
ranking rule achieves efficiency in a unit-price auction setting (Liu and Chen 2006,
Lahaie 2007). Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) both study the “second-
price-like” feature of keyword auctions, that is, an advertiser pays not his or her own
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pay-per-click but the next highest one. Edelman et al. (2007) show that such an
auction mechanism does not have a dominant-strategy equilibrium and truth-telling
is not an equilibrium. All of the above studies treat share structures as exogenously
given. This paper complements the above studies by exposing the share structure
decisions facing keyword advertising providers.
Keyword auctions depart from traditional auctions for divisible goods known
as “share auctions.” The earliest paper to study share auctions is dated back to Wil-
son (1979). Share auctions have been used in selling important economic resources,
such as electricity, pollution permits, and treasury notes (Wang and Zender 2002).
In share auctions, auctioneers ask each buyer to report both a price and a share of
the total resources that the buyer desires at this price. Auctioneers subsequently
solve the market-clearance problem based on buyers’ price/share quotes. Whereas in
keyword auctions, auctioneers “pre-package” resources into shares, and bidders only
bid on prices. Our research on keyword auctions contributes to the literature on
divisible-goods auctions by studying a novel auction format.
4.3 Research Model
A risk-neutral auctioneer has an exogenous amount of divisible resources, with
normalized size 1. The auctioneer auctions the resources in prepackaged shares to n
risk-neutral bidders (advertisers), indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n. The total resources are
packaged in as many as n shares (i.e., the number of shares is no more than the
number of bidders). Denote sj as the size of the jth largest share (jth share for
short). We term vector s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) as a share structure. We denote S as the
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set of feasible share structures, that is, those satisfying the following two conditions:
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ ... ≥ sn ≥ 0 and
n∑
j=1
sj ≤ 1. (4.1)
The first condition comes from the definition of sj’s. The second condition requires
that the sum of all shares does not exceed available resources.
The auctioneer uses a unit-price auction to allocate all shares simultaneously.
In particular, the auctioneer invites bidders to bid on their willingness-to-pay for
per-unit resource, or the unit prices, and assigns the largest share s1 to the highest
bidder, the second largest share s2 to the second highest bidder, and so on. Bidders
pay for their assigned shares at the unit prices they bid.4
Our assumption that advertisers are ranked by their unit-price bids is consis-
tent with prevailing ways of allocating advertising resources. As we have mentioned
earlier, one approach is to rank advertisers by their willingness-to-pay per impression,
which corresponds directly to our assumption. Another approach is to rank adver-
tisers by the product of their pay-per-clicks and historical click-through-rates. If an
advertiser’s historical click-through-rate is an unbiased estimator for the advertiser’s
future click-through-rates, then this approach essentially ranks advertisers by their
expected pay-per-impressions, thus largely consistent with our model assumption. In
fact, our model can also be applied in pay-per-action advertising (i.e., advertisers
pay only when a user performs a designated action, such as purchase or registra-
tion), as long as keyword advertising providers rank advertisers by the product of
pay-per-action and action rates (corresponds to click-through-rates in pay-per-click
advertising).
4The results on share structures hold also in the case where bidders pay the next highest unit
price. This is because the problem of optimal share structure is fully determined by the auctioneer’s
expected revenue and the auctioneer’s expected revenue is the same under two specifications. The
proof of the latter is analogous to a proof of the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson 1981).
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We assume that bidder i’s valuation of a share is a function of a parameter vi,
termed as bidder i’s type, and the size of the share. Specifically, bidder i’s valuation
for the jth share takes the following form,
u (vi, sj) = viQ (sj) , (4.2)
where Q(0) = 0 and Q′ (·) > 0. Type v captures the difference in bidders’ valuation
for resources. Q (·) captures how bidders’ valuation changes in share sizes.
We assume that each bidder’s type is drawn from a common distribution F (v),
v ∈ [v, v¯]. Each bidder’s type is private information, but the distribution F (v) is
common knowledge. We assume F (v) is twice-differentiable, and its density function,
f(v), is positive anywhere on [v, v¯]. In the keyword advertising setting, advertisers
have different valuation for effective impressions for several reasons. First, everything
else being equal, users may tend to click on one advertisement over another. Second,
even when users tend to click on two advertisements equally, advertisements may
differ in their power to generate follow-up activities such as purchasing or signing up.
Each bidder’s expected payoff is the expected valuation minus expected pay-
ment to the auctioneer. In particular, if we denote pj(b) as the probability of winning
the jth share by placing bid b, the expected payoff of a bidder of type v is
U(v, b) =
n∑
j=1
pj(b) (vQ(sj)− bsj) (4.3)
The auctioneer’s revenue is the sum of payments from all bidders. Because
the auctioneer does not know bidders’ types or their bids ex ante, the auctioneer’s
expected revenue is the expected payment from all bidders:
pi = nE
[
b
n∑
j=1
pj(b)sj
]
(4.4)
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In sum, the game proceeds as follows. First, the auctioneer announces a share
structure (s1, s2, ..., sn). All bidders learn their types and compete for shares by
bidding their unit prices. The auctioneer then allocates the shares based on the
ranking of the bids. A bidder’s problem is to maximize, for any announced share
structure, the expected payoff (4.3) by choosing a unit price b. The auctioneer’s
problem is to maximize the expected revenue (4.4) by choosing a share structure
s ∈ S. How to design the share structure from the auctioneer’s perspective is the
focus of this paper.
Notice that given the valuation function (4.2), we can define an induced de-
mand function of bidder i for a fixed-price setting
Di(p) = argmax
s
{viQ (s)− ps} (4.5)
Correspondingly, we can calculate the (price) elasticity of demand as− Q′(s)
Q′′(s)s . Clearly,
Q (·) determines the elasticity of bidders’ demand. Specifically, a bidder’s demand
is perfectly elastic if Q (·) is linear, and the elasticity of demand decreases as Q (·)
becomes more concave.
4.4 General Results on the Optimal Share Structure
In this section, we study the keyword advertising provider’s problem of choos-
ing an optimal share structure. We assume there is no minimum bid to focus on
the impact of underlying supply and demand factors. We examine the interaction
between the optimal share structure and the minimum bid policy in Section 4.6. In
the following, we first derive some basic concepts and results under a relatively sim-
ple linear-valuation setting. We then use these concepts and results to examine the
optimal share structures under more general valuation functions.
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4.4.1 Equilibrium Bidding Function and Revenue
Using methods outlined in the auction literature (e.g., McAfee and McMillan
1987), we can derive bidders’ bidding function (see the appendix for details) as
β (v) = v
n∑
j=1
Pj(v)Q(sj)
n∑
j=1
Pj(v)sj
−
n∑
j=1
Q (sj)
∫ v
v
Pj(x)dx
n∑
j=1
Pj(v)sj
, v ∈ [v, v¯] (4.6)
where
Pj(v) ≡
(
n− 1
n− j
)
F (v)n−j (1− F (v))j−1 (4.7)
is the equilibrium probability for a bidder of type v to win the jth share .
The auctioneer’s expected revenue is the sum of expected payments from all
bidders, which can be written as (see the appendix for details)
pi = n
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)
∫ v¯
v
Pj(v)
[
v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
]
f(v)dv (4.8)
We denote
J (v) ≡ v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
, (4.9)
and term J(v) the marginal revenue of type v.5 The term Q (sj) J (v) represents
a bidder’s contribution to the auctioneer’s revenue if the bidder’s type is v and is
assigned the jth share. It is clear from (4.9) that the marginal revenue from a bidder
is less than the bidder’s true type v (except for bidders with v = v¯ ). The difference
reflects the bidder’s informational rent.
We further denote
αj ≡ n
∫ v¯
v
Pj(v)J (v) f(v)dv, j = 1, 2, ..., n (4.10)
5The term “marginal revenue” is also used by Bulow and Roberts (1989) and Klemperer (1999)
under a single-object auction setting.
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and term αj the return factor for the jth share. Noting that Pj(v) is the equilibrium
probability of winning the jth share, the return factor is the expected marginal rev-
enue generated by winners of the jth share. By this definition, the expected revenue
(4.8) can be written as
pi =
n∑
j=1
αjQ(sj) (4.11)
Intuitively, a share with a high return factor yields higher revenue for the auctioneer
than a same-sized share with a low return factor. The auctioneer’s problem is to
maximize (4.11) subject to conditions in (4.1).
The relative magnitude of the return factors holds special importance in the
optimal share structure problem. The return factor of a share is generally determined
by the distribution of types and the number of bidders, but is independent of the share
structure s or the valuation function Q (·). The following lemma provides some insight
on the ranking of αj’s.
We say a distribution satisfies the monotone-hazard-rate (MHR) condition if
its hazard rate, f(v)
1−F (v) , is monotonically increasing within its support. The MHR
property is satisfied by most commonly used single-peaked distributions, such as
uniform, normal, and logistic.
Lemma 4.4.1. (a) α1 > αj, for all j > 1, and α1 > 0. (b) Under the MHR condition,
α1 > α2 > ... > αn.
Lemma 4.4.1 (a) shows that the first share is superior than any other share in
terms of return factors, regardless of the number of bidders or the type distribution.
The intuition for this result is as follows. According to (4.10), the return factor of
the jth largest share is the expected marginal revenue of the winner of the jth largest
share. Notice that the marginal revenue is the highest at v¯ regardless of the type
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distribution. This implies that the marginal revenue at the neighborhood of v¯ is
higher than other values of v (due to the continuity). Meanwhile, the bidders at that
neighborhood of v¯ are more likely to win the first share. Therefore, the first share
has an advantage of getting the bidders with the highest marginal-revenue, therefore
generating the highest return.
The intuition for (b) is as follows. In general, a high-type bidder is more likely
to win a high-ranked share than a low-ranked share, and the reverse is true for a
low-type bidder. The MHR condition, which implies that a high-type bidder has
higher marginal revenue than a low-type bidder, reinforces the advantage of offering
a high-ranked share (in terms of the revenue generated), thus ensuring the decreasing
order among return factors.
Lemma 4.4.1 has immediate implications for the linear-valuation case. With
linear valuation Q (s) = s, an advertiser’s valuation of a share becomes u (v, s) = vs.
So v can be interpreted as advertisers’ marginal valuation. The problem of choosing
an optimal share structure (4.11) becomes the following constrained linear program:
max
s1,s2,...,sn
n∑
j=1
αjsj, subject to (4.1) (4.12)
Since α1 is the largest among all the return factors by Lemma 4.4.1, the auctioneer
should allocate all the resources to the first share, leading to a winner-take-all share
structure. Under the MHR condition, return factors decrease. The winner-take-all
result can be strengthened to a greedy allocation, that is, to fill up the jth share
before the (j+1)th share. The strengthened result is useful when, say, the first share
must be less than 1. The following proposition summarizes the above intuition.
Proposition 4.4.2. If advertisers’ valuation is linear in share size, (a) it is optimal
to provide one grand share of size 1 (whenever possible). (b) When the MHR condition
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holds, the auctioneer should allocate the resources in a greedy way, that is, to fill up
jth share before moving on to (j + 1)th share.
Proof. omitted.
Recall that linear valuation corresponds to the setting in which advertisers’
demand for effective impressions is perfectly elastic. This setting may hold approx-
imately when supply of advertising resources is small compared with the demand –
if we believe advertisers’ marginal valuation starts to decline beyond a certain point.
Proposition 4.4.2 suggests that when advertisers’ valuation is perfectly elastic (supply
is relatively small), it is optimal to use a winner-take-all share structure.
Our analysis shows that a high-ranked share promotes higher bids from high-
type bidders than a low-ranked share, provided that two shares have the same size.
The opposite is true for low-type bidders. So the optimal choice of share structure
generally involves trading off between best motivating high-type bidders and best
motivating low-type ones. One would naturally think it depends on how bidders’ type
is distributed. Surprisingly, the above proposition shows that it is always optimal to
best-motivate the high-type ones, regardless of the distribution of bidder types or the
number of bidders.
It is also worth pointing out that when the MHR condition is violated, return
factors may not follow a descending order, and therefore the greedy allocation specified
in (b) may not be optimal, as proved by the following example.
Example 4.4.3. Let F (v) = (v−1)1/4, v ∈ [1, 2], and n = 3. Assume that share sizes
cannot exceed 0.5. Calculation shows that the return factors are 1.14, 0.91, and 0.94,
respectively. A greedy allocation, (0.5, 0.5, 0), generates an expected revenue of 1.029
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whereas the optimal share structure, (0.5, 0.25, 0.25), generates an expected revenue
of 1.036.
4.4.2 Concave Valuation
Proposition 4.4.2 suggests that the auctioneer should allocate all the resources
to the largest share. In the keyword advertising setting, this would require one adver-
tisement to appear at all available advertising slots for a particular keyword. However,
we seldom see this. One explanation could be that advertisers’ valuation is nonlinear
in share sizes. We address the nonlinear valuation case in this section.
When Q(·) is convex, bidders’ marginal valuation, vQ′(s), increases with the
share size. Hence, the auctioneer has stronger incentive to create a larger share than
in the linear valuation case. Consequently, the results in proposition 4.4.2 continue
to hold. Thus, we will focus on the case of concave Q(·).
In keyword advertising, Q(·) might be concave for a few reasons. First, con-
sumers’ attention devoted to an advertisement may be less than twice as much if we
double the amount of time it is shown. Second, the unit cost to fulfill consumers’
requests may rise because of limited production/service capacity. Thus, advertisers’
marginal valuation for effective impression may decrease as the total effective im-
pressions increase. Casual observation shows that smaller e-commerce websites start
losing some customers because of the congestion problem as the traffic to their website
becomes very high.
In the case of concave valuation, bidders’ unit valuation decreases with share
size, and so does the unit price they are willing to pay. As a result, the auctioneer has
additional incentive to offer the advertising resources in smaller shares. The following
example illustrates an optimal share structure with multiple shares. The optimal
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share structure consists of several groups of same-sized shares. We call each such
group a plateau (a plateau is nontrivial if it consists of more than one share).
Example 4.4.4. Let F (v) = (v−1)1/4, v ∈ [1, 2], n = 3, and Q(s) = √s. Under this
specification, the optimal share structure is (0.4311, 0.2845, 0.2845), where the first
plateau consists of the first share, and the second plateau consists of the second and
the third shares.
When do nontrivial plateaus occur in optimal share structures? What deter-
mines the boundaries of plateaus (i.e., their starting and ending ranks)? The following
lemma shows that the boundaries are intimately related to return factors.
We let j0 = 0 and define index jk as one that maximizes the average return
factor of shares starting from (jk−1 + 1).6 Formally, let
jk = arg max
j∈{jk−1+1,...,n}
 1j − jk−1
j∑
l=jk−1+1
αl
 (4.13)
Lemma 4.4.5. Under an arbitrary concave function Q(·), (jk+1)th to (jk+1)th shares
must be equal in size in the optimal share structure.
Lemma 4.4.5 says that the optimal share structure is segmented into a series
of plateaus with jk being their ending ranks. Denote the average return factor for the
k-th plateau as
α¯k ≡ 1
jk − jk−1
jk∑
j=jk−1+1
αj (4.14)
By definition of jk’s, the α¯k’s must strictly decrease; otherwise, α¯k is less than or equal
to α¯k+1, and jk cannot be the maximizer for the average return factor starting from
6If there are multiple maximums, we define jk as the largest one.
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jk−1+1. Moreover, for a similar reason, the average return factor of the first l shares
within a plateau is no greater than that of the remaining shares in that plateau.
The rationale behind this lemma is as follows. Suppose (jk+ l)-th and (jk+ l+
1)-th shares are both in a same plateau and the former is assigned more resources than
the latter. The auctioneer can always profitably shift a small amount of resource from
each of the first l shares and spread equally among remaining shares in the plateau.
This is because our definition of jk’s guarantees the average return factor of the first
l shares in a plateau to be lower than that of the remaining ones in the same plateau.
This process can continue till all shares within the plateau are equal in size.
Note that from Lemma 4.4.1, the return factor of the first share is higher than
that of any other share. Hence the return factor of the first share is higher than any
average return factors starting from the first share. This implies the first plateau
must end at rank 1. In other words, the first plateau must consist of the first share
only.
Example 4.4.6. Continue with the previous example. Calculation shows that α1 =
1.14, α2 = 0.91, and α3 = 0.94. By definition of jk’s (4.13), j1 = 1 and j2 = 3.
Thus, the first plateau consists of the first share, and the second plateau consists of
the second and the third shares, confirming the previous example.
Based on the result in Lemma 4.4.5, we characterize the optimal share struc-
ture in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.7. Given an arbitrary concave function Q(·) and jk’s and α¯k’s as
defined in (4.13) and (4.14), respectively, the optimal share structure is given by
s∗ = (z1 , z2, ..., z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
j2−j1
, z3, ..., z3︸ ︷︷ ︸
j3−j2
, ... , zk, ..., zk︸ ︷︷ ︸
jk∗−jk∗−1
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−jk∗
) (4.15)
90
where the number of positive plateaus k∗ and their sizes z1, ..., zk∗ are determined by
α¯1Q
′ (z1) = α¯2Q′ (z2) = ... = α¯k∗Q′ (zk∗) ≥ α¯k∗+1Q′ (0) (4.16)
and
∑k∗
k=1 (jk − jk−1) zk = 1. Furthermore, z1 > z2 > ... > zk∗ > 0.
Proposition 4.4.7 shows that the optimal share structure consists of a series of
decreasing plateaus. This is a result of decreasing average return factors associated
with these plateaus. The beginning and ending ranks of each plateau are determined
only by the return factors (and thus by the type distribution and the number of
bidders), whereas the number of plateaus and the share sizes within plateaus are
jointly determined by the return factors and the shape of the valuation function.
Under the MHR condition, the return factors monotonically decrease. As a
result, the α¯k’s are identical to αj’s, and each plateau consists of a single share. Hence,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4.8. If the MHR condition holds, the optimal share structure s∗, together
with the optimal number of positive shares, k∗, is determined by
α1Q
′(s1) = α2Q′(s2) = ... = αk∗Q′(sk∗) ≥ αk∗+1Q′ (0) . (4.17)
and
∑k∗
k=1 sk = 1. Furthermore, s1 > s2 > ... > sk∗ > 0.
Proposition 4.4.7 and Corollary 4.4.8 indicate that the average marginal re-
turns (αkQ
′(sk)) should be equal across plateaus. This is because otherwise the auc-
tioneer can always profitably shift the resources from a plateau with a low average
return to ones with high average returns. Plateaus will degenerate to single shares
if the MHR condition holds (Corollary 4.4.8). Otherwise, an optimal share structure
may contain plateaus of at least two shares wherever the underlying average returns
is non-monotonic. It is worth noting that the optimal share structure characterized
in Proposition 4.4.7 holds for general concave valuations and type distributions.
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4.5 The Relationship between Optimal Share Structures and
Underlying Supply and Demand Factors
In this section, we carry out a series of comparative-static analysis on the
optimal share structure. The optimal share structure may be affected by several
factors, including the shape of the bidders’ valuation function Q(·), the distribution
of type v, and the total resources available. A comparative-static analysis on these
underlying factors provides rich managerial implications on how to set different share
structures for different market settings.
To carry out the comparative-static analysis, we need a way of comparing
share structures. We propose a “steepness” order defined as follows.
Definition 4.5.1 (Steepness Order). Let s = (s1, ..., sn) and sˆ = (sˆ1, ..., sˆn) be two
feasible share structures with
∑n
j=1 sj =
∑n
j=1 sˆj. We say sˆ is less steep (or flatter)
than s if there exists c, c ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, such that
sˆj < sj, ∀j < c and sˆj ≥ sj, ∀j ≥ c. (4.18)
We say sˆ is strictly less steep (or strictly flatter) than s if c > 1.7
Intuitively, a steeper share structure has larger high-ranked shares and smaller
low-ranked shares. By the definition of the steepness order, the steepest share struc-
ture is one grand share, or winner-take-all, and the least steep one is n equal shares.
The steepness order can be measured by the widely used Herfindahl index,
defined as the sum of squares of shares. We can easily verify that the steeper the
share structure the higher the Herfindahl index, but the converse is not necessarily
7When c = 1, sˆj ≥ sj for any j, implying sˆ = s because the total allocated resources are the
same.
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Figure 4.1: Optimal Share Structure as a Function of γ, Q(s) = sγ
true. For example, (0.6, 0.2, 0.2) has a higher Herfindahl index than (0.5, 0.35, 0.15),
but the former is neither steeper nor flatter than the latter.
4.5.1 Concavity of the Valuation Function
We next consider the impact of the concavity of the valuation function on the
optimal share structure, starting with an example.
Example 4.5.1. Let v be uniformly distributed on [1, 2], n = 3, and Q(sj) = s
γ
j .
Figure 4.1 shows the optimal sizes of the first, the second, and the third shares as
functions of γ.
Example 4.5.1 shows that as the concavity increases (γ decreases), the optimal
share structure moves away from winner-take-all toward a more egalitarian share
structure. Specifically, this involves a gradual shift of resources away from the first
share to the second and the third shares. Can this example be generalized to a broader
setting? Below we show that the answer is yes.
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We adopt a typical concavity measure using the concave transformation (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995). Let Q(·) and Qˆ(·) be strictly increasing and concave functions
defined on X ⊆ R+. We say Qˆ(·) is more concave than Q(·) if there exists an
increasing concave function ψ(·) such that Qˆ(x) = ψ(Q(x)) for every x.
Proposition 4.5.2. The optimal share structure becomes less steep as the concavity of
Q (·) increases. Furthermore, if the optimal share structure under Q (·) is not winner-
take-all, the optimal share structure becomes strictly less steep as the concavity of Q (·)
increases.
By Proposition 4.5.2, as the valuation function becomes more concave, the
optimal share structure moves away from winner-take-all toward n equal shares. It
is worth noting that the result in Proposition 4.5.2 holds regardless of the type dis-
tribution.
The process prescribed by Proposition 4.5.2 has a few properties. First, as
the concavity of valuation function increases, the number of shares weakly increases.
This is because if sˆ is flatter than s, the number of (positive) shares in sˆ is no less
than those in s. Second, the new optimal share structure, provided it is different
from the previous one, always has a smaller first share. Otherwise, the steepness
order implies the remaining shares would be at least as large as those in the previous
optimal share structure, which is unlikely except when the two share structures are
exactly the same. Third, the low-ranked shares will not become smaller as valuation
functions become more concave. For example, if the current optimal share structure
is (0.5, 0.25, 0.25), (0.45, 0.35, 0.2) must not be optimal for more concave valuation
functions.
We are the first, to our knowledge, to establish the relationship between the
concavity of bidders’ valuation (which can also be interpreted as the price elasticity
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of their demands) and the steepness of optimal share structure. Moldovanu and
Sela (2001) suggested that it may become optimal to award multiple prizes when
contestants’ disutility functions become concave. But they have not gone further to
show how a multiple-prize structure should evolve as the disutility functions become
more concave. We show that share structures become less steep as the valuation
function becomes more concave for a general type distribution. One must note that
it is not entirely clear whether similar results hold under the contest setting because
of differences in the problem structures.
The implication of Proposition 4.5.2 is highly actionable. Keyword advertising
providers can estimate the elasticity of advertisers’ demands for a particular keyword,
which is possible given the bidding history of advertisers and the experimentation
opportunities in keyword auctions. Then, based on whether the elasticity is high or
low, keyword advertising providers decide whether to provide steep share structures
(e.g., via featured listings) or flat ones (e.g., via randomizing in slot assignment).
4.5.2 Type Distribution
The distribution of types varies across different keywords. Some keywords
(e.g., “mortgage”) are more expensive than others (e.g., “CD”). The distribution of
willingness-to-pay per impression may also differ from one keyword to another. For
example, keywords with generic appeal may attract advertisers from different indus-
tries with wildly different willingness-to-pay; whereas more specific ones may attract
advertisers of the same narrowly defined industry with nearly identical willingness-
to-pay. The question is how the keyword advertising providers should tailor the share
structure offerings from different type distributions.
The type distribution affects the optimal share structure via the return factors.
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To study the effect of the type distribution, we first must understand how the return
factors impact steepness of the optimal share structure. The next lemma associates
the steepness with return factors.
Lemma 4.5.3. Let Q(·) be an arbitrary concave function and denote s and sˆ as
the optimal share structures under return factor vectors α = (α1, ..., αn) and αˆ =
(αˆ1, ..., αˆn), respectively. Suppose that the plateau boundaries under α and αˆ are the
same.8 sˆ is less steep than s if
ˆ¯αk+1
ˆ¯αk
≥ α¯k+1
α¯k
, for any k such that zk+1 > 0. (4.19)
sˆ is strictly less steep than s if at least one strict inequality holds in (4.19).
Lemma 4.5.3 shows that if ˆ¯αk+1/ ˆ¯αk is closer to 1 or, in other words, the
average return factors are more equal among different plateaus, then the optimal
share structure is flatter.
We say the type distribution is “scaled” if each bidder’s type parameter is
multiplied by w, w > 0. We say bidders’ type distribution is “shifted” to the right
if each bidder’s type parameter increases by w, w > 0. The following proposition
summarizes the impact of scaling, shifting, and a change in the underlying type
distribution termed as marginal-revenue-ratio compression.
8This result can be extended to share structures with different plateau boundaries. To do so, we
can “iron out” the peaks in the return factors in each share structure by defining a normalized return
factor vector β ≡ (β1, ..., βn) such that βjk−1+1 = ... = βjk = α¯k, for each k. The normalized return
factor vector retains the original plateau boundaries and average return factors, and is nonincreasing.
The optimal share structure under the normalized return factor vector is the same as under the
original one, because by Proposition 4.4.7, all that matters to the optimal share structure problem
is the average return factors. We can then compare two share structures based on normalized return
factors using the following result: sˆ is less steep than s if βˆj+1
βˆj
≥ βj+1βj , for any j such that sj+1 > 0
(the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.5.3).
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Proposition 4.5.4. We use αj and αˆj to denote the return factors under type dis-
tributions F and Fˆ , respectively.
(a) (scaling) When Fˆ is F scaled by a factor w, the return factors αˆj = wαj, and
the optimal share structure remains the same.
(b) (shifting) When Fˆ is F shifted to the right by w, the return factors αˆj = αj +w,
and the optimal share structure becomes less steep.
(c) (marginal-revenue-ratio compression) Assume both type distributions are regular
and have positive marginal revenues. When the ratio of marginal revenues at
percentile y and percentile x (y > x) under Fˆ is smaller than that under F , that
is,
Jˆ(Fˆ−1 (y))
Jˆ(Fˆ−1 (x))
≤ J (F
−1 (y))
J (F−1 (x))
, 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1, (4.20)
sˆ is less steeper than s (strictly steeper if the above holds in strict inequality).
Proof. (a) See Appendix for a proof for αˆj = wαj. Given αˆj = wαj, the jk sequence
remains the same as before by definition, suggesting the boundaries of plateaus will
be the same. In addition, the optimal solution to (4.16) is invariant to a scaling of
αˆj’s, suggesting the optimal share size for each plateau is also the same.
(b) See Appendix for a proof for αˆj = w + αj. Given αˆj = w + αj, the
jk sequence remains the same as before by definition, suggesting the boundaries of
plateaus will be the same. However, the ratio of average return factors decreases
because for given w > 0, α¯k+1
α¯k
< α¯k+1+w
α¯k+w
. Therefore, the optimal share structure
becomes less steep (Lemma 4.5.3).
(c) See the appendix for a proof.
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The intuition for Proposition 4.5.4(a) is as follows. When all bidders’ valuation
is scaled by factor w, their equilibrium bids are scaled by the same factor, but their
probabilities of winning each share remain the same. As a result, all the return factors
are scaled by the same factor. Because what matters to the optimal share structure
are the relative sizes of return factors, the optimal share structure should remain the
same.
Proposition 4.5.4(b) suggests shifting to the right causes a flatter optimal
share structure. Again, shifting does not change bidders’ winning probabilities. But
it causes all bidders’ to increase their bids. The increase in low-type bidders’ bids is
more significant as their type v has increased by a larger proportion. This in turn
reduces the ratios between return factors of high-ranked shares and those of low,
because the low-ranked shares are more likely assigned to low-type bidders. As the
return factors for low-ranked shares increase relative to those for high-ranked shares,
the optimal share structure should be less steep (Lemma 4.5.3).
J (F−1 (x)) measures the marginal revenue at percentile x. Proposition 4.5.4
(c) suggests that the optimal share structure should be less steep if marginal revenue
ratios between any two percentiles are compressed. This result highlights that the
optimal share structure is particularly associated with marginal revenues, and what
matters is the ratios of marginal revenues at different percentiles rather than the
absolute marginal revenues.
Returning to the questions we raised at the beginning of the section, we can
now say that the optimal share structure for expensive keywords may be steeper or
flatter than less expensive ones. If the type distribution (approximately interpreted as
willingness-to-pay) for more expensive keywords is simply a rescaling of that for the
less expensive ones, such as from a uniform distribution on [1, 2] to a uniform distri-
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bution on [2, 4], keyword advertising providers should apply the same share structure
for these keywords. If the type distribution shifts from [1, 2] to [4, 5], the marginal rev-
enue ratio between two percentiles is compressed, and keyword advertising providers
should use a flatter share structure (Proposition 4.5.4 (b) and (c)).
4.5.3 Total Resources
So far we have assumed the total resource is fixed and normalized to 1. In this
subsection, we allow the total resources to change and examine its impact on optimal
share structures.
The total resources available to advertisers change with the number of searches
conducted (in search-based advertising) and the number of page views (in contextual
advertising). The total resources may change over time for many reasons, including
a change in the popularity of the websites, increased searches on particular keywords
because of special events, or new additions to the advertising networks. For exam-
ple, when Google signed a contract with AOL.com to serve online advertisements
on AOL.com, Google’s keyword advertising resources surged. How should keyword
advertising providers adjust their share offerings according to the total resources
available? We address this question below.
First, note that our characterization of the optimal share structures in Propo-
sitions 4.4.2 and 4.4.7 still holds except that total available resources are no longer
1. Moreover, when total resource is the only changing factor, the return factors are
the same, and therefore the boundaries of plateaus should remain the same (Lemma
4.4.5). Therefore, we can concentrate on how the total resources are allocated among
different plateaus. We observe the following trend in the sizes and the number of
shares in the optimal structure.
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Lemma 4.5.5. Under a concave Q(·), as the total resources increase, the size of each
positive share increases and the number of positive shares weakly increases.
In general, the marginal return of resource decreases in the amount of resources
allocated because of the concave valuation function. The size of each share must
increase because otherwise it will generate higher marginal return than previously,
contradicting the optimal condition.
From the above analysis we know that all shares will increase. But how about
the proportions of shares? When all shares increase by the same percentage, the
proportions of all shares (relative to the total resources) should remain constant.
When high-ranked shares increase by a larger (smaller) percentage than low-ranked
shares, the proportion of high-ranked share should increase (decrease). The following
examples show that the proportions of shares may or may not be the same.
Example 4.5.6. Assume there are two bidders. Let Q (s) =
√
s and assume α1 >
α2 > 0. According to (4.17), the optimal size of the first share s
∗
1 must satisfy
−1
2
(s∗1)
−0.5α1 = −12 (s∗2)−0.5 α2, which implies that the proportion of share 1, s
∗
1
s∗1+s
∗
2
=
α21
α21+α
2
2
, is a constant.
Example 4.5.7. Continue with the previous example. Let Q(s) = ln(s + 1) instead
and assume α1 < 2α2 (to rule out the winner-take-all case). By (4.17), we have
s∗1+1
s∗2+1
= α1
α2
. Using simple algebra we can conclude that the proportion of the first share
(
s∗1
s∗1+s
∗
2
) decreases as the total resources increase.
The following proposition suggests that whether some shares will increase rel-
atively faster than others depends on how bidders’ price elasticities change with the
resources allocated to them.
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Proposition 4.5.8. As the total resources increase, a high-ranked share will increase
by a smaller (bigger, or the same) percentage than a low-ranked one, if bidders’ price
elasticity decreases (increases, or remains constant) in the amount of resources allo-
cated to them.
The above result has an intuitive explanation. When bidders have a decreas-
ing price elasticity, their demand becomes less elastic as shares become larger. Thus,
when the total resources increase, the auctioneer should increase high-ranked shares
by a smaller percentage. Conversely, when bidders have increasing (constant) price
elasticity, the auctioneer should increase high-ranked shares by a larger (equal) per-
centage.
To compare share structures by their proportions, we can normalize the total
resources available to one by dividing each share by
∑n
j=1 sj. After such a normaliza-
tion, the above proposition effectively says that as the total resources increase, the
optimal (normalized) share structure becomes flatter (becomes steeper, or remains
constant), if bidders’ price elasticity decreases (increases, or remains constant) in
the amount of resources allocated to them. This result reveals a clear connection
between the steepness of optimal share structures and bidders’ demand elasticities
through changes in total resources and their impact on bidders’ demand elasticities.
In example 4.5.6, it can be easily verified that we have constant elasticity of demand,
which accounts for the same increase speeds for shares or the same steepness as the
total resource increases.
101
4.6 The Interaction between Optimal Share Structures and
Minimum Bids
In this section, we extend our model to the case where minimum bids are
imposed. Most of keyword advertising providers use a minimum bid policy to screen
advertisers. This is consistent with the general result in the optimal auction design
literature that an optimally set minimum bid can help auctioneers to achieve higher
revenue. In the following, we focus on how the introduction of minimum bids affects
the optimal share structure. We start by examining the optimal minimum bid policy
under our model setting.
We assume the auctioneer imposes a minimum bid r. As a result, some low-
type bidders may no longer participate in the auction, because bidding higher than
r would result in negative payoffs for them. Therefore, there exists a corresponding
marginal type, v0, who is indifferent between participating and not participating.
Using a similar approach as in section 4.4.1, we can derive the equilibrium
bidding function for bidders and the expected revenue for the auctioneer under a
minimum bid r, as follows.
β (v) = v
∑n
j=1 Pj(v)Q(sj)∑n
j=1 Pj(v)sj
−
∑n
j=1Q (sj)
∫ v
v0
Pj(x)dx∑n
j=1 Pj(v)sj
, v ∈ [v0, v¯] (4.21)
pi = n
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)
∫ v¯
v0
Pj(v)J(v)f(v)dv (4.22)
where the marginal type v0 is determined by
r = v0
∑n
j=1 Pj(v0)Q(sj)∑n
j=1 Pj(v0)sj
. (4.23)
The bidding function and the auctioneer’s revenue are similar to those without min-
imum bids, except that the lower bound of integral changes from v to the marginal
type v0.
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The auctioneer should choose the optimal marginal type v∗0 to maximize the
total expected revenue (see the proof of Proposition 4.6.1 for the derivation of v∗0).
9
We assume v∗0 > v to avoid the trivial case. It is worth noting that although the
optimal marginal type does not depend on the share structure, the corresponding
minimum bid does, as seen from (4.23).
We redefine the return factors as
αj (v0) ≡ n
∫ v¯
v0
Pj(v)J(v)f(v)dv, (4.24)
which are the same as before except that they are now functions of the marginal type.
We show in the appendix (in Lemma C.0.1) that Lemma 4.4.1 (b) carries over to this
case; that is, under the MHR condition, the return factors decrease in rank. This is
because excluding low-type bidders reinforces the advantages of high ranked shares
in generating returns. Immediately, it follows that Proposition 4.4.2 (b) carries over
too; that is, when the MHR condition holds and the valuation is linear, the auctioneer
should use a greedy allocation among shares.
Given any marginal type, the characterizations of optimal share structures
in Proposition 4.4.7 and Corollary 4.4.8 continue to hold. So do the results on the
impact of concavity of valuation function (Proposition 4.5.2) and of total resources
(Proposition 4.5.8) on optimal share structures. In addition, the impact of scaling
and shifting of type distribution in Proposition 4.5.4 continues to hold as long as the
marginal type is adjusted accordingly (multiplied by w in scaling case and increased
by w in shifting case).
9Under reasonable conditions, v∗0 is unique and is invariant to the share structure. For example,
under the MHR condition, the marginal revenue function J(v) crosses zero (from below) at most
once, and thus it is optimal to set the optimal marginal type to the crossing point or v, whichever is
higher. When the MHR condition is not satisfied, J(v) may cross zero multiple times. But in many
cases, the optimal marginal type is the same crossing point across different share structures.
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We next examine the impact of minimum bids on optimal share structures.
Properly set minimum bids will exclude low-type bidders with negative marginal
revenue, and thus improve the return factors of all shares. However, the improvements
may differ across shares. Therefore, the optimal share structure may change as a result
of imposing minimum bids, as suggested by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6.1. If the MHR condition holds, the optimal share structure under
the optimal minimum bid r∗ is flatter than under no minimum bid.
Intuitively, minimum bids exclude low-type bidders who have negative marginal
revenues, and thus increase the total expected revenue. These bidders, if permitted
in the auction, would be more likely to win low ranked shares than high ranked ones.
Therefore, excluding them results in relatively larger improvements on the marginal
returns of low ranked shares than those of high ranked ones. This implies that re-
sources should be shifted toward low ranked shares, and the optimal share structure
should be flatter.
In sum, the optimal share structure interacts with the optimal minimum bid
policy. On one hand, changes in the share structures call for adjustments of the
optimal minimum bids. On the other hand, the introduction of minimum bids requires
a flatter optimal share structure.
4.7 Conclusion
The innovative use of auctions in the development of e-commerce challenges
our understanding. Much research has been done on auctions used in business-to-
consumer environments such as eBay auctions (Bapna et al. 2003) or in business-
to-business environments (Jap 2007). In comparison, less has been done on another
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major application of auctions in electronic commerce, namely keyword advertising
auctions. This paper aims to address a novel problem in keyword advertising auction
settings: how an auctioneer should choose the optimal share structure to maximize
revenue.
The above issue is important because keyword advertising providers face the
issue of optimal share structure design routinely. The demand and supply of keyword
advertising resources are highly dynamic. On one hand, the supply of advertising
resources fluctuate as new websites join keyword advertising providers’ advertising
network and existing websites may lose their draw of online users. On the other hand,
the demand for advertising on particular keywords shifts constantly in response to
changes in underlying market trends. Therefore, keyword advertising providers must
constantly manage their share offerings to best respond to the changes in demand and
supply. To do so, keyword advertising providers need a good understanding of how
the optimal share structures are affected by changes in demand and supply factors.
We study the optimal share structure problem in a setting where bidders’
valuation for a share is jointly determined by their private value for effective impres-
sions (their type) and a common valuation function that captures their elasticity of
demand. The auctioneer prepackages resources into shares and allocates the shares
using a unit-price auction. Using this framework, we characterize the optimal share
structures and investigate how the optimal share structures change with several un-
derlying primitives.
While we use keyword auctions as the setting of our discussion, the unit-price
auctions with prepackaged shares may be used for other divisible goods, such as
network bandwidth and grid-computing power. In fact, Google filed a proposal on
May 21, 2007, to the Federal Communications Commission calling on using keyword-
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auction-like mechanisms to allocate radio spectrum.
4.7.1 Implications for Managers
Our characterization of the optimal share structure, together with the compar-
ative static analysis of the underlying demand and supply factors, generates several
insights for keyword advertising providers on share structure designs.
First, one key determinant of the sharing structure is advertisers’ price elastic-
ities. In our setting, advertisers’ price elasticity is defined as the percentage change
in their demand for effective impressions due to one percent change in price per unit
effective impression. When facing a perfect or near-perfect elastic demand, keyword
advertising providers should allocate as much exposure as possible to the highest-
paying advertisers. As advertisers’ demand for exposure becomes less elastic, keyword
advertising providers should use flatter share structures – meaning that they should
move advertising resources away from highest bidders to lower-ranked bidders.
Another important determinant is return factors of shares. Return factors
reflect the difference in returns from different shares for the same amount of resource
allocated. Return factors are determined mainly by the distribution of bidders’ types.
When return factors strictly decrease (such as under uniform, normal, or exponential
distributions), the optimal share structure should strictly decrease. Otherwise, the
optimal share structures may have plateaus.
Because return factors are determined by the distribution of valuation, changes
in the underlying valuation distribution may lead to different optimal share structures.
The rule of thumb is that the ratio of return factors rather than absolute values
determine the optimal share structure. For example, when the valuation distribution
is scaled by a common factor, all return factors are also scaled by the same factor, and
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the optimal share structure remains the same. When the valuation distribution shifts
(to the right) by a common factor, return factors for low-ranked shares increase by a
higher percentage than those for high-ranked shares, and the optimal share structure
should be flatter. In other words, it is not the absolute difference in advertisers’
valuation for keywords but the relative difference in their valuations that affects the
optimal share structures. Keyword advertising providers may estimate return factors
for different ranks by conducting controlled experiments (e.g., systematically varying
the amount of resources allocated to each share rank).
Third, keyword advertising providers should react to changes in total adver-
tising resources based on bidders’ price elasticity. Specifically, keyword advertising
providers should allocate proportionally less resources to high-ranked shares when
bidders’ price elasticities decreases with exposure levels; and keyword advertising
providers should allocate proportionally more to high-ranked shares when bidders’
price elasticities increase. Keyword advertising providers may estimate advertisers’
price elasticities by examining the accumulated data on advertisers’ willingness-to-pay
and their budgets or by conducting market research with a sample of advertisers.
Finally, keyword advertising providers should coordinate between the mini-
mum bids and the optimal share structures. In general, keyword advertising providers
should use flatter share structures when they use minimal bids than when they do not.
If keyword advertising providers decide to raise minimum bids, they should generally
offer flatter structures at the same time.
4.7.2 Implications for Future Research
We have abstracted away some of the details in keyword auctions as we focus
on factors that are most relevant to the share structure problem. Some of these details
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may deserve their own attention in future studies. For example, we have assumed that
bidders’ valuation for a slot can be captured by a one-dimensional variable “effective
impression.” It is conceivable that there are cases where participants of the same
auction may have “horizontally differentiated” tastes for slots. It would be interesting
to look at how keyword advertising providers should package their resources in this
heterogenous setting.
This paper focuses on the issue of optimal share structure design, assuming
the auctioneer has decided to use the keyword auction. Why keyword auctions have
become the mechanism of choice is interesting in itself. There may be a few reasons
for such auctions to become mainstream in online advertising markets. Keyword auc-
tions are simpler than conventional divisible good auctions. Given that the online
advertising is designed to facilitate participation of thousands of small advertisers,
keeping the auction mechanism simple and easy to understand is essential. Winner
determination in the keyword auction is straightforward, making it for real-time en-
vironments. Nevertheless, it remains interesting to compare keyword auctions with
alternative mechanisms for divisible goods such as the conventional discriminatory-
price and uniform-price auctions (Wilson 1979; Wang and Zender 2002). Our paper
facilitates such comparison because one would need to pick an optimal share structure
for keyword auctions to make a meaningful comparison.
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Appendices
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Appendix A
Proofs of the Results in Chapter 2
Throughout the appendix, we denote
ρθ(v) ≡
m∑
j=1
P jθ (v)δj (A.1)
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1.
Consider an h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click wv who bids wb and a
lower-CTR advertiser with v who bids b. Both advertisers get a score wb, and their
payoff functions are
Ul(v, b) = Ql(v − b)
∑m
j=1
δjPr(wb ranks jth) (A.2)
Uh(wv,wb) = Qh(wv − wb)
∑m
j=1
δjPr(wb ranks jth) (A.3)
It is easy to establish that
Uh (wv,wb) =
wQh
Ql
Ul(v, b). (A.4)
For bl(v) and bh(v) to be equilibrium bidding functions, at any v, bl(v) must
maximize Ul(v, b) and bh(v) must maximize Uh(v, b). So, (A.4) suggests that if bidding
b is the best for an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v, bidding wb must be
the best for an h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click wv, which implies bh(wv)
equals wbl(v).
Proof of the Revenue Equivalence between First- and Second-ScoreWeighted
Unit-price Auctions.
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First, we show that the same relationship as in (2.3) holds between l- and
h-type advertisers’ bidding functions under the second-score setting. To see, we de-
note sj:n−1 as the random variable for jth highest score among n − 1 advertisers in
equilibrium. Consider an h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click wv bidding wb
and an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v bidding b. So both advertisers get
a score s = wb.
Uh (wv,wb) = Qh
[
m∑
j=1
δjPr(wb ranks jth) (wv − E [sj:n−1|sj:n−1 ≤ s < sj−1:n−1])
]
Ul (v, b) = Ql
[
m∑
j=1
δjPr(wb ranks jth)(v − 1
w
E [sj:n−1|sj:n−1 ≤ s < sj−1:n−1])
]
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we have Uh (wv,wb) =
wQh
Ql
Ul(v, b) and bh (wv) =
wbl (v). bh (wv) = wbl (v) implies the l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v and
the h-type advertiser with wv will tie in both first- and second-score weighted unit-
price auctions. Therefore, first- and second-score weighted unit-price auctions allocate
the slots in the same way. By the revenue equivalence theorem (e.g., Proposition 14.1
in Krishna 2002), the two formats must generate the same amount of revenue.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2.
Denote the inverse bidding functions as b−1l (b) and b
−1
h (b), respectively, which
are strictly increasing given the monotonicity of the bidding functions. Lemma 1
implies that b−1h (wb) = wb
−1
l (b) for b ∈ [0, bl (1)]. Substituting this into (A.2) and
(A.3), we can uniformly write the payoff functions as
Uθ(v, b) = Qθ(v − b)ρθ
(
b−1θ (b)
)
(A.5)
where ρθ(v) is defined in (A.1).
We denote
Vθ(v) ≡ Uθ(v, bθ(v)) = Qθ(v − bθ(v))ρθ
(
b−1θ (bθ(v))
)
(A.6)
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as the equilibrium payoff of an advertiser with valuation-per-click v.
dVθ(v)
dv
=
∂Uθ (v, bθ(v))
∂v
+
∂Uθ (v, bθ(v))
∂b
dbθ(v)
dv
=
∂Uθ (v, bθ(v))
∂v
= Qθρθ(v)
where the second equality is due to ∂Uθ(v,bθ(v))
∂b
= 0 (the first-order condition). Apply-
ing the boundary condition Vθ(0) = 0, we get
Vθ(v) = Qθ
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt (A.7)
Combining (A.6) (note b−1θ (bθ(v)) = v) and (A.7), we can solve the equilibrium
bidding function as
bθ(v) = v −
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt
ρθ(v)
(A.8)
Now we show that dbθ(v)
dv
> 0.
dbθ(v)
dv
=
ρ′θ(v)
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt
ρ2θ(v)
(A.9)
The sign of the above first-order derivative is solely determined by that of ρ′θ(v). It
is sufficient to show ρ′θ(v) > 0, or
∑m
j=1 δjP
j′
θ (v) > 0.
P j′θ (v) = (
n−1
n−j)Gθ(v)
n−j−1 (1−Gθ(v))j−2 [(n− j)− (n− 1)Gθ(v)]G′θ (v) (A.10)
Notice that P 1′θ (v) ≥ 0 and P n′θ (v) ≤ 0 for all v; P j′θ (v) (1 < j < n) crosses zero
only once from positive to negative on (0, 1). The crossing point, vcj , is the solution
to Gθ(v
c
j) =
n− j
n− 1. It is clear that 0 < v
c
n−1 < ... < v
c
3 < v
c
2 < 1. Thus, for a given
v ∈ (0, 1), there exists jv ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} such that
P j′θ (v) > 0, for j = 1, ..., jv, and P
j′
θ (v) ≤ 0, for j = jv + 1, ..., n. (A.11)
Let δm+1 = δm+2 = ... = δn = 0. We have
m∑
j=1
δjP
j′
θ (v) =
n∑
j=1
δjP
j′
θ (v) > δjv
n∑
j=1
P j′θ (v) = 0 (A.12)
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where the inequality is due to δ1 ≥ δ2 ≥ ... ≥ δn and (A.11), and the last equality is
due to the fact that
∑n
j=1 P
j
θ (v) = (Gθ(v) + 1−Gθ(v))n−1 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3.
First note that Gh(wv) = Gl(v) and
dGh(v)
dw
|wv = −1−ααw fl(v)fh(wv)
dGl(v)
dw
. We can
establish
dρh (v)
dw
|wv = −1− α
αw
fl (v)
fh (wv)
dρl (v)
dw
. (A.13)
Using the same technique in Proof of Proposition 1, we can show
dρl(v)
dw
> 0 (A.14)
Taking the first-order derivative of (2.8) with respect to w yields
(1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
v
dρl (v)
dw
fl (v) dv + αQh
∫ 1
0
v
dρh (v)
dw
fh (v) dv (A.15)
If w ≤ 1, noting dρh(v)
dw
= 0 for v > w, we can re-organize (A.15) as
(1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
v
dρl (v)
dw
fl (v) dv + αQh
∫ w
0
v
dρh (v)
dw
fh (v) dv
= (1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
v
dρl (v)
dw
fl (v) dv − (1− α)wQh
∫ 1
0
v
dρl (v)
dw
fl (v) dv
= (1− α) (Ql − wQh)
∫ 1
0
v
dρl (v)
dw
fl (v) dv (A.16)
where the second equality is due to integration by substitution and (A.13). Because
dρl(v)
dw
> 0 by (A.14), the above first order derivative is positive if w < Ql
Qh
and negative
if w > Ql
Qh
. So w = Ql
Qh
maximizes the social welfare among all w ∈ [0, 1].
Using a similar logic, we can verify w > 1 cannot maximize the social welfare.
So, weff =
Ql
Qh
.
The Derivation of Expected Revenue.
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The expected payment from an advertiser is equal to the advertiser’s total
expected valuation upon winning minus the advertiser’s expected payoff.
Qθvρθ(v)− Vθ(v) = Qθ
[
vρθ(v)−
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt
]
(A.17)
where the equality is due to (A.7).
The expected payment from one advertiser (with probability α being h-type
and with probability (1− α) being l-type) is
αE [Qhvρh(v)− Vh(v)] + (1− α)E [Qlvρl(v)− Vl(v)]
= αQh
∫ 1
0
[
vρh(v)−
∫ v
0
ρh(t)dt
]
fh(v)dv
+(1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
[
vρl(v)−
∫ v
0
ρl(t)dt
]
fl(v)dv
= αQh
∫ 1
0
ρh(v)
[
v − 1− Fh(v)
fh(v)
]
fh(v)dv
+(1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
ρl(v)
[
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
]
fl(v)dv (A.18)
The total expected revenue from all advertisers is n times the above.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.4.
Taking the first order derivative of the expected revenue (2.9) with respect to
w yields
dpi
dw
= (1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
dρl (v)
dw
(
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
)
fl(v)dv
+αQh
∫ 1
0
dρh (v)
dw
(
v − 1− Fh(v)
fh(v)
)
fh (v) dv (A.19)
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We only need to check the sign of dpi
dw
for 0 < w ≤ Ql
Qh
. For 0 < w ≤ Ql
Qh
,
dpi
dw
= (1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
dρl (v)
dw
(
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
)
fl(v)dv
+αQh
∫ w
0
dρh (v)
dw
(
v − 1− Fh(v)
fh(v)
)
fh (v) dv
= (1− α)Ql
∫ 1
0
dρl (v)
dw
(
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
)
fl(v)dv
− (1− α)Qh
∫ 1
0
dρl (v)
dw
(
wv − 1− Fh(wv)
fh(wv)
)
fl(v)dv
= (1− α)
∫ 1
0
dρl (v)
dw
fl(v)
[
Ql
(
v − 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
)
−Qh
(
wv − 1− Fh(wv)
fh(wv)
)]
dv
= (1− α)
×
∫ 1
0
dρl (v)
dw
fl(v)
[
v (Ql −Qhw) +Qh1− Fh(wv)
fh(wv)
−Ql 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
]
dv (A.20)
where the first equality is because for v > w, dρh(v)
dw
= 0 and the second equality is
due to (A.13).
Note that dρl(v)
dw
> 0 by (A.14). Clearly, for 0 < w ≤ Ql
Qh
, v (Ql −Qhw) ≥ 0.
By the IHR property (note that Fl(·) = Fh(·) = F (·)),
Qh
1− Fh(wv)
fh(wv)
−Ql 1− Fl(v)
fl(v)
> 0, (A.21)
So, (A.20) is greater than 0, which implies w∗ > Ql
Qh
.
Proof of the Strict Monotonicity of Bidding Functions.
Take l-type advertisers as an example. The incentive compatibility conditions
requires that for any v′′ > v′.
[v′ − bl (v′)] ρl (v′) ≥ [v′ − bl (v′′)] ρl (v′′) (A.22)
[v′′ − bl (v′′)] ρl (v′′) ≥ [v′′ − ρl (v′)] ρl (v′) (A.23)
Combining (A.22) and (A.23), we get ρl (v
′′) ≥ ρl (v′), which implies bl (v′′) ≥ bl (v′).
Next we show bl (v
′) 6= bl (v′′). Actually, if bl (v′) = bl (v′′) ≡ b, then bl(v) = b for all
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v ∈ [v′, v′′]. an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v′′ is better off by bidding
b + ² (² is an infinitesimal positive number) since the advertiser loses only ² for per-
unit resource awarded, yet improves its probability of beating another advertiser by a
significant amount. This contradicts the equilibrium condition. Therefore bl (v) must
be strictly increasing.
Proof for Lemma 2.5.1.
We suppose there exists a mapping Λ : (v0, 1] → [bh, 1] such that wbl (v) =
bh (Λ (v)). That is, an l-type advertiser with v will tie with an h-type advertiser
Λ(v) in equilibrium. Similarly, we define P jθ (v) ≡ (n−1n−j) [Gθ(v)]n−j [1−Gθ(v)]j−1 and
ρθ(v) ≡
∑m
j=1 P
j
θ (v) δj, θ ∈ {l, h}, where
Gl (v) = [(1− α)Fl (v) + αFh (Λ (v))] , for all 1 ≥ v > v0
Gh (v) =
[
(1− α)Fl
(
Λ−1 (v)
)
+ αFh (v)
]
, for all Λ(1) ≥ v > Λ(v0)
We can then solve the equilibrium bidding for each advertiser type as
bl (v) = v −
U0l /Ql +
∫ v
v0
ρl (t) dt
ρl (v)
(A.24)
bh (v) = v −
U0h/Qh +
∫ v
Λ(v0)
ρh (t) dt
ρh (v)
(A.25)
where U0l and U
0
h are equilibrium payoff of an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-
click v0 and equilibrium payoff of an h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click Λ (v0),
respectively. By wbl(v) = bh(Λ(v)),
w
[
v − U
0
l /Ql +
∫ v
v0
ρl (t) dt
ρl (v)
]
= Λ (v)−
U0h/Qh +
∫ Λ(v)
Λ(v0)
ρh (t) dt
ρh (Λ (v))
= Λ (v)− U
0
h/Qh +
∫ v
v0
ρl (t) Λ
′ (t) dt
ρl (v)
(A.26)
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where the second step is due to ρl (v) = ρh (Λ (v)). We multiply both sides of (A.26)
by ρl (v) and take the first-order derivative with respect to v,
w [vρ′l + ρl − ρl] = Λ′ρl + ρ′lΛ− ρlΛ′ (A.27)
so we get Λ (v) = wv.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.2.
Our analysis in section 2.5.1 implies that an l-type advertiser with v ∈ [bh, v0)
participates but cannot compete with any participating h-type advertisers. The
probability for such an l-type advertiser to beat any other advertiser is Gl(v) =
αFh (bh)+(1− α)Fl (v). For an l-type advertiser with v ∈ [v0, 1] (who competes with
both l-type advertisers and h-type advertisers), Gl(v) = αFh (wv) + (1− α)Fl (v).
Similarly, we can obtain the probability of beating any other advertiser for h-type
advertisers with valuation-per-click in [bh, wv0] (who beat any l-type advertisers in
[bh, v0) but none of the l-type advertisers in [v0, 1]), in [wv0, w] (who compete both
with h-type advertisers and l-type advertisers), and in (w, 1] (who beat any l-type
advertisers). The equilibrium winning and the equilibrium bidding functions follow
naturally. The only undetermined variable is v0. Notice that Lemma 2.5.1 implies
for any v ∈ [v0, 1],
Vh(wv) = Qh(wv − bh(wv))ρh(wv) = Qhw(v − bl(v))ρl(v) = wQh
Ql
Vl(v) (A.28)
Meanwhile, we have (by a similar process in the proof of Proposition 2.4.2)
Vl(v0) = Ql
∫ v0
bl
ρl(t)dt and Vh(wv0) = Qh
∫ wv0
bh
ρh(t)dt. (A.29)
Evaluating (A.28) at v = v0 and substituting the above, we immediately have w
∫ v0
bl
ρl(t)dt =∫ wv0
bh
ρh(t)dt, which determines v0. We can verify that the bidding strategies obtained
in the above process constitute an equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5.3.
In the following proof, we only consider the non-trivial case in which at least
some participating l-type advertisers can match h-type ones in valuation; i.e., bh <
Ql/Qh.
(Only-if part) We first show that a weighted unit-price auction with unequally
constraining minimum bids is inefficient. When the minimum bid for h-type advertis-
ers is more constraining, any weighting factor that results in a matching point being
1 for l-type advertisers is not efficient, since an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-
click 1 would lose to an h-type advertiser with valuation-per-click bh despite having
higher expected valuation. If the matching point is less than 1, by Lemma 2.5.1,
an l-type advertiser with valuation-per-click v > v0 will tie with an h-type advertiser
with valuation-per-click wv (provided that wv < 1). By the same argument in Propo-
sition 2.4.3, the allocation among these advertisers is efficient only if the weighting
factor is Ql/Qh. However, if the weighting factor is Ql/Qh and the minimum bid for
h-type advertisers is more constraining, by Proposition 2.5.2, h-type advertisers with
valuation-per-click between bh and wv0 are unmatched by any l-type advertisers, im-
plying that the h-type advertisers are inefficiently favored under the current minimum
bids. So, it is not possible to achieve allocation efficiency with a more constraining
minimum bid for h-type advertisers. By a similar argument, we can show that nor is
it possible with a less constraining minimum bid for h-type advertisers.
One cannot achieve efficiency with equally-constraining minimum bids but an
inefficient weighting factor either. If minimum bids are equally constraining, an l-
type advertiser with valuation-per-click v always ties with an h-type advertiser with
valuation-per-click wv. By the argument in Proposition 2.4.3, one can achieve effi-
ciency only by setting the weighting factor to Ql/Qh. In sum, a weighted unit-price
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auction is weakly efficient only if the weighting factor is efficient and minimum bids
are equally constraining.
The Derivation of Revenue-maximizing Minimum Bids.
Define Jθ(v) = v − 1−Fθ(v)fθ(v) and ρl
(
v−0
) ≡ limv→v−0 ρl(v) = ρh (bh). Taking the
partial derivative of of (2.17) with respect to bh and bl, respectively, we obtain the
first-order conditions (note that v0 is a function of bh and bl)
(1− α)Qlρl
(
v−0
)
Jl (v0) fl (v0)
∂v0
∂bh
+ (1− α)Ql
∫ v0
bl
dρl(v)
dbh
Jl (v) fl (v) dv
− (1− α)Qlρl (v0) Jl (v0) fl (v0) ∂v0
∂bh
− αQhρh (bh) Jh (bh) fh (bh)
+αQh
∫ wv0
bh
dρh (v)
dv0
∂v0
∂bh
Jh (v) fh (v) dv = 0 (A.30)
− (1− α)Qlρl (bl) Jl (bl) fl (bl) + (1− α)Qlρl
(
v−0
)
Jl (v0) fl (v0)
∂v0
∂bl
− (1− α)Qlρl (v0) Jl (v0) fl (v0) ∂v0
∂bl
+αQh
∂v0
∂bl
∫ wv0
bh
dρh (v)
dv0
Jh (v) fh (v) dv = 0 (A.31)
where ∂v0
∂bh
and ∂v0
∂bl
can be derived from the partial derivatives of both sides of equation
(2.16) with respect to bh and bl, respectively:
wρl
(
v−0
) ∂v0
∂bh
+ w
∫ v0
bl
dρl(t)
dbh
dt = wρh (wv0)
∂v0
∂bh
− ρh (bh) +
∂v0
bh
∫ wv0
bh
dρh (t)
dv0
dt
−wρl (bl) + wρl
(
v−0
) ∂v0
∂bl
= wρh (wv0)
∂v0
∂bl
+
∂v0
∂bl
∫ wv0
bh
dρh (v)
dv0
dv
The system of equations above allows us to solve the revenue-maximizing min-
imum bids for l-type advertisers (b∗l ) and h-type advertisers (b
∗
h). For example, solving
(A.30) we can get bh = b
∗
h (bl). Substituting b
∗
h (bl) into (A.31), we can derive b
∗
l .
Proof of Proposition 2.6.1.
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Denote H(x) ≡ αFh
(
x
Qh
)
+ (1 − α)Fl
(
x
Ql
)
. Using the similar approach as
in Proof for Proposition 1, we can derive the equilibrium bidding function for the
generalized first-price auction as
b (x) = x−
∑m
j=1 δj
∫ x
0
(n−1n−j)H(t)
n−j [1−H(t)]j−1 dt∑m
j=1 δj(
n−1
n−j)H(x)n−j [1−H(x)]j−1
If this bid is from an l-type advertiser, let v = x/Ql. Noting that H(Qlv) =
αFh
(
Ql
Qh
v
)
+ (1− α)Fl (v) = αFh (weffv) + (1− α)Fl (v) = Gl(v), we have
b (x) = Qlv −
∑m
j=1 δj
∫ Qlv
0
(n−1n−j)H(t)
n−j [1−H(t)]j−1 dt∑m
j=1 δj(
n−1
n−j)H(Qlv)n−j [1−H(Qlv)]j−1
= Qlv −Ql
∫ v
0
ρl(t)dt
ρl(v)
= Qlbl(v)
which means the total payment the advertiser bids is exactly the unit price he/she
would bid under efficient weighted unit-price auctions times his/her expected CTR.
Similar argument holds if the bid is from an h-type advertiser. Therefore, efficient
weighted unit-price auctions are revenue-equivalent to generalized first-price auctions.
120
Appendix B
Proofs of the Results in Chapter 3
We can specify fθ(v) as follows.
fL(v) =
f(v)
F (v∗)
, if v ∈ [0, v∗] . (B.1)
fH(v) =
{
αf(v)
1−(1−α)F (v∗) , if v ∈ [0, v∗] ,
f(v)
1−(1−α)F (v∗) , if v ∈ (v∗, 1] .
(B.2)
Substituting (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) into (3.6) and (3.7), respectively, we have
ρL(v) = [αF (wv) + (1− α)F (v)]n−1 , for v ∈ [0, v∗] , (B.3)
and
ρH(v) =

[
αF (v) + (1− α)F ( v
w
)]n−1
, for v ∈ [0, wv∗] ,
[αF (v) + (1− α)F (v∗)]n−1 , for v ∈ (wv∗, v∗] ,
[F (v)]n−1 , for v ∈ (v∗, 1] .
(B.4)
For v ∈ [0, v∗], it is easy to establish
ρL(v) = ρH(wv), (B.5)
and
dρL (v)
dw
= −w α
1− α
f (wv)
f (v)
dρH (v)
dw
|wv. (B.6)
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1.
Consider an L type with v who bids b and an H type with unit-valuation wv
who bids wb. Both bidders get a score wb, and their payoff functions are
UL(v, b) = yL(v − b)Pr(wb is the highest score) (B.7)
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and
UH(wv,wb) = yH(wv − wb)Pr(wb is the highest score). (B.8)
It is easy to establish that
UH (wv,wb) =
wyH
yL
UL(v, b). (B.9)
For bL(v) and bH(v) to be equilibrium bidding functions, at any v, b = bL(v) must
maximize UL(v, b) and b = bH(v) must maximize UH(v, b). So, (B.9) suggests that if
bidding b is the best choice for an L type with unit-valuation v, bidding wb must be
the best choice for an H type with unit-valuation wv, which implies bH(wv) = wbL(v).
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2.
We denote Vθ(v) ≡ Uθ(v, bθ(v)) as the equilibrium expected payoff of a bidder
with type θ and unit valuation v. By (3.2),
Vθ(v) ≡ Uθ(v, bθ(v)) = yθ(v − bθ(v))Prob(win|bθ(v), θ). (B.10)
By the Envelope Theorem (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 965), dVθ(v)
dv
=
∂Uθ(v,bθ(v))
∂v
. So
dVθ(v)
dv
= yθ × Prob(win|bθ(v), θ) = yθρθ(v), (B.11)
where the last step is due to Prob(win|bθ(v), θ) = ρθ(v) (both representing one’s
equilibrium winning probability). Applying the boundary condition Vθ(0) = 0 (i.e.,
the bidder with the lowest valuation gets zero payoff), we get
Vθ(v) = yθ
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt. (B.12)
Combining (B.12) and (B.10) (noting Prob(win|bθ(v), θ) = ρθ(v)), we can solve the
bidding function as
bθ(v) = v −
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt
ρθ(v)
. (B.13)
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It is easy to see that bθ(v) is indeed monotonically increasing, since
dbθ(v)
dv
= 1− 1 + ρ
′
θ(v)
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt
ρ2θ(v)
> 0, (B.14)
where the inequality is due to ρ′θ(v) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3.
For a given v∗ and any v < v∗, by (3.10) and (3.12),
∆V (v∗)− [VH(v)− VL(v)] = yH
∫ v∗
v
ρH(t)dt− yL
∫ v∗
v
ρL(t)dt. (B.15)
Because yH > yL and ρH(t) ≥ ρL(t) for all t ∈ [v, v∗], the above in (B.15) must be
positive. Therefore, by substituting ∆V (v∗) = c in (B.15),
VH(v)− VL(v) < c. (B.16)
If c = 0, all L types convert to H types for the benefit from the performance
increase and the scoring rule (3.1), and hence v∗ = 0. If ∆V (1) ≤ c, then v∗ = 1 must
be an equilibrium because (B.16) implies that the benefit from deviating to convert
cannot compensate for the investment cost for any L type with v ∈ [0, 1).
If 0 < c < ∆V (1), there is an unique solution to ∆V (v∗) = c, since ∆V (v∗) is
continuous and monotonically increasing in v∗ (by checking the first order derivative).
And, v∗ determined by ∆V (v∗) = c must be an equilibrium for the following reasons.
First, for an L type with unit valuation v ∈ [0, v∗), it is unprofitable to deviate
to convert due to (B.16). Second, for an L type with valuation v ∈ (v∗, 1], if he
remained at the low performance (instead of conversion), his best bidding strategy in
the second period was to bid bH(wv)/w by a similar argument to the one for Lemma
3.3.1. Therefore, by (B.9), his maximum expected payoff could be
UL(v, bH(wv)/w) =
yL
wyH
UH (wv, bH(wv)) =
yL
wyH
VH (wv) , (B.17)
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which can be shown to be less than VH(v) − c, the net equilibrium payoff. In fact,
[VH(v)− yLwyH VH (wv)] increases in v (by checking the first-order derivative), and
c = ∆V (v∗) = VH(v∗)− VL(v∗) = VH(v∗)− yL
wyH
VH (wv
∗) , (B.18)
where the last step is due to the mapping in (B.9) at equilibrium (recall Uθ(v, bθ(v)) ≡
Vθ(v)). Therefore, VH(v) − c > yLwyH VH (wv) for any v ∈ (v∗, 1], implying that it is
unprofitable for an L type of this v to deviate.
Proof of Corollary 3.3.4.
In the equilibrium, we have
∆V (v∗) = yH
∫ v∗
0
ρH(t)dt− yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL(t)dt = c, (B.19)
where v∗ can be regarded as a function of the related parameters. Applying the
Implicit Function Theory (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 940) to (B.19) with
respect to c and noticing ρH(t) is a function of v
∗ from (B.4), we have[
yHρH(v
∗)− yLρL(v∗) + yH
∫ v∗
wv∗
dρH(t)
dv∗
dt
]
v∗′(c) = 1, (B.20)
Since the coefficient of v∗′(c) in the above is positive, v∗′(c) > 0.
Similar argument leads to that v∗ decreases in yH .
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1.
Applying the Implicit Function Theory to (B.19) with respect of w and noticing
ρθ(v) is a function of w from (B.3) and (B.4), we have[
yHρH (v
∗)− yLρL (v∗) + yH
∫ v∗
wv∗
dρH(t)
dv∗
dt
]
dv∗(w)
dw
= yL
∫ v∗
0
dρL(t)
dw
dt− yH
∫ wv∗
0
dρH(t)
dw
dt.
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Since the right hand side is positive (due to dρL(t)
dw
> 0 and dρH(t)
dw
< 0) and the
coefficient of dv
∗(w)
dw
is positive, dv
∗(w)
dw
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2.
Substituting in (3.5), (B.1), and (B.2), we can re-organize (3.13) as
(1− α) yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) f (v) dv + αyH
∫ v∗
0
ρH (v) f (v) dv + yH
∫ 1
v∗
ρH (v) f (v) dv.
(B.21)
Taking the first order derivative of the above with respect to w, we have (recall
ρH(v) is a step function as specified in (B.4))
(1− α) [yLρL(v∗)− yHρH(v∗)] f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
+ (1− α) yL
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv
+αyH
∫ wv∗
0
dρH (v)
dw
f (v) dv + αyH
dv∗(w)
dw
∫ v∗
wv∗
dρH (v)
dv∗
f (v) dv.
By integration by substitution and then applying (B.6),∫ wv∗
0
dρH (v)
dw
f (v) dv =
∫ v∗
0
dρH (v)
dw
|wzf (wz)wdz = −1− α
α
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv.
(B.22)
Substituting in (B.22) and integrating
∫ v∗
wv∗
dρH(v)
dv∗ f (v) dv , we can re-write the above
first-order derivative as
(1− α) [yLρL (v∗)− yHρH (v∗)] f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
+ (1− α) yL
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv
− (1− α) yH
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv + (1− α) yH (ρH (v∗)− ρH (wv∗)) f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
= (1− α) (yL − yH) ρL (v∗) f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
+(1− α) (yL − yH)
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv, (B.23)
where the equality is due to ρH(wv
∗) = ρL(v∗) from (B.5). Since
dv∗(w)
dw
> 0 (by
Lemma 3.4.1) and dρL(v)
dw
> 0, the first order derivative is negative, which implies that
the expected performance decreases in w.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.1.
Substituting in (3.5), (B.1), and (B.2), we can re-organize (3.14) as
n
[
(1− α) yL
∫ v∗
0
vρL (v) f (v) dv
+αyH
∫ v∗
0
vρH (v) f (v) dv + yH
∫ 1
v∗
vρH (v) f (v) dv
]
−n (1− α) (1− F (v∗)) c. (B.24)
Taking the first order derivative of (B.24) with respect to w (and removing
the constant n),
(1− α) [yLρL (v∗)− yHρH (v∗)] v∗f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
+ (1− α) f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
c
+(1− α) yL
∫ v∗
0
v
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv
+αyH
∫ wv∗
0
v
dρH (v)
dw
f (v) dv + αyH
dv∗(w)
dw
∫ v∗
wv∗
v
dρH (v)
dv∗
f (v) dv. (B.25)
By integration by parts,
αyH
∫ v∗
wv∗
v
dρH (v)
dv∗
f (v) dv = (1− α) yHf (v∗)
(
ρH (v) v|v∗wv∗ −
∫ v∗
wv∗
ρH (v) dv
)
.
(B.26)
Also, notice ρH(wv
∗) = ρL(v∗) from (B.5). By substituting in (B.26) and applying
integration by substitution similar to the one in (B.22), (B.25) can re-organized as
(1− α) (yL − wyH)
∫ v∗
0
v
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv
+(1− α) (yL − wyH) ρL (v∗) v∗f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
+(1− α) f (v∗) dv
∗(w)
dw
[c− yH
∫ v∗
wv∗
ρH (v) dv], (B.27)
Using ρH(wv) = ρL(v) by (B.5), we can re-write the equilibrium condition (B.19) as
(yHw − yL)
∫ v∗
0
ρL (x) dx+ yH
∫ v∗
wv∗
ρH (x) dx = c (B.28)
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By substituting into (B.28), the first-order derivative (B.27) can be re-organized as
(1− α)
[
f (v∗)
dv∗(w)
dw
(v∗ρL (v∗)−
∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) dv) +
∫ v∗
0
v
dρL (v)
dw
f (v) dv
]
(yL − wyH) .
(B.29)
Since the coefficient of (yL − wyH) is positive, w = yLyH is the only solution making
(B.29) zero. Therefore, w∗ = yL
yH
.
Derivation of the Expected Revenue.
The expected payment from a θ-type bidder of unit valuation v is the difference
between his expected valuation and his expected payoff; that is
yθvρθ(v)− Vθ(v) = yθ
[
vρθ(v)−
∫ v
0
ρθ(t)dt
]
. (B.30)
The expected payment from one bidder (with probability PH being an H type
and with probability PL being an L type) is
PLE [yLvρL(v)− VL(v)] + PHE [yHvρH(v)− VH(v)]
= yLPL
∫ v∗
0
[
vρL(v)−
∫ v
0
ρL(t)dt
]
fL(v)dv + yHPH
∫ 1
0
[
vρH(v)−
∫ v
0
ρH(t)dt
]
fH(v)dv
= yLPL
∫ v∗
0
ρL(v)
[
v − 1− FL(v)
fL(v)
]
fL(v)dv + yHPH
∫ 1
0
ρH(v)
[
v − 1− FH(v)
fH(v)
]
fH(v)dv.
The expected revenue from all bidders is n times the above.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.1.
Given v∗, the first-order derivative of pi in (3.15) with respect to w can be
organized as (substituting in (3.5), (B.1), and (B.2))
∂pi
∂w
= n(1− α)yL
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
JL(v)f(v)dv + nαyH
∫ wv∗
0
dρH (v)
dw
JH(v)f(v)dv (B.31)
= n(1− α)yL
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
JL(v)f(v)dv − n(1− α)yH
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
JH(wv)f(v)dv,
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where the second step is by applying integration by substitution similar to the one in
(B.22). Substituting in Jθ(v), we have
∂pi
∂w
= n(1−α)
∫ v∗
0
dρL (v)
dw
[
(yL − yHw) v +
(
yH
1− FH(wv)
fH (wv)
− yL1− FL(v)
fL (v)
)]
f(v)dv.
(B.32)
Notice that
1− FL(v)
fL (v)
=
F (v∗)− F (v)
f(v)
≤ 1− F (v)
f(v)
and
1− F (wv)
f(wv)
≤
1−(1−α)F (v∗)
α
− F (wv)
f(wv)
=
1− FH(wv)
fH (wv)
.
If f(v)
1−F (v) is increasing in v, then
1−F (v)
f(v)
≤ 1−F (wv)
f(wv)
and thus 1−FL(v)
fL(v)
≤ 1−FH(wv)
fH(wv)
.
Therefore, for all w ∈ [0, yL
yH
], we have ∂pi
∂w
> 0, implying wLopt >
yL
yH
.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.2.
Substituting F (v) = v and f (v) = 1 into (B.32),
∂pi
∂w
= n(1− α)(n− 1)(αw + 1− α)n−2α
×
∫ v∗
0
vn−1
[
2 (yL − wyH) v +
(
1− (1− α)v∗
α
yH − v∗yL
)]
dv. (B.33)
By integration, we can obtain the solution to ∂pi/∂w = 0:
wLopt =
(n+ 1) yH
1−(1−α)v∗
α
+ (n− 1) yLv∗
2nyHv∗
.
It is easy to see that wLopt decreases in v
∗. Notice that in the static case v∗ = 1 and
in our dynamic (nontrivial) case with limited commitment v∗ < 1. So the revenue-
maximizing weighting factor in a dynamic limited-commitment case is greater than
in a static case.
Proof of Lemma 3.6.4.
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In the full commitment case, we have
dpi
dw
=
∂pi
∂w
+
∂pi
∂v∗
dv∗(w)
dw
, (B.34)
where ∂pi/∂w is the same as specified in (B.31). To get ∂pi/∂v∗, we re-organize the
expected revenue pi in (3.15) as below by substituting in Pθ, fθ(v), and Fθ(v) (specified
in (3.5), (B.1), (B.2), (3.3), and (3.4)).
n (1− α) yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) JL (v) f (v) dv
+nyH
[∫ v∗
0
ρH (v) JH (v)αf (v) dv +
∫ 1
v∗
ρH (v) JH (v) f (v) dv
]
= n (1− α) yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) [vf (v)− (F (v∗)− F (v))] dv
+nyH
[∫ v∗
0
ρH (v) [αvf (v)− (1− (1− α)F (v∗)) + αF (v)] dv
+
∫ 1
v∗
ρH (v) [vf (v)− (1− F (v))] dv
]
Then, we have
∂pi
∂v∗
= n (1− α) [yLρL (v∗)− yHρH (v∗)] v∗f (v∗)− n (1− α) f (v∗) yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) dv
+n (1− α) f (v∗) yH
∫ v∗
0
ρH (v) dv + nyH
∫ v∗
wv∗
dρH (v)
dv∗
JH (v)αf (v) dv(B.35)
which leads to (3.18) by noticing that yH
∫ v∗
0
ρH (v) dv − yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) dv = c.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.5.
Notice that JH(v)αf(v) = [αvf (v)− (1− (1− α)F (v∗)) + αF (v)] for v ∈
[wv∗, v∗]. By substituting (B.26) in (B.35),
∂pi
∂v∗
= n (1− α) f(v∗)
[
(yLρL(v
∗)− wyHρH(wv∗)) v∗ + yH
∫ wv∗
0
ρH(v)dv − yL
∫ v∗
0
ρL(v)dv
]
+n
[
−yH
∫ v∗
wv∗
dρH (v)
dv∗
(1− (1− α)F (v∗)− αF (v)) dv
]
.
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Notice that the term in the second square bracket is negative. The term in the
first square bracket, by integration by substitution for
∫ wv∗
0
ρH(v)dv and applying
ρH(wv) = ρL(v) from (B.5), can be simplified to
[
(yL − wyH)
(
ρL (v
∗) v∗ − ∫ v∗
0
ρL (v) dv
)]
,
which is negative for w > yL/yH . Therefore, ∂pi/∂v
∗ < 0 for all w ≥ yL/yH .
Notice that dv
∗(w)
dw
> 0 by Lemma 3.4.1. Therefore, for a certain w˜ ≥ yL/yH ,
we have dpi
dw
|w˜ < 0 by (B.34) as long as ∂pi∂w |w˜ ≤ 0. In particular, if F (v) is IHR,
wLopt > yL/yH ; if
∂2pi
∂w2
< 0, ∂pi
∂w
|wLopt = 0 leads to ∂pi∂w < 0 for w ∈ (wLopt, 1]. So we have
dpi
dw
< 0 for for w ∈ (wLopt, 1], implying wFopt < wLopt.
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Appendix C
Proofs of the Results in Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4.4.1.
(a) For j = 1, 2, ..., n− 1,
αj = n
∫ v¯
v
Pj (v) [vf (v)− (1− F (v))] dv = n
∫ v¯
v
Pj (v) d [−v (1− F (v))]
= n
∫ v¯
v
v (1− F (v)) dPj (v)
= n
∫ v¯
v
(
n− 1
n− j
)
F (v)n−j−1 (1− F (v))j−1 [(n− j)− (n− 1)F (v)] vf (v) dv
where the third step is due to integration by parts. We can easily verify α1 > 0.
For j = 2, 3, ..., n− 1,
α1 − αj = n
∫ v¯
v
{(n− 1)F (v)n−2 (1− F (v))−(
n− 1
n− j
)
F (v)n−j−1 (1− F (v))j−1 [(n− j)− (n− 1)F (v)]}vf (v) dv(C.1)
Denoting A (v) ≡ (n− 1)F (v)j−1 − (n−1
n−j
)
(1− F (v))j−2 [(n− j)− (n− 1)F (v)], we
can rewrite (C.1) as α1 − αj = n
∫ v¯
v
[1− F (v)]F (v)n−j−1A (v) vf (v) dv. We argue
that A(v) single-crosses zero from below on [v, v¯]. To see, let v0 be the solution to
(n− j) − (n− 1)F (v) = 0. We can verify that A (v) < 0, A (v) increases in v for
v ≤ v0, and A (v) is positive for all v > v0. Thus A (v) crosses zero only once from
below, implying [1− F (v)]F (v)n−j−1A (v) f (v) also single-crosses zero from below
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on (v, v¯). Denoting the crossing point of the latter as vc, we have
α1 − αj = n
∫ v¯
v
(1− F (v))F (v)n−j−1A (v) f (v) vdv
> nvc
∫ v¯
v
(1− F (v))F (v)n−j−1A (v) f (v) dv
= nvc
∫ v¯
v
[P2 (v)− jPj+1 (v) + (j − 1)Pj (v)] f (v) dv (C.2)
where the last equality results from substituting the definition of A (v) and rearranging
terms. The right side of (C.2) is zero because for j = 1, ..., n,∫ v¯
v
Pj (v) f (v) dv =
(
n− 1
n− j
)∫ v¯
v
F (v)n−j [1− F (v)]j−1 dF (v)
=
(
n− 1
n− j
)∫ 1
0
xn−j (1− x)j−1 dx
=
(
n− 1
n− j
)(
n− 1
n− j
)−1
1
n
=
1
n
(C.3)
where the second step is due to integration by substitution and the third step is due
to repeated integration by parts. Therefore, α1 − αj > 0 for j = 2, 3, ..., n− 1.
We next show that α1 − αn > 0.
α1 − αn = n
∫ v¯
v
{
F (v)n−1 − [1− F (v)]n−1} d [−v (1− F (v))]
= −nv + n
∫ v¯
v
v [1− F (v)] (n− 1) [F (v)n−2 + (1− F (v))n−2] f(v)dv
> −nv + nv
∫ v¯
v
[1− F (v)] (n− 1) [F (v)n−2 + (1− F (v))n−2] f(v)dv
= −nv + nv
(
1
n
+
n− 1
n
)
= 0
where the second step is due to integration by parts and the fourth step is due to
(C.3).
(b) Denote hj (x) ≡ nPj (x) f (x). By (C.3),
∫ v¯
v
hj (x) dx = 1. Thus we can
regard hj (x) as a probability density function. We next show that for j = 1, 2, ..., n−1,
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hj (x) first-order stochastically dominates hj+1 (x).
hj (x)− hj+1 (x)
= nf (x)
{(
n− 1
n− j
)
F (x)n−j [1− F (x)]j−1 −
(
n− 1
n− j − 1
)
F (x)n−j−1 [1− F (x)]j
}
=
(
n
j
)
f (x)F (x)n−j−1 [1− F (x)]j−1 [nF (x)− (n− j)]
Denote vcj as the solution to nF (x) − (n− j) = 0. Because hj (x) < hj+1 (x)
for any x ∈ (v, vcj), ∫ vv hj (x) dx < ∫ vv hj+1 (x) dx for v ∈ (v, vcj). Because hj (x) >
hj+1 (x) for any x ∈
(
vcj , v¯
)
,
∫ v¯
v
hj (x) dx >
∫ v¯
v
hj+1 (x) dx for v ∈
(
vcj , v¯
)
, which implies∫ v
v
hj (x) dx <
∫ v
v
hj+1 (x) dx for v ∈
(
vcj , v¯
)
(note that
∫ v
v
hj (x) dx = 1−
∫ v¯
v
hj (x) dx).
In all, we have
∫ v
v
hj (x) dx <
∫ v
v
hj+1 (x) dx for any v ∈ (v, v¯), implying that hj (x)
first-order stochastically dominates hj+1 (x). According to the property of first-order
stochastic dominance (e.g., Proposition 6.D.1 at page 195 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995)),
if J (x) is an increasing function of x,
∫ v¯
v
hj (x) J (x) dx >
∫ v¯
v
hj+1 (x) J (x) dx. There-
fore αj > αj+1.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.5.
Assume the optimal share structure is (s∗1, s
∗
2, ..., s
∗
n). Denote
∑jk+1
j=jk+1
s∗j ≡ σ
and notice that s∗jk ≥ 1jk+1−jkσ ≥ s∗jk+1+1 ≥ 0 because of the size-order constraint.
(s∗jk+1, s
∗
jk+2
, ..., s∗jk+1) must be the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
jk+1∑
j=jk+1
αjQ (sj) , subject to: sjk+1 ≥ ... ≥ sjk+1 and
jk+1∑
j=jk+1
sj ≤ σ (C.4)
s∗jk ≥ sjk+1 and sjk+1 ≥ s∗jk+1+1 (C.5)
We will work on the related maximization problem without constraint (C.5)
and check (C.5) later. The Lagrangian function then can be written as
L =
jk+1∑
j=jk+1
αjQ (sj) + µ
(
σ −
jk+1∑
j=jk+1
sj
)
+
jk+1−1∑
j=jk+1
γj (sj − sj+1)
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where µ and γj are Lagrange multipliers. Hence, the Kuhn-Tucher conditions are (let
γjk ≡ 0, γjk+1 ≡ 0)
αjQ
′ (sj)− µ+ γj − γj−1 = 0, for j = jk + 1, ..., jk+1 (C.6)
Averaging (C.6) for the first l shares and the remaining shares, respectively, we have
1
l
(∑jk+l
j=jk+1
αjQ
′ (sj) + γjk+l
)
=
1
jk+1 − jk − l
(∑jk+1
j=jk+l+1
αjQ
′ (sj)− γjk+l
)
.
(C.7)
By definition, jk+1 is the maximizer for the average return factor starting from jk+1,
so
1
l
∑jk+l
j=jk+1
αj ≤ 1
jk+1 − jk − l
∑jk+1
j=jk+l+1
αj (C.8)
Also note that Q′(sj) is nondecreasing in j. Therefore, we have 1l
∑jk+l
j=jk+1
αjQ
′ (sj) ≤
1
jk+1−jk−l
∑jk+1
j=jk+l+1
αjQ
′ (sj). If γjk+l = 0, (C.7) can hold only if (C.8) holds in
equality and sjk+1 = ... = sjk+1 . In other words, if any γj = 0 (jk < j < jk+1), we
must have sjk+1 = ... = sjk+1 . Otherwise, we have γj > 0 for all jk < j < jk+1, which
implies sjk+1 = ... = sjk+1 by the Kuhn-Tucker condition. So, regardless, we have
sjk+1 = ... = sjk+1 =
1
jk+1−jkσ, which naturally satisfies constraint (C.5).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.7.
Suppose that we have m plateaus. By Lemma 4.4.5, shares are equal in size
within a plateau. Denote nk ≡ jk − jk−1 as the number of shares in plateau k and
zk as the size of a share in that plateau. Recall that α¯k decreases in k. Without loss
of generality, we assume there exists k0 ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} such that α¯k0 > 0 ≥ α¯k0+1.
Clearly, it is never optimal to allocate resources to plateaus with non-positive average
return factors. Therefore, zk0+1 = ... = zm = 0 in the optimal share structure. The
optimal share structure problem becomes
max
{z1,...,zk0}
k0∑
k=1
nkα¯kQ (zk) , subject to: z1 ≥ ... ≥ zk0 ≥ 0 and
k0∑
k=1
nkzk ≤ 1 (C.9)
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The Lagrangian function for the above is (notice that zk0+1 = 0)
L (s, µ, λ) =
k0∑
k=1
nkα¯kQ(zk) + µ
(
1−
k0∑
k=1
nkzk
)
+
k0∑
k=1
λk (zk − zk+1) (C.10)
where µ and λk are Lagrange multipliers. Hence, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
(define λ0 ≡ 0)
nkα¯kQ
′ (zk)− nkµ+ λk − λk−1 = 0, for k = 1, 2, ..., k0 (C.11)
If λ1 = ... = λk0 = 0, we immediately have, by (C.11), that α¯1Q
′ (z1) = ... =
α¯k0Q
′ (zk0) ≥ α¯k0+1Q′ (0). Otherwise, there must exist k (k < k0) such that λ0 =
... = λk = 0 and λk+1 > 0. From (C.11),
α¯k+1Q
′ (zk+1)− µ+ λk+1 − λk
nk+1
= α¯k+2Q
′ (zk+2)− µ+ λk+2 − λk+1
nk+2
. (C.12)
Note that α¯k+1 > α¯k+2 > 0 and zk+1 = zk+2 (because λk+1 > 0). (C.12) requires
λk+2 > λk+1 > 0. Using the similar logic repeatedly, we can get λk0 > ... > λk+2 >
λk+1 > 0, which implies zk0+1 = zk0 = ... = zk+1 = 0 (because zk0+1 = 0). Substitut-
ing the λ-sequence into (C.10), we have
α¯1Q
′ (z1) = α¯2Q′ (z2) = ... = α¯kQ′ (zk) ≥ α¯k+1Q′ (0) , (C.13)
which implies z1 > z2 > ... > zk (because α¯k decreases and Q (·) is concave).
In addition, we have µ > 0 from (C.11) when k = 1, which implies
∑k0
k=1 nkzk =
1, that is, all the resources are offered in the optimal share structure.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.2.
Assume that Qˆ(·) is more concave than Q(·); that is, there exists a concave
function ψ(·) such that Qˆ(·) = ψ (Q(·)). Notice that Qˆ′(x)
Q′(x) = ψ
′ (Q(x)), which de-
creases in x. Therefore, for any x1 and x2 (x1 < x2),
Qˆ′ (x1)
Qˆ′ (x2)
>
Q′ (x1)
Q′ (x2)
(C.14)
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Denote s and sˆ as the optimal share structures under Q(·) and Qˆ(·), respectively. To
show sˆ is less steep than s, it is sufficient to show that
sˆj ≥ sj ⇒ sˆj+1 ≥ sj+1, ∀j (C.15)
First, note that s and sˆ have identical plateau boundaries by Lemma 4.4.5. If
j and j +1 are located in the same plateau, sj = sj+1 and sˆj = sˆj+1, and sˆj+1 ≥ sj+1
holds trivially. Otherwise, we assume j and j + 1 are located in plateau k and k + 1,
respectively. We focus the nontrivial case sj+1 > 0. By Proposition 4.4.7, we have
α¯kQˆ
′(sˆj) ≥ α¯k+1Qˆ′(sˆj+1) and α¯kQ′(sj) = α¯k+1Q′(sj+1), and hence
Qˆ′(sˆj+1)
Qˆ′(sˆj)
≤ Q
′(sj+1)
Q′(sj)
(C.16)
Combining (C.16) with that
Qˆ′(sˆj+1)
Qˆ′(sj)
≤ Qˆ′(sˆj+1)
Qˆ′(sˆj)
(because of the concavity of Qˆ(·)) and
Q′(sj+1)
Q′(sj)
<
Qˆ′(sj+1)
Qˆ′(sj)
(because of (C.14)), we have
Qˆ′(sˆj+1)
Qˆ′(sj)
<
Qˆ′(sj+1)
Qˆ′(sj)
, which implies that
sˆj+1 > sj+1.
We now show sˆ1 < s1, if s2 > 0. If sˆ1 ≥ s1, we know from the above proof
that sˆ2 > s2 (note that s1 and s2 are not in the same plateau by Proposition 4.4.7)
and sˆj ≥ sj for j > 2, which contradicts that
∑n
j=1 sj =
∑n
j=1 sˆj.
Proof of Lemma 4.5.3.
It is sufficient to show that if sˆj ≥ sj then sˆj+1 ≥ sj+1, for any j. If j and
j +1 are located in the same plateau, sˆj = sˆj+1 and sj = sj+1, and sˆj+1 ≥ sj+1 holds
trivially. So we assume j and j+1 are located in plateau k and k+1, respectively. If
sj+1 = 0, the result holds trivially. Suppose sj+1 > 0 (so that sˆj ≥ sj > sj+1 > 0). By
Proposition 4.4.7, we have ˆ¯αkQ
′ (sˆj) ≥ ˆ¯αk+1Q′ (sˆj+1) and α¯kQ′ (sj) = α¯k+1Q′ (sj+1).
Together with condition (4.19), we have
Q′ (sˆj)
Q′ (sˆj+1)
≥ ˆ¯αk+1
ˆ¯αk
≥ α¯k+1
α¯k
=
Q′ (sj)
Q′ (sj+1)
(C.17)
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which implies
Q′(sˆj)
Q′(sj)
≥ Q′(sˆj+1)
Q′(sj+1)
. Note that
Q′(sˆj)
Q′(sj)
≤ 1 by concavity of Q(·) and sˆj ≥ sj.
So we have
Q′(sˆj+1)
Q′(sj+1)
≤ 1, which implies sˆj+1 ≥ sj+1.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.4.
(a) Denote Fˆ (wv) as the distribution function after scaling. Clearly, Fˆ (wv) =
F (v), and hence Pˆj(wv) = Pj (v). It is easy to verify fˆ(wv) =
f(v)
w
and Jˆ(wv) =
wJ (v). Based on these relationships, we have
αˆj = n
∫ wv¯
wv
Pˆj(x)Jˆ(x)fˆ(x)dx = n
∫ wv¯
wv
Pj(
x
w
)J(
x
w
)f
( x
w
)
dx = wn
∫ v¯
v
Pj(v)J(v)f(v)dv
where the third step is due to integration by substitution.
(b) Denote Fˆ (v+w) as the distribution function after shifting. Clearly, Fˆ (v+
w) = F (v), and hence Pˆj(v + w) = Pj (v). It is easy to verify fˆ(v + w) = f(v) and
Jˆ(v + w) = J(v) + w. Based on these relationships, we have
αˆj = n
∫ v¯+w
v+w
Pˆj(x)Jˆ(x)fˆ(x)dx = n
∫ v¯+w
v+w
Pj(x− w) (J(x− w) + w) f(x− w)dx
= wn
∫ v¯
v
Pj(v)f(v)dv + n
∫ v¯
v
Pj(v)J(v)f(v)dv = w + αj (C.18)
where the third step is due to integration by substitution and the last step is due to
(C.3).
(c) Under the regular condition, α¯j sequence coincides with αj sequence. So,
by Lemma 4.5.3, a sufficient condition for sˆ to be less steeper than s is
αˆj+1
αˆj
≥ αj+1
αj
, whenever sj+1 > 0 (C.19)
Denote P nj (x) ≡ (n−1n−j)xn−j (1− x)j−1 and J (x) = J (F−1 (x)). We can write that
αj = n
∫ 1
0
P nj (F (v)) J (v) f(v)dv = n
∫ 1
0
P nj (x) J (x) dx. Noting that αˆj+1 > 0 and
αj+1 > 0 (from Jˆ(x) > 0 and J(x) > 0), we can rewrite (C.19) as∫ 1
0
P nj+1 (x) J (x) dx
∫ 1
0
P nj (x) Jˆ (x) dx ≤
∫ 1
0
P nj (x) J (x) dx
∫ 1
0
P nj+1 (x) Jˆ (x) dx
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By Athey (2000), the above holds if the following two conditions are satisfied:
P nj+1 (x) J (x) · P nj (y) Jˆ (y) ≤ P nj (y) J (y) · P nj+1 (x) Jˆ (x) , ∀ x < y (C.20)
P nj+1 (x) J (x) · P nj (y) Jˆ (y) ≤ P nj (x) J (x) · P nj+1 (y) Jˆ (y) , ∀ x > y (C.21)
(C.21) simplifies to P nj+1 (x)P
n
j (y) ≤ P nj (x)P nj+1 (y), which holds naturally for x > y.
(C.20) can be written as
Jˆ (y)
Jˆ (x)
≤ J (y)
J (x)
,∀x < y. (C.22)
If (C.22) holds in strict inequality, so does (C.19), suggesting sˆ is strictly less steeper
than s.
Proof of Lemma 4.5.5.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that we have m plateaus. Let sˆ denote
the new optimal share structure after increasing the total resources. Notice that
α¯j’s remain the same. Assume zˆl ≤ zl for some l ∈ {1, 2, ..., k∗}. Then it must be
that zˆk ≤ zk, for all k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}. Otherwise, assume zˆj > zj ≥ 0 for some
j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}. Because zˆj > 0 and zl > 0, by the first order condition (4.16),
α¯jQ
′(zˆj) ≥ α¯lQ′(zˆl) and α¯lQ′(zl) ≥ α¯jQ′(zj). Since α¯lQ′ (zˆl) ≥ α¯lQ′ (zl), we thus
have α¯jQ
′(zˆj) ≥ α¯jQ′(zj), which contradicts with zˆj > zj. But if zˆk ≤ zk for all k,
the available resources are not fully allocated, which cannot be optimal. So all shares
with positive sizes must increase with the total resources. As a result, the number of
positive shares weakly increases.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.8.
Let s and sˆ denote the share structure before and after increasing the total
resources, respectively. Consider zk+1 > 0 (so that zˆk+1 > 0 by Lemma 4.5.5). By the
optimal condition (4.16), Q
′(zk)
Q′(zk+1)
= α¯k+1
α¯k
= Q
′(zˆk)
Q′(zˆk+1)
. Noting that
∫ b
a
Q′′(x)
Q′(x) dx = ln
Q′(b)
Q′(a) ,
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we have, ∫ zk
zk+1
Q′′ (x)
Q′ (x)
dx =
∫ zˆk
zˆk+1
Q′′ (x)
Q′ (x)
dx. (C.23)
Denote r (x) ≡ − Q′(x)
Q′′(x)x . Note that∫ b
a
Q′′ (x)
Q′ (x)
dx = −
∫ b
a
1
r (x)x
dx = − 1
r (ξ)
∫ b
a
1
x
dx = − 1
r (ξ)
ln
b
a
, for some ξ ∈ (a, b) .
(C.24)
From Lemma 4.5.5, we know zk+1 < zˆk+1 and zk < zˆk. Suppose zk ≤ zˆk+1. Substi-
tuting (C.24) into both sides of (C.23), we have
1
r (ξ)
ln
zk
zk+1
=
1
r(ξˆ)
ln
zˆk
zˆk+1
, where zk+1 < ξ < zk ≤ zˆk+1 < ξˆ < zˆk.
It is straightforward that r′ (·) > (<,=) 0 implies zk
zk+1
< (>,=) zˆk
zˆk+1
, or zˆk+1
zk+1
<
(>,=) zˆk
zk
. If zˆk+1 < zk, (C.23) can be rewritten as,∫ zˆk
zk
Q′′ (x)
Q′ (x)
dx =
∫ zˆk+1
zk+1
Q′′ (x)
Q′ (x)
dx
By the same logic, r′ (·) > (<,=) 0 implies zˆk+1
zk+1
< (>,=) zˆk
zk
.
Lemma C.0.1 (Ranking of αj (v0)). Under the MHR condition, for any marginal
type v0 ∈ (v, v¯), if αj (v0) > 0, αj (v0) > αj+1 (v0); if αj (v0) ≤ 0, αj+1 (v0) < 0.
Proof. For the case v0 ∈ (v, v¯), define hj (x|x ≥ v0) ≡ hj(x)∫ v¯
v0
hj(t)dt
. Following steps in
the proof of Lemma 4.4.1 (b), we can similarly show that hi (x|x ≥ v0) first-order
stochastically dominates hi+1 (x|x ≥ v0). Thus,∫ v¯
v0
hj (x|x ≥ v0) J (x) dx >
∫ v¯
v0
hj+1 (x|x ≥ v0) J (x) dx, for j = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
(C.25)
Substituting hj (x|x ≥ v0) with hj(x)∫ v¯
v0
hj(t)dt
and rearranging, we have
αj(v0) =
∫ v¯
v0
hj (x) J (x) dx >
∫ v¯
v0
hj (t) dt∫ v¯
v0
hj+1 (t) dt
∫ v¯
v0
hj+1 (x) J (x) dx =
∫ v¯
v0
hj (t) dt∫ v¯
v0
hj+1 (t) dt
αj+1(v0).
(C.26)
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Suppose αj(v0) > 0. If αj+1(v0) ≥ 0, from
∫ v¯
v0
hj (t) dt >
∫ v¯
v0
hj+1 (t) dt > 0 (be-
cause hj (t) first-order stochastically dominates hj+1 (t)), we have αj(v0) > αj+1(v0).
If αj+1(v0) < 0, it is easy to see αj(v0) > αj+1(v0).
If αj(v0) ≤ 0, (C.26) implies αj+1(v0) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.6.1.
First, we derive v∗0. The first-order derivative of the expected revenue (4.22)
with respect to the marginal type (v0) is −n
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)Pj(v0)J(v0)f(v0). The optimal
marginal type is either an interior solution of J (v) = 0 or one of the two corner solu-
tions (v or v¯). Notice that v¯ cannot be optimal since the expected revenue decreases
at the neighborhood of v = v¯, implied by J (v¯) > 0. Under the regular condition, v∗0
is either the solution to J(v0) = 0 or v, whichever is higher.
We prove Proposition 4.6.1 for any v0 ∈ (v, v∗0]. First note that αj(v0) =
αj (v) −
∫ v0
v
hj (v) J (v) dv. According to Lemma 4.5.3, a sufficient condition is that
for any j such that s∗j+1 > 0 (s
∗
j+1 denotes the (j + 1)-th share in the optimal share
structure under no minimum bid),
αj+1 (v0)
αj (v0)
=
αj+1 (v)−
∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) J (v) dv
αj (v)−
∫ v0
v
hj (v) J (v) dv
>
αj+1 (v)
αj (v)
(C.27)
Following steps in the proof of Lemma 4.4.1 (b), we can similarly show that∫ v0
v
hj (v) dv <
∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) dv and hj (v) /
∫ v0
v
hj (v) dv first-order stochastically dom-
inates hj+1 (v) /
∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) dv. Therefore,
∫ v0
v
hj (v) J (v) dv∫ v0
v
hj (v) dv
>
∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) J (v) dv∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) dv
(C.28)
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By the MHR condition, J(v) ≤ 0 for v ≤ v∗0, so we have
0 >
∫ v0
v
hj (v) J (v) dv >
∫ v0
v
hj (v) dv∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) dv
∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) J (v) dv >
∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) J (v) dv
(C.29)
where the last inequality is due to 0 <
∫ v0
v
hj (v) dv <
∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) dv.
Given s∗j+1 > 0, we have αj+1(v) > 0. The result (C.27) follows from the
fact that αj(v) > αj+1(v) > 0 (Lemma 4.4.1) and that 0 >
∫ v0
v
hj (v) J (v) dv >∫ v0
v
hj+1 (v) J (v) dv (by (C.29)).
Derivation of the Bidding Function.
Let β (v) denote bidders’ bidding function. We consider the case with a strictly
increasing bidding function, and thus the inverse bidding function, β−1 (b), exists and
is strictly increasing.
If a bidder’s rivals bid according to β (v), the bidder’s probability of winning
jth share by placing bid b is pj(b) ≡
(
n−1
n−j
)
F (β−1 (b))n−j (1− F (β−1 (b)))j−1. Since
in equilibrium the bidder bids b = β (v), the equilibrium probability of winning jth
share is Pj (v) ≡ pj (β(v)) =
(
n−1
n−j
)
F (v)n−j (1− F (v))j−1.
Denote V (v) ≡ U (v, β (v)) as the equilibrium payoff of a bidder of type v.
V (v) = U (v, β(v)) =
n∑
j=1
pj(β (v)) (vQ(sj)− β(v)sj) (C.30)
We have dV (v)
dv
= ∂U(v,β(v))
∂v
+ ∂U(v,β(v))
∂b
dβ(v)
dv
. According to the first-order condi-
tion, ∂U(v,β(v))
∂b
= 0. So
dV (v)
dv
=
∂U (v, β (v))
∂v
=
n∑
j=1
pj(β (v))Q(sj) =
n∑
j=1
Pj(v)Q(sj) (C.31)
Moving dv to the right hand side, integrating both sides from v to v, and
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assuming V (v) = 0 (the lowest type gets zero payoff),we get
V (v) =
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)
∫ v
v
Pj(x)dx, for v ∈ [v, v¯] . (C.32)
Combining (C.30) and (C.32), we can solve the equilibrium bidding function as
β (v) = v
n∑
j=1
Pj(v)Q(sj)
n∑
j=1
Pj(v)sj
−
n∑
j=1
Q (sj)
∫ v
v
Pj(x)dx
n∑
j=1
Pj(v)sj
, v ∈ [v, v¯] (C.33)
Derivation of the Expected Revenue.
The expected payment from a bidder of type v is β (v)
n∑
j=1
sjPj(v). The ex-
pected payment from one bidder is
E
[
β (v)
n∑
j=1
sjPj(v)
]
=
∫ v¯
v
[
β (v)
n∑
j=1
sjPj(v)
]
f(v)dv
=
∫ v¯
v
[
v
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)Pj(v)−
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)
∫ v
v
Pj(t)dt
]
f(v)dv
=
∫ v¯
v
[
v
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)Pj(v)f(v)− (1− F (v))
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)Pj(v)
]
dv
=
n∑
j=1
Q(sj)
∫ v¯
v
Pj(v)
(
v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
)
f(v)dv (C.34)
The total expected revenue from all bidders is n times the above.
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